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Comparative Analysis of Human Rights Violations under Military Rule in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay

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Beginning with the coup in Brazil in 1964, a set of military regimes emerged in the most developed nations of South America that held power for most of the 1970s and into the 1980s. These regimes attracted considerable academic interest, particularly after Guillermo O'Donnell published his controversial theory concerning their emergence.[1] During the 1970s, it was important that the attention of scholars be focused upon the similarities among these regimes so that their surprisingly concurrent emergence could be understood. As most of these authoritarian military regimes have given way to civilian democratic governments that must now deal with the legacy of military rule, it is more important that the differences among the regimes be examined.[2]

One commonly noted similarity among the military regimes of Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay is that they were all highly repressive. In fact, the employment of governmental repression to "exclude" the popular sectors from political participation was one of the key policies that characterized these military regimes.[3] Thus an analysis of the differences in the governmental repression employed by each of these regimes offers an effective way to analyze the differences among them. In this study, the differences in the governmental repression of the regimes are analyzed at the most basic level through an examination of the quantitative variation in the levels of the repression in terms of its human consequences.

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[1] Guillermo O'Donnell, *Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973).

The year 1973 was also marked by the establishment of military regimes in Chile and Uruguay, which broke long traditions of democratic politics and, no doubt, contributed to the surge of scholarly interest in these regimes.

[2] The military regimes examined include Argentina (1966–73 and 1976–83), Brazil (1964–85), Chile (1973–present), and Uruguay (1973–84).

[3] O'Donnell, *Modernization*, p. 54; and Robert R. Kaufman, "Industrial Change and Authoritarian Rule," in *The New Authoritarianism in Latin America*, David Collier, ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 187–189.

The comparison of the levels of repression is carried out as follows. First, I take up the difficulties encountered in cross-country comparisons of repression. The problems in finding accurate and usable data and in presenting those findings are discussed. Then I explain the methodology used to develop my comparisons. The repression of each of the regimes is then described in the following order: Argentina (1976), Chile, Uruguay, Brazil, and Argentina (1966). This reverse chronological order allows the most severe cases of repression for which the best data are available to be analyzed first. Finally, a general comparison of the levels of repression is made.

Problems in Comparing Levels of Repression

The Data

In defending its reluctance to "compare and contrast human rights records of different countries or successive regimes,"[4] Amnesty International (AI) mentions several problems with the collection of human rights data for cross-country comparisons. First, data on governmental repression are not something that governments are generally interested in reporting accurately. Government secrecy and open opposition to the work of those who seek to collect repression data are major obstacles in the way of establishing a reliable base for comparison. AI also claims that prisoners are subjected to widely differing forms of abuse, in different situations, and with different effects upon the victims, their families, and the community. "This fact," claims AI, "would render any statistical or other general comparison meaningless as a real measure of the impact of human rights abuses."[5]

A more significant problem is the way that AI, with its access to human rights data and its reputation for objectivity, nevertheless, stands as an obstacle to the collection of data for comparison due to its perspective on the use of such data. For example, AI, in the same report referred to above, claims that the use of human rights data for comparative purposes is subject to "political manipulation and misuse," and is a "disservice to human rights," having "nothing to do with helping victims."[6] This attitude creates what Christopher Mitchell and his colleagues describe as an "anti-social

[4] *AI Report 1984*, p. 4.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Ibid.

science bias" in AI's reporting of data on human rights abuses.[7] In describing this bias, Mitchell claims that

> AI has consciously reported its findings in such a way that social science reconstruction of yearly reports could not yield a document that would be comparative across countries within a single year or by country across years. The organization believes not only that it is impossible to create such accurate reporting but that to do so would be politically unwise.[8]

Though Mitchell and his associates recognize this problem, they conclude in their article, which evaluates the existing data base for state repression, that AI is the best available source.[9] This conclusion is indicative of the difficulty in finding data that can be used to compare the levels of repression among regimes.

The second observation of AI was that the differences in the forms of abuse, the situations, and the effects of the repression would make it difficult to measure the impact of the repression. Though this statement is correct, it is no reason to abandon all efforts to make cross-country comparisons. Since governmental repression is a complex concept, it can be understood only through a detailed historical analysis of the situation in which it was employed. Any such analysis, however, must have as a starting point a good base of quantitative repression data on each of the regimes to be compared.

Presentation of the Data

Scholars deal with the problems of the accuracy of the data and the complexity of the concept of governmental repression in various ways as they present their findings on repression. One approach is to merely base the comparisons of the levels of repression on the opinions of experts. This cuts through all the problems of accuracy since the results are merely opinions. The concept of repression can also be simplified as much as necessary since the underlying data need not be presented.

The problem is that the reader is asked to completely trust in the opinion of the expert. This clearly affects the reliability of the results since the opinions of experts can vary with the competence of those who are making the judgements and with their opinions regarding the regimes being compared. Aside from the problems of reliability, a more important problem in merely using the opinions of experts is that such a comparison generally tells the reader very little about the individual cases of repression. There are no tables to be analyzed nor statistics to be compared, merely an opinion to be accepted.

Another common approach in making cross-country comparisons of repression is to use some kind of an index. With a repression index, each of the regimes to be compared is given a score for various aspects of its repression, and the scores for each characteristic are totaled to produce a single numerical measure by which the repression of each of the regimes can be compared. The primary advantage of such an index is that it simplifies the complex concept of governmental repression by breaking it down into a set of measurable components which are quantified and converted into one numerical measure for comparative purposes. This approach is particularly practical when many very diverse regimes are being compared.

There is a certain price that must be paid, however, for the convenience of an index. The principal problem is that it puts distance between the reader and the actual underlying characteristics of the cases of repression being compared. This gives the scholar using the index a great deal of freedom with respect to the utilization of the data, how the figures from the data are scored within each category, and how the scores within each category are weighed in arriving at the final index measure. This idea is demonstrated by the fact that the data upon which the indexes are based are generally excluded completely by the scholars who use such indexes.[10] All that the reader is given is a reference to the general sources used and a basic explanation of how the scoring was done. Once again, the reader is asked to trust the opinion of the indexer. In essence, an index is merely a more complex and quantitative way to use the opinions of experts.

An additional problem lies in the vagueness of indexes. While an index helps to simplify the complicated concept of governmental repression, repression can be simplified to the point that it loses most of its meaning. In their comparison of the repression of twenty Latin American countries from 1950 to 1969, Ernest Duff and John McCamant give each country yearly scores of between "0" and "4" in the following four categories:

1. suspension of constitutional guarantees;
2. arrests, exiles, and executions;
3. restrictions on the organization of political parties; and
4. censorship of the media.[11]

It is clear that with a vast category like "arrests, exiles, and executions," a score between "0" and "4" tells the reader very little about what occurred during each regime. One

[7] Christopher Mitchell, Michael Stohl, David Carleton, and George A. Lopez, "State Terrorism: Issues of Concept and Measurement," in *Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research*, Michael Stohl and George A. Lopez, eds. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1986), p. 22.

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] The well-known repression index of Ernest Duff and John McCamant, found in *Violence and Repression in Latin America* (New York: The Free Press, 1976), is a good example. See also David Pion-Berlin, "The Political Economy of State Repression in Argentina," in *The State as Terrorist*, Michael Stohl and George Lopez, eds. (New York: Greenwood Press, 1984), pp. 99–122.

[11] Duff and McCamant, *Violence and Repression*, p. 26.

point in a sixteen point total could represent the difference between 10,000 people disappearing and a few cases of assassination by "unofficial" groups.[12]

Again, the most important problem with using an index for repression is that it tells the reader very little about the individual cases of repression aside from the position of a particular regime in relation to the others in the opinion of the indexer. In reality, both expert opinions and indexes obscure the main problems in making cross-country comparisons of repression.

The Approach of This Comparative Analysis

The main objective of the following analysis is to simply identify the underlying numbers that characterize each case of repression. This is done by examining the estimates available for certain key categories of repression and by evaluating those numbers in the light of other available evidence in order to arrive at reasonable estimates for those key characteristics of repression. In other words, the problem of the reliability of the underlying data is dealt with by confronting the problem head-on rather than by trying to hide the problem with sophisticated presentation techniques.

The problem connected with the complexity of the concept of governmental repression is quite significant and hard to avoid. We are fortunate that the present comparison involves a small number of highly comparable regimes. Since each regime employed a high level of repression, the concept of repression can be simplified by focusing on only its most extreme aspects. Using the Duff and McCamant index as a model, only the category of "arrests, exiles, and executions" will be examined, while it will be assumed that similarly high levels of the other less severe forms of repression measured by Duff and McCamant existed in each regime. Thus this comparison highlights just a few easily quantifiable measures of governmental repression and focuses on those measures that are most commonly identified with governmental repression.

More precisely, the categories of repression examined include:

1. the number of deaths;
2. the population of long-term political prisoners at the height of the repression;
3. the cumulative population of political prisoners; and
4. the number of political exiles.

Deaths include both executions and disappearances of those who were arrested by government forces, excluding deaths due to natural causes or accidents. Long-term political prisoners are those who were held by the government for a significant period of time (which I have established as one month), during the height of the repression. Where there were significant variations in the terms of imprisonment, those differences are discussed. The cumulative population of political prisoners is all those who were detained for at least 24 hours during the course of the repression. Finally, exiles are the total number of those who left the country as a direct or indirect result of the repression.

The following analysis reviews country by country the available data to intelligently estimate the number of arrests, exiles, and executions that resulted in each case of repression. The years for which the data are examined vary with each regime. I attempt, however, to describe the repression of each regime during its peak. This stipulation is only important for Brazil and Chile where repression was applied in two clearly distinguishable waves. The milder wave of repression for each regime is mentioned but not analyzed in great detail.[13]

Following the country reviews, the levels of repression for each of the regimes are compared. First, the data are adjusted to reflect the vastly different populations being considered.[14] The adjusted repression figures are then considered in comparing two general aspects of the repression of the regimes, the intensity and the extent of repression. In simple terms, the extent of repression deals with the gross number of individuals affected by repression, while intensity refers to the manner in which they were affected.[15] Each regime is ranked as high, intermediate, or low in terms of the extent and intensity of repression. To determine the intensity, the number of deaths and long-term imprisonments is considered, with greater weight given to deaths. To determine the extent of repression, all of the categories are considered, with more weight going to the more extreme categories since the effective range of that repression is greater. Qualitative aspects of the different cases are also evaluated in making the rankings in terms of the comparative extent and intensity of the repression.

[12] Ibid., p. 33.

[13] The waves of milder repression include the post-coup repression in Brazil before the regime was hardened by Institutional Act No. 5 in late 1968 and Chilean repression in response to the popular demonstrations of the early 1980s.

[14] The figures are adjusted using the population of Argentina as a base for comparison. Using rough population estimates of 25 million for Argentina, 100 million for Brazil, 10 million for Chile, and 2.5 million for Uruguay, the repression figures are adjusted by multiplying them by the following numbers: 1.0 (for both Argentine regimes), .25 (for Brazil), 2.50 (for Chile), and 10.0 (for Uruguay).

[15] This characterization conflicts with the way these terms are set forth by Mitchell and his associates. See Mitchell et al., "State Terrorism," pp. 14–17.

I use these terms because I believe they more clearly describe the aspects of governmental repression examined here. Mitchell uses the term "intensity" in the quantitative sense that I use the term "extent." The dictionary definition of "intensity" makes the term a qualitative one implying a change in degree rather than a quantitative term implying a change in number.

Sources for the Estimates

The main sources of the data analyzed are reports of Amnesty International, U.S. House and Senate subcommittee hearings held to investigate the human rights records of each of these regimes, and the U.S. State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices. For the repression of the 1976 Argentine regime, the report of the Argentine Commission on the Disappearance of Persons was closely reviewed. Finally, the opinions of academic experts were considered where available.

The U.S. House and Senate hearings are of great importance since they present the findings of several governmental, international, and human rights organizations. This, in essence, is what the AI reports are, although the very limited AI annual reports (and even the more extensive special reports) do not reveal all the information that AI is using to arrive at its conclusions. The State Department reports are generally good, but they can be biased at times to favor or disfavor different countries in accord with more general State Department policy.[16] Even where the State Department figures are somewhat biased, those figures can generally be used as upper or lower limits in conjunction with other less politically tainted data.

The estimates discussed in each of the regime sections to follow are arranged in tables that appear at the end of each of those sections. Complete citations are found in the source notes for the tables and will not be given for the estimates as they are discussed in the text of the regime sections.

The tables, however, contain only those estimates that fall neatly into the four categories of repression examined here (deaths, long-term imprisonments, cumulative population of prisoners, and exiles). For example, the number of bodies seen at a Santiago morgue would not be included in the tables since it is not an overall estimate of repression deaths. Qualitative assertions regarding the cases of repression (i.e., descriptions of the nature of the torture or imprisonment) are excluded from the tables, but complete citations are given in the text.

Data Analysis

Argentina 1976

It is advantageous to begin with the 1976 Argentine regime for several reasons. First, the Argentine repression, with the "desaparecidos" it produced, is the most notorious of the cases examined here. More importantly, it is the regime for which the best data on the consequences of repression are available. In the Argentine case, a special commission, the Argentine Commission on the Disappearance of Persons (CONADEP), was formed to investigate repression once democracy had been restored in 1983. In an unprecedented display of governmental cooperation and concern for detail, the commission produced 50,000 pages of evidence to document the repression.[17]

According to the CONADEP report, human rights were violated in a systematic manner by the government.[18] Though the repression was directed in a decentralized manner, it was well organized. The highest ranking military officials are reported to have gathered before the coup of March 24, 1976, to plan how the war against subversion would be conducted,[19] and the disappearances began even before the coup. Jacobo Timerman, one of the most well known victims of the repression, describes the general organization of the repressive forces.

> The military leaders hastily organized their personal domains, each one becoming a war lord in the zone under his control. Whereupon the chaotic, anarchic, irrational terrorism of the left and Fascist death squads gave way to intrinsic, systematized, rationally planned terrorism. Each officer of a military region had his own prisoners, prisons, and form of justice and even the central power was unable to request the freedom of an individual.[20]

During the first stage of repression, the names of the subversives to be abducted were provided by centralized intelligence services run by each branch of the armed forces and some other government ministries.[21] The local forces were the small task forces that carried out the abductions and the 340 secret prisons where the subversives were held. As additional names were extracted under torture at the local level, the repression took on an even more localized and terrifying character. As John Simpson and Jana Bennett explain:

> What happened in Argentina was worse, in every way, than what happened in Chile after Pinochet's coup. A distinctive quality of the Argentine repression was the strong element of pure slapdash about it. You could be kidnapped and tortured and most likely murdered, simply because you had the same

[16] I base this conclusion specifically on an analysis of the hearing materials on the repression of the Uruguayan regime. The State Department estimates are clearly in conflict with a number of other reasonable and reliable reports, which in my opinion indicates a bias.

Christopher Mitchell, in his analysis of the data base for state repression, comes to the same general conclusion regarding the State Department reports (Mitchell et al., "State Terrorism," p. 22).

[17] Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, *Nunca Más: Informe de la CONADEP* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1984), p. 7.

[18] Ibid., p. 15.

[19] John Simpson and Jana Bennett, *The Disappeared: Voices from a Secret War* (London: Robson Books, 1985), p. 76.

[20] Jacobo Timerman, *Prisoner without a Name, Cell without a Number* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), pp. 26–27.

[21] Simpson and Bennett, *The Disappeared*, p. 77.

surname as someone the military murder gangs were looking for, you drove the same kind of car, or you lived nearby and might know something.[22]

Based upon depositions received by the commission, the number of those who were abducted by the armed forces and subsequently disappeared was 8,960. Of the 8,960 documented cases of disappearance, 1,300 were seen alive in detention centers,[23] and in most cases family members witnessed the abduction.[24] Disappearance in the Argentine case was equivalent to death. This was especially true in light of the military decree of 1979 which reduced to a few months the time that had to pass before a missing person could be presumed dead.[25]

According to CONADEP, the 8,960 figure could be subject to two types of errors. First, it could be overstated with respect to those who have reappeared but who failed to inform the proper authorities. Second, the commission stated that many depositions were not filed "either because the victims had no relatives or because the relatives were frightened or lived a long distance from any urban center."[26] Obviously, the error due to the second factor would be greater than that due to the first. Simpson and Bennett claim that the Argentine commission's estimate of the total number of those who have disappeared is 11,000.[27]

The majority of those who disappeared were abducted between 1976 and 1979. Six hundred were kidnapped before the military coup of March 24, 1976.[28] The number of persons who disappeared per year is shown in Table 3500. Of those who disappeared 70 percent were males and 30 percent females.[29] Breakdowns by age and occupation are shown in Tables 3501 and 3502.

Table 3500

ARGENTINA DISAPPEARANCES, 1976–80

Year	Total
1976	4,166
1977	3,136
1978	1,075
1979	179
1980	89

SOURCE: Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, *Nunca Más: Informe de la CONADEP* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1984), p. 298. Yearly totals were calculated from the percentage graphs in the CONADEP report.

[22] Ibid., p. 15.
[23] CONADEP, *Nunca Más*, p. 293.
[24] Ibid., p. 17.
[25] Peter H. Smith, "Argentina: The Uncertain Warriors," *Current History* 78 (February 1980), p. 62.
[26] CONADEP, *Nunca Más*, p. 293.
[27] In my review of the CONADEP report, I did not find any such estimate.
[28] CONADEP, *Nunca Más*, p. 16.
[29] Ibid.

Table 3501

ARGENTINA DISAPPEARANCES BY AGE, 1976–83

(%)

Age (Years)	%
Under 5 years	.82
6–10	.25
11–15	.58
16–20	10.61
21–25	32.62
26–30	25.90
31–35	12.26
36–40	6.73
41–45	3.40
46–50	2.41
51–55	1.84
56–60	1.17
61–65	.75
66–70	.41
Over 70 years	.25
Total	100.0

SOURCE: Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, *Nunca Más: Informe de la CONADEP* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1984), p. 294.

Table 3502

ARGENTINA DISAPPEARANCES BY OCCUPATION, 1976–83

(%)

Category	%
Blue-collar Workers	30.2
Students	21.0
White-collar Workers	17.9
Professionals	10.7
Teachers	5.7
Self-Employed and Others	5.0
Homemakers	3.8
Military Personnel	2.5
Reporters	1.6
Actors, Artists, etc.	1.3
Priests and Nuns	.3

SOURCE: Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, *Nunca Más: Informe de la CONADEP* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria, 1984), p. 296.

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Estimates of the number of people who disappeared which were made by various human rights organizations while the military was still in power were fairly accurate. In 1977, Amnesty International made a cautious estimate that between 2,000 and 10,000 disappeared. By 1981, a list of 6,800 people were registered as disappeared with the Argentine Permanent Assembly of Human Rights. In its January 1981 report, the United Nations working group on enforced or involuntary disappearance indicated that it had information on between 7,000 and 9,000 cases of disappearance in Argentina. In 1978 AI stated that the most common estimate of Argentine human rights organizations was 15,000. The State Department report of 1979 lists the estimate of the New York City Bar Association as 10,000.

Despite these fairly accurate estimates, many scholars cite figures as high as 20,000 and 30,000 disappeared. After the publication of the CONADEP report in 1984, most scholars adjusted their figures, but some continue to cite the higher numbers.[30] Taking into account the possible problems with the commission's figure on documented cases of disappearance, the figure given by Simpson and Bennett of 11,000 is probably high. A figure of 10,000, adding more than one thousand to the commission's figure, probably more than accounts for those cases in which no deposition was filed. This is especially true considering the great amount of publicity that the commission's investigations received throughout Argentina.[31]

The numbers for political prisoners are a bit more difficult to estimate. There was more public concern about the unknown fate of the disappeared, than about making an accurate accounting of those who had been imprisoned but survived. According to the CONADEP report, the total number of prisoners at the disposition of the National Executive (Poder Ejecutivo Nacional, PEN) was 8,625. These persons were detained under the powers granted to the executive under state of siege rules, most without ever having a trial or formal charges brought against them. Before the March 24 coup, 3,443 were in custody; and 5,182 were put at the disposal of the National Executive after that date. Of the latter figure, 3,485 were detained during the nine months remaining in 1976 after the coup and 1,264 more in 1977.[32] These numbers represent legalized arrests with detention orders being submitted to the Argentine legal system. This often occurred when the military, after having abducted a person, decided not to kill the person but to legalize the arrest instead.

The commission report lists the number of years that each of the PEN detainees was held at the disposition of the National Executive: 4,029 were detained less than 1 year, 2,229 were detained 1–3 years, 1,172 were detained 3–5 years, 668 were detained 5–7 years, and 431 were detained 7–9 years.[33] Of these prisoners, 157 passed into the category of disappeared after their release was ordered by the National Executive, and 20 disappeared after the courts had ordered their release.[34]

These figures, of course, only include legalized arrests. Many other individuals were abducted and then released without their arrest ever having been legalized. AI estimated in 1977 that there was a total of 6,000 political prisoners in Argentina. The AI report of 1979 estimates that there were 3,000 to 4,000 at the disposition of the National Executive, while the government only admitted holding 2,700, detained for committing crimes of subversion. According to AI, the government reported holding 980 prisoners on March 25, 1981. Doubt was expressed as to the accuracy of this number.[35] The State Department estimated at the end of 1981 that those detained other than common criminals totaled 1,050.

Thus it appears that the government's figures for PEN prisoners understate the total number of political prisoners somewhat. Nevertheless, the government figure of 8,625 is a good base figure for any estimate of the cumulative population of political prisoners in Argentina. All of those who disappeared must have been political prisoners at one time; thus 10,000 should be added to the total. Finally, those who were arrested and survived, but whose detention was never officially recognized, would bring the cumulative total up to

[30] Probably the most incredible estimate of all is that made by Nick Caistor of 8,000 to 20,000 disappearances. The amazing thing about this estimate is that it appears in the Foreword to the English translation of the CONADEP Report (Nick Caistor, "Foreword," in *Nunca Más: A Report by Argentina's National Commission on Disappeared People* [London: Faber & Faber, 1986], p. xiv).

Donald Hodges claims that between March 1976 and the end of 1978, "the Military Process was responsible for some 30,000 disappearances, at least four times as many cases of torture, and another 10,000 assassinations carried out by the forces of repression" (Hodges, *Argentina 1943–1987: The National Revolution and the Resistance* [Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988], p. 199).

David Rock made a high estimate in the 1984 edition of his book *Argentina*. In the 1987 edition, however, he revised the estimate to "more than 10,000" (Rock, *Argentina 1516–1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín* [Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987], p. 368).

[31] I base this opinion on my own observations within Argentina during the first two years of the Alfonsín administration. The publicity that was given the Commission's quest for depositions was such that some friend or relative would have come forward in most cases. Also, the fear that the military would return to power was not great, at least not in the first jubilant year of Alfonsín's term. Finally, various human rights groups, such as the Argentine Permanent Assembly of Human Rights and the Madres de la Plaza de Mayo, had laid a very good foundation for the work of the CONADEP commission. This made it easier for people to come forward once the Commission was established.

[32] CONADEP, *Nunca Más*, p. 408.

[33] Ibid., p. 409.

[34] Ibid.

[35] *AI Report 1981*, p. 111.

about 30,000. This figure is higher than the estimate of 20,000 by Simpson and Bennett, but their estimate probably does not include those who disappeared.

As for the number of long-term political prisoners held at any point in time, the AI estimate of 3,000 to 4,000 would be good, but the estimate was for 1979, after the most intense repression was over. As with the cumulative total, the disappeared should be counted here because of the fairly long-term nature of the confinement before the people were actually eliminated. With 340 secret prisons functioning in Argentina at the height of the repression, and given the numbers already established for those who disappeared and the cumulative prisoner population, an estimate of 7,000 for the population of long-term political prisoners is reasonable though perhaps a bit conservative.

Escape abroad by persons sought or held by the Argentine military was complicated by two problems. First, since Argentina was the last of the neighboring countries to go to military control, there was no close place left for the refugees to go by 1976. Second, the Institutional Act of March 24, 1976, suspended the right of option to leave the country, and a complex set of procedures was instituted to gain permission to leave.[36] Simpson and Bennett estimate that those who fled the country numbered two million. In light of the obstacles to leaving the country, their estimate is very high, although I find no other estimates to support or refute it. The lack of treatment of this issue by human rights groups is probably indicative of the insignificance of the problem. Because of the lack of information, I will make no firm estimate of the number of exiles; I will merely use the number of 500,000 for the sake of comparison with the other regimes.

In conclusion, a few remarks must be made as to the qualitative nature of Argentine repression. The horrors of the secret prisons are probably the most eloquent testimony to its extreme intensity. As the CONADEP report explains:

> To enter into one of these prisons meant in all cases to CEASE TO EXIST. There the identities of the prisoners were destroyed, their time/space relationships altered, and their bodies and minds tormented more than can be imagined.[37]

Constantly hooded, these prisoners passed through months of brutal torture to have their lives ended in mysterious disappearance, many being dropped alive from airplanes into the ocean.[38] Torture is always horrible, but the situation in the 340 Argentine secret prisons went beyond what can be imagined. Because there was no need to produce a live prisoner at the end of the interrogation, the torturers could do whatever they wanted, and they had all the time in the world to do it.

[36] CONADEP, *Nunca Más*, pp. 415–416.

[37] Ibid., p. 55.

[38] Ibid., pp. 235–236.

Table 3503

ESTIMATES OF REPRESSION OF THE 1976 ARGENTINE REGIME, 1976–83

Category of Repression	Source	Date of Estimate	Estimate
Deaths			
Disappearances			
Government Sources	1. Commission on Disappearance of Persons	1984	8,960+
	2. Commission on Disappearance of Persons	1984	11,000
Human Rights Sources	3. Amnesty International	1977	2,000–10,000
	4. Argentine Human Rights Groups	1978	15,000
	5. New York Bar Association	1979	10,000
	6. Argentine Permanent Assembly for Human Rights	1981	6,800+
	7. United Nations Working Group on Disappearances	1981	7,000–9,000
Academic Sources	8. Nick Caistor	1986	8,000–20,000
	9. David Rock	1987	10,000+
	10. Donald Hodges	1988	40,000
	11. Peter King	1989	10,000
Political Prisoners			
Number Detained at a Certain Point in Time			
Government Sources	12. Argentine Government	1979	2,700
	13. Argentine Government	1981	980
	14. U.S. State Department	1981	1,050
Human Rights Sources	15. Amnesty International	1977	6,000
	16. Amnesty International	1979	3,000–4,000
Academic Source	17. Peter King	1989	7,000

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Table 3503 (Continued)

ESTIMATES OF REPRESSION OF THE 1976 ARGENTINE REGIME, 1976–83

Category of Repression	Source	Date of Estimate	Estimate
Political Prisoners (Continued)			
Cumulative Total Detained			
Government Source	18. Argentine Government	1983	8,625
Academic Sources	19. John Simpson and Jana Bennett	1985	20,000 (+11,000)
	20. Peter King	1989	30,000
Exiles			
Academic Sources	21. John Simpson and Jana Bennett	1985	2,000,000
	22. Peter King	1989	500,000

SOURCES:

1. Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, *Nunca Más: Informe de la CONADEP* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Universitaria de Buenos Aires, 1984), p. 16.
2. John Simpson and Jana Bennett, *The Disappeared: Voices from a Secret War* (London: Robson Books, 1985), p. 7.
3. Amnesty International, *Amnesty International Report 1977* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1977), p. 120; Amnesty International annual reports subsequently cited as *AI Report 19–* .
4. *AI Report 1978*, p. 99.
5. U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1979* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 239; State Department annual reports subsequently cited as *State Dept. Report 19–* .
6. *AI Report 1981*, p. 108.
7. Ibid.
8. Argentina, Comisión Nacional sobre la Desaparición de Personas, *Nunca Más: A Report by Argentina's National Commission on Disappeared People* (London: Faber, 1986), p. xiv.
9. David Rock, *Argentina 1516–1987: From Spanish Colonization to Alfonsín* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), p. 368.
10. Donald C. Hodges, *Argentina, 1943–1987: The National Revolution and the Resistance* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1988), p. 199.
11. See Table 3507.
12. *AI Report 1979*, p. 49.
13. *AI Report 1981*, p. 111.
14. *State Dept. Report 1981*, p. 330.
15. *AI Report 1977*, p. 118.
16. *AI Report 1979*, p. 49.
17. See Table 3507.
18. CONADEP, *Nunca Más*, p. 408.
19. Simpson and Bennett, *The Disappeared*, p. 7.
20. See Table 3507.
21. Simpson and Bennett, *The Disappeared*, p. 7.
22. See Table 3507.

Chile

Moving from Argentina to Chile, we go from the case in which the best data on repression are available to the case for which the data are the least solidly established. One reason for this is that the Chilean military is still in control of the country. Thus there can be no wide-scale investigations as in the Argentine case. The more important reason for the lack of reliable data, however, is the nature of the repression itself. The most extreme Chilean repression took place in the first days after the 1973 coup that ousted socialist president Salvador Allende. The general societal confusion and virtual civil war that followed were not conducive to the compilation of accurate data.

The 1974 Amnesty International special report on Chile discussed in some detail the various figures for the immediate post-coup death toll. The discussion starts with a statement that the estimates ranged from 5,000 to 30,000.[39] Many analysts go no further and merely cite that figure as the authoritative AI estimate. While claiming that "more than 2,000 are known to have been executed in custody between September 11 and the end of December [1973]," the only other claim that AI makes is that "a vast but unknown number of people have lost their lives in Chile since the military coup."[40]

The various figures cited in the 1974 report give some clues as to what the actual number of deaths as a result of the coup might be. The official figure given by the Chilean government at the end of March 1974 was 3,500.[41] On October 24, 1973, the day that the government ordered an end to summary executions, a total of 81 executions were reported by official sources.[42] A later report from official sources would probably cite a higher figure since the trip of General Stark to five northern Chilean towns alone accounted for an estimated 68 executions.[43] The investigations of *Newsweek* correspondent John Barnes indicated that 2,796 corpses were processed by the Santiago morgue in the first two weeks after September 11.[44] There was some question, however, as to whether or not that figure was for the whole year up to that point.[45] Finally, the Chicago Commission of Inquiry pointed out that in 42 separate newspaper reports up to December 12, 1973, a total of 410 persons were listed as shot while trying to escape.[46]

The U.S. House and Senate hearings on the human rights situation in Chile add a few more numbers to those given by the AI report. Adam and Patricia Garrett-Schesch, American graduate students studying in Chile at the time of the coup, who were held in the National Stadium in Santiago from September 14 to September 21, 1973, claim to have witnessed the execution of 400 to 500 people who were reportedly taken out in groups of 10 to 20 and shot.[47] This report is significant since the National Stadium is known to have been the "principal detention center following September 11."[48] Also, in a House Subcommittee hearing, the Deputy Assistant for Inter-American Affairs of the Department of State, Harry W. Shlaudeman, rejected the estimate of 50,000 deaths given in an earlier testimony and asserted that "most estimates we have seen by responsible observers, including the press generally, have run around 2,000."[49] This statement is supported by newspaper reports in the months following the coup. The estimate of the *New York Times* was 2,000 in the first few months after the coup. Jonathan Kandell, in an article written a year after the coup, revises this estimate to a figure of "more than 2,500."[50]

Most of those who discuss the Chilean repression with any degree of expertise, not merely repeating the range of estimates cited in the 1974 AI report, will cut off the upper range of those estimates, putting the death toll at between 5,000 and 15,000 persons. The estimates by various scholars are the following: between 7,000 and 10,000 by Laurence Birns; not more than 5,000 by Richard Gott; and between 2,000 and 3,000 by Suzanne Labin.

With the information given by the AI report, the U.S. House and Senate Subcommittee hearings, and academic experts, a reasonable estimate can be made of the number of people who died in Chile after the September 1973 coup. First, the higher estimates should be ruled out. As shown in the review of Argentine repression, the death of 10,000 people is not easily hidden by a government even when the

[39] Amnesty International, *Chile: An Amnesty International Report* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1974), p. 31.

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid. The figure of 3,500 that AI gives as the official figure of the Chilean government is not the only figure cited as the government figure nor is it necessarily the most reliable one. No particular official source is cited for the 3,500 figure. The same AI report also refers to a number given by the Institute of Medical Law on October 4, 1973, of 476 deaths, of which 14 were soldiers. In the report of Frank C. Newman on the November 1973 AI mission to Chile, officers at the Ministry of Defense are reported to have claimed that 994 died as a result of combat.

In his *New York Times* article (October 12, 1973), Jonathan Kandell cites two other government estimates. The article states that the Junta conceded that 513 had died since September 11 with 36 officially reported executions. Kandell also cites one ranking government official as stating that unpublished reports from military garrisons around the country document 841 civilian deaths and 430 deaths of soldiers and police up to October 6.

[42] Ibid.

[43] Ibid., p. 32.

[44] Ibid.

[45] Jonathan Kandell ("The Death Toll in Chile") quotes the director of the Santiago morgue, Dr. Oscar Novoa, as claiming that the total of 2,796 corpses was the number processed from January 1 to September 21 (see U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings, *Refugee and Humanitarian Problems in Chile*, Part I, p. 65).

[46] AI, *Chile: An AI Report*, p. 32.

[47] U.S. Senate, Hearings, *Refugee and Humanitarian Problems*, Part I, p. 13: Testimony of Adam and Patricia Garrett-Schesch, September 28, 1973.

[48] Ibid., Part II, July 23, 1974, p. 82: Responses of the State Department to questions submitted by Senator Edward Kennedy.

[49] U.S. House, Hearings, *Human Rights in Chile*, Part I, p. 120: Testimony heard on June 11, 1974.

[50] Kandell, "The Death Toll in Chile."

executions are carried out in secret over a period of years. If 10,000 or 20,000 or 30,000 had died in Chile, those estimates would not be difficult to confirm. Another important fact is that human rights groups were permitted to enter Chile in the first few months after the coup.[51] Not only does this indicate something about General Pinochet's opinion of the mildness or severity of the repression, but these groups should have been able to document more evidence of massive executions, if, in fact, such executions occurred.

The mission of General Stark to northern Chile, which resulted in 68 executions and which was carried out in order to intensify the repression in that area,[52] indicates that Santiago was the main center of post-coup repression.[53] There were reports of 2,796 bodies in the Santiago morgue, 400 to 500 executions at the National Stadium, 410 people shot while trying to escape, one official government figure of 3,500 deaths, and an assertion by AI that more than 2,000 had been executed. Even if all the eyewitness accounts were correct, a synthesis of the information would involve a considerable amount of double counting. In light of the numbers that were circulating in the months after the coup, a lower limit for the estimate would be the State Department figure of 2,000 and the upper limit would be about 5,000. The official government figure of 3,500 reported by AI would be a good intermediate-range estimate for the number of immediate post-coup deaths in Chile.

In order to get the total number of deaths that occurred as a result of the Chilean repression, the number of those who disappeared must be added to the post-coup death figure cited above. In 1978, figures as high as 15,000 were cited by the media for those who had disappeared in Chile since the coup of 1973. AI, at the same time, gave what appeared to be a conservative estimate of 1,500. However, the number of disappeared cited by Vicariate of Solidarity, the most important Chilean human rights organization, was only 651. In its 1979 report, AI revised its estimate to agree with that of the Chilean organization with no explanation.[54] The State Department report for 1980 put the number of disappeared at 635, citing the most recent Vicariate of Solidarity estimate.

It should be noted that many of the people presumed to have disappeared were probably killed in the period immediately following the coup and not accounted for. Thus there is some danger of double counting in combining the post-coup death toll and disappearance figures. Also, there is a higher chance in this case than in the Argentine case that those listed as disappeared merely fled to another country, because in 1973 Argentina still provided a convenient place of refuge. In fact, Labin, based on her own investigations, cites a few cases where precisely that had occurred.[55] In light of these factors, the estimates are probably a bit overstated. At any rate, it is clear that disappearances were used much less in the Chilean case as an informal means of execution than in the Argentine case. The figure of 500 for disappearances should be added to the estimate of the immediate post-coup death toll to arrive at a figure of 4,000 for the total estimated loss of life as a result of the Chilean repression.

Chile adopted a distinctive pattern of repression. The Chilean death toll (whether 2,000, 3,500, 5,000, or 10,000) was less significant than the deaths in the Argentine case because most of the deaths in the Chilean case occurred in the midst of an active armed struggle during a short period of time immediately after the coup. There can be much debate as to the significance of the armed resistance, but the fact remains that there were at least some centers of active armed resistance (i.e., the Presidential Palace of La Moneda, the Ex-Sumar factory, and the "La Legua" barrio);[56] there was a great deal of sniper activity even after the centers of resistance were destroyed;[57] and the Revolutionary Leftist Movement (MIR) was underground at the time of the coup. In fact, Labin claims that 30 percent of the 2,000 to 3,000 estimated post-coup deaths occurred among regular troops and the police.[58] The bottom line is that it is doubtful that much of the immediate post-coup Chilean death toll can even be referred to as repression. According to the December 1974 report of the OAS Inter-American Commission for Human Rights, the deaths occurring in the first days after the coup were not considered violations of human rights.[59]

As with the death toll figures, there is a wide variety of estimates for the number of political prisoners in Chile. In November 1973, Foreign Minister Ismael Huerta Díaz gave the figure 10,900 for the cumulative total of prisoners. The Minister referred to what appeared to be an official record of prisoners held by the government.[60] There is little doubt,

[51] In the second week of October, the secretary generals of the International Association of Democratic Jurists, the International Federation of Human Rights, and the International Movement of Catholic Jurists visited Chile. (See U.S. Senate, Hearings, *Refugee and Humanitarian Problems*, p. 94; Marvine Howe, "Chile Is Accused of Rights Abuses," *New York Times*, October 14, 1973.) And in November 1973, a delegation from AI visited Chile. (See AI, *Chile: An AI Report*, p. 7.)

[52] These executions were documented by AI (AI, *Chile: An AI Report*, p. 32) and by the ICJ (U.S. House, Hearings, *Human Rights in Chile*, Part II, p. 54: "Final Report of Mission [of the ICJ] to Chile, April 1974, to Study the Legal System and the Protection of Human Rights."

[53] AI also claims that the repression in the North was "far milder" than elsewhere (AI, *Chile: An AI Report*, p. 32).

[54] *AI Report 1979*, p. 54.

[55] Suzanne Labin, *Chile: The Crime of Resistance* (Richmond, England: Foreign Affairs Publishing Company, 1982), p. 207.

[56] Samuel Chaukin, *The Storm Over Chile: The Junta Under Siege* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1985), pp. 169–173.

[57] Ian Roxborough, Philip O'Brien, and Jackie Roddick, *Chile: The State and Revolution* (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1977), p. 237.

[58] Labin, *The Crime of Resistance*, p. 200. Though this percentage may be high, it agrees generally with some of the government figures already cited (see note 41).

[59] U.S. House, Hearings, *Human Rights in Chile*, Part II, p. 94: "Report on the Status of Human Rights in Chile by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American States: Conclusions and Recommendations."

[60] *Chile: An AI Report*, p. 16.

however, that in the general confusion and with the massive numbers of people detained, it would have been impossible for the government to keep accurate records of prisoners even if it had wanted to do so. There were also reports of as many as 7,000 prisoners being held in the National Stadium of Santiago alone at the end of September.[61]

Chilean church sources estimated in 1974 that the cumulative total for those arrested, excluding those held for less than 24 hours, was between 45,000 and 50,000. The International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) estimated that 60,000 people had been held for more than 24 hours in the first six months after the coup and that about 95,000 had been arrested in the first 18 months. The estimate of the Chicago Commission was 80,000 detentions in the first six months, that figure possibly including shorter term detentions.

It is very hard to make a reliable estimate in the Chilean case because of the practice of short-term detentions for intimidation, especially against the members of the lower class settlements.[62] Though the estimates of the ICJ and the Chicago Commission are higher, I am inclined to accept the church sources cited by AI. The church groups were permanently within the country, while the delegations of the commissions only passed through for a few days.[63] In order to account for the short-term detentions in the *poblaciones*, 10,000 should be added to the church estimate of 50,000 to get a figure of 60,000 for the cumulative total of political prisoners in Chile. This figure, of course, does not consider the arrests taking place in the second wave of repression after 1978.[64]

More solid figures are available with respect to longer term political prisoners. According to the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, the government's figure for political prisoners in July 1974 was 5,500. The AI estimates were 6,000 to 7,000 in 1974, 5,000 to 6,000 in 1975, and fewer than 5,000 by April 1976. Church sources put the prisoner population in spring 1974 at 10,000. The ICJ estimated that there were 18,000 in custody at the end of 1973 and 9,000 to 10,000 prisoners by March 1974, 4,000 of the latter total being short-term detainees. Beginning in 1976, large numbers of prisoners were released; and by 1977, most of the prisoners previously held had been released as a result of a general amnesty.[65]

The estimate for the population of long-term political prisoners during the height of the repression should probably be somewhere between the AI and ICJ estimates for those in custody at the end of 1973. Since there is no way to know how many of these prisoners were short-term detainees, the numbers should be decreased. My estimate is 6,500 for the population of long-term political prisoners at the height of the Chilean repression.[66]

There was a great deal of torture of prisoners in Chile. Sixteen were reported to have died as a result of torture in the early days of the military regime.[67] It is also suspected that many of those who disappeared had died as a result of torture.[68] The 1976 AI report stated that "torture is still a systematic practice."[69] And, of course, torture remained a systematic practice in the second wave of repression with the State Department citing 100 reports of torture in 1980.[70]

Despite the general prevalence of torture, the practice in the Chilean case was not nearly as systematic or brutal as torture in the Argentine case. The percentage figures for arrests involving torture vary from 10–20 percent declared by Ralph Dungan, the former Ambassador to Chile,[71] to 50 percent according to the ICJ.[72] At any rate, it is clear that it was only with the later arrests that the repression became more systematic and more selectively applied.[73] In general, there are very few documented accounts of deaths as a result of torture and relatively few deaths at all are reported after the early days of the coup.

The number of political exiles is uncertain. AI estimated that there were approximately 10,000 Chilean exiles in Argentina and Peru in 1974.[74] The Inter-Governmental Committee for European Migration also reported to have moved 20,000 people out of the country by 1980.[75] Having no other estimates, I will double the figure given by the inter-government committee to account for those who left the country informally. Thus my estimate for Chilean exiles is 40,000. It should be noted, however, that this figure is very uncertain, and I give it mainly for comparative purposes.

[61] Ibid.

[62] According to the ICJ, 10,000 to 15,000 were arrested and held for 7 to 10 days in the raids on the *poblaciones* in mid-1974 to round up common criminals (U.S. House, Hearings, *Human Rights in Chile*, Part II, p. 64).

[63] The ICJ also gave figures for those detained at certain points in time which are high compared with the AI estimates. This leads me to believe that the ICJ figures for long-term imprisonments are also high.

[64] That repression lies beyond the scope of this analysis.

[65] *AI Report 1977*, p. 130.

[66] The AI figures are probably more reliable than the ICJ's figures. AI has more experience in making estimates and access to better data. Also, an AI delegation visited Chile in November 1973, while the ICJ delegation did not visit Chile until April 1974.

In light of this conclusion, the logical way to arrive at the estimate for long-term political prisoners would be to subtract short-term detentions from the AI figure. My estimate is higher than the result of such a calculation since the AI estimate is for May 1974 after the decrease in political prisoners.

[67] *AI Report 1974–75*, p. 40.

[68] *AI Report 1977*, p. 132.

[69] Ibid.

[70] *State Dept. Report 1980*, p. 368.

[71] U.S. Senate, Hearings, *Refugee and Humanitarian Problems*, p. 7: Testimony of Ralph Dungan, chancellor of higher education for the state of New Jersey, former ambassador to Chile, and member of a study mission to Chile; July 23, 1974.

[72] U.S. House, Hearings, *Human Rights in Chile*, Part II, p. 4: Testimony of Niall MacDermot, Secretary General of the ICJ, November 19, 1974.

[73] It was only in a few detention centers, such as Tejas Verde, that the torture was systematic and well organized in the early days of the regime (see AI, *Chile: An AI Report*, p. 59).

[74] *AI Report 1974–75*, p. 40.

[75] *State Dept. Report 1980*, p. 378.

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Table 3504

ESTIMATES OF REPRESSION OF THE CHILEAN REGIME, 1973–77

Category of Repression		Source	Date of Estimate	Estimate
Deaths				
Immediate Post-Coup Death Toll				
Government Sources	1.	Chilean Institute of Medical Law	10/4/73	476
	2.	Chilean Government	10/73	513
	3.	Chilean Government	10/73	1,217
	4.	Chilean Government	12/7/73	994
	5.	Chilean Government	3/74	3,500
	6.	U.S. State Department	6/11/74	2,000
Human Rights Sources	7.	Human Rights Organizations	1974	5,000–30,000
	8.	Amnesty International	1974	2,000+
Media Sources	9.	*New York Times*	10/12/73	2,000
	10.	*New York Times*	9/13/74	2,500+
Academic Sources	11.	Laurence Birns	1974	7,000–10,000
	12.	Richard Gott	1974	5,000 (or Less)
	13.	Suzanne Labin	1982	2,000–3,000
	14.	Peter King	1989	3,500
Disappearances				
Human Rights Sources	15.	Amnesty International	1978	1,500
	16.	Vicariate of Solidarity	1978	651
	17.	Amnesty International	1979	650
	18.	Vicariate of Solidarity	1980	635
Media and Academic Sources	19.	Media	1978	15,000
	20.	Peter King	1989	500
Political Prisoners				
Number Detained at a Certain Point in Time				
Government Source	21.	Chilean Government	7/74	5,500
Human Rights Sources	22.	International Commission of Jurists	12/29/73	18,000
	23.	Amnesty International	5/74	6,000–7,000
	24.	Chilean Church Groups	5/74	10,000
	25.	International Commission of Jurists	3/74	9,000–10,000
	26.	Amnesty International	1975	5,000–6,000
	27.	Amnesty International	4/76	Less than 5,000
Academic Source	28.	Peter King	1989	6,500
Cumulative Total Detained				
Government Source	29.	Chilean Government	11/73	10,900
Human Rights Sources	30.	International Commission of Jurists	3/74	65,000
	31.	Chicago Commission	3/74	80,000
	32.	Chilean Church Groups	1974	45,000–50,000
	33.	International Commission of Jurists	3/75	95,000
Academic Source	34.	Peter King	1989	60,000
Exiles				
Human Rights Sources	35.	Amnesty International	1974	10,000+
	36.	Inter-government Committee for European Migration	1980	20,000+
Academic Source	37.	Peter King	1989	40,000

SOURCES:

1. Amnesty International, *Chile: An Amnesty International Report* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1974), p. 31.
2. Jonathan Kandell, "The Death Toll in Chile Now Put at 2,000," *New York Times*, October 12, 1973; article reprinted in U.S. Congress, Senate, Hearings, *Refugee and Humanitarian Problems in Chile*, Part I, September 28, 1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 65.
3. Ibid.
4. Frank Newman (testimony), December 7, 1973, U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, *Human Rights in Chile*, Part I (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974).

Table 3504 (Continued)

ESTIMATES OF REPRESSION OF THE CHILEAN REGIME, 1973–77

Category of Repression	Source	Date of Estimate	Estimate

SOURCES: (Continued)

5. AI, *Chile*, p. 31.
6. Harry W. Shlaudeman (testimony), June 11, 1974, *Human Rights in Chile*, Part I, p. 120.
7. AI, *Chile*, p. 31.
8. Ibid.
9. Kandell, "The Death Toll," pp. 64–66;
10. Jonathan Kandell, "Chile's Junta a Year After: Unrelenting Dictatorship," *New York Times*, September 13, 1974; article reprinted in *Refugee and Humanitarian Problems*, Part II, p. 239.
11. Laurence Birns, "The Demise of a Constitutional Society," in *The End of Chilean Democracy*, Laurence Birns, ed. (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), p. 23.
12. Richard Gott, "Chile's Incipient Fascism," in *The End of Chilean Democracy*, p. 67.
13. Suzanne Labin, *Chile: The Crime of Resistance* (Richmond, England: Foreign Affairs Publishing Company, 1982), p. 200.
14. See Table 3507.
15. Amnesty International, *Amnesty International Report 1978* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1979), p. 108; Amnesty International annual reports subsequently cited as *AI Report 19–*.
16. Labin, *The Crime of Resistance*, p. 207.
17. *AI Report 1979*, p. 54.
18. U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1980* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), p. 369; State Department annual reports subsequently cited as *State Dept. Report 19–*.
19. Labin, *The Crime of Resistance*, p. 206.
20. See Table 3507.
21. Report of the Organization of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, December 1974, reproduced in *Human Rights in Chile*, Part II, p. 95.
22. Report on the April 1974 mission of the International Commission of Jurists to Chile; reproduced in *Human Rights in Chile*, Part II, p. 54.
23. *AI Report 1974*, p. 39.
24. *AI Report 1976*, p. 92.
25. Report on ICJ Mission to Chile, *Human Rights in Chile*, p. 54.
26. *AI Report 1976*, p. 92.
27. Ibid.
28. See Table 3507.
29. AI, *Chile*, p. 16.
30. José Zalaquett, defense attorney, Vicariate of Solidarity (testimony), May 5, 1976, U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, *Chile: The Status of Human Rights and Its Relationship to U.S. Economic Assistance Programs*, April 29 and May 5, 1976 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 51.
31. "Terror in Chile: The Chicago Commission Report," *The New York Review of Books*, May 30, 1974; reprinted in *Refugee and Humanitarian Problems*, Part II, p. 223.
32. AI, *Chile*, p. 16.
33. José Zalaquett, *Chile*, p. 51.
34. See Table 3507.
35. *AI Report 1974*, p. 40.
36. *State Dept. Report 1980*, p. 378.
37. See Table 3507.

Uruguay

The Uruguayan coup was not sudden and violent like the Chilean coup, but rather it was a gradual process. Thus there were very few official or even semiofficial executions. In order to determine the number of deaths that resulted from the repression of the Uruguayan regime, the categories of disappearances and deaths under torture must be examined. This analysis will show that although there were some serious human rights abuses in the Uruguayan case, the death toll was much lower than it was for either the Argentine or Chilean case.

The State Department's report for 1980 mentioned that there were some cases of disappearance from earlier years that had still not been resolved.[76] The Amnesty International report for 1978 mentions a total of five such cases. This low figure and the lack of any further discussion probably indicate that disappearances were not a great problem in the Uruguayan case.

Certainly, the Argentine government can be said to have been responsible for the disappearance of more Uruguayans than the Uruguayan government. In June 1976, AI had an incomplete list of 105 names of Uruguayans who had disappeared in Argentina.[77] Some complicity on the part of the Uruguayan government was indicated by the testimony of Wilson Ferreira-Aldunate, the leader of the Uruguayan Blanco party, concerning the May 1976 disappearance and murder of Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz, the former speaker of the Uruguayan Chamber of Deputies, and Zelmar Michelini, a well-known Colorado party senator.[78]

The Uruguayan death tolls that have received the greatest amount of attention are the deaths that occurred as a result of torture. Between May 1972 and November 1975, twenty-two persons were reported by AI to have died as a result of torture. By June 1976, nine additional cases were reported bringing the AI total to 31. Edy Kaufman, an AI researcher and expert on Uruguay, testified to the House Subcommittee on International Organizations regarding these deaths.[79] The State Department, however, disputed these estimates, claiming that only 4 of the 22 alleged deaths by torture could be confirmed.[80] If the five cases of disappearance are added to the AI total for deaths under torture, a maximum of 36 people can be said to have lost their lives as a result of the Uruguayan repression.

In sharp contrast to the low totals for the number of deaths that occurred as a result of repression, the number of political prisoners was extremely high and the practice of torture quite widespread. Uruguayan repression came in various waves. Beginning in 1972, repression was aimed at defeating the Tupamaro guerrilla movement. By 1973, the guerrillas were completely overcome,[81] but repression continued, being directed at trade unionists and the politicians who criticized the use of torture by the military and whom the military accused of corruption. Between October and December 1975, the communists were targeted for the first time, with between 800 and 1,200 being arrested.[82] By that time, however, all those who spoke out against the government were repressed, with the crime of "attacking the morale of the armed forces" becoming one of the more common offenses.[83]

Beginning in 1976, there were growing signs of dissent within the ranks of the military. AI reports the arrest of approximately 100 officers in April 1976.[84] In the beginning of 1977, between 20 and 50 officers were arrested, tortured, and sentenced to prison when a document was discovered indicating that they had been planning to prevent the 1973 coup.[85] In 1979, there were still reports of several hundred to 1,500 civilians being detained in the new waves of arrests during the beginning of that year.[86] By that time, however, repression had began to subside. The population of political prisoners slowly decreased thereafter as those who had been imprisoned began to complete their prison terms.

The State Department's report for 1981 cites the Uruguayan government's figures for the total number of persons arrested. A total of 6,200 were said to have been turned over to the military justice system since April 1972. Of those prisoners, 1,300 were freed without trial, 3,500 were freed by judicial order over time, and 1,500 remained in prison at the end of 1979.[87] By December 18, 1981, a total of 1,014 were still in prison. The State Department added that its figures did not include the "small number" detained at any given time without formal charges.[88]

According to AI, the number of those informally held was not small. In its 1976 report, AI cites estimates of 3,000 (*Newsweek*, June 2, 1975) and 6,000 (exile sources: *Punto*, Caracas, November, 1975); and they give their own estimate of 5,000 for the number of political prisoners in Uruguay. At the same time, the State Department stood behind the figures of the Uruguayan government, estimating

[76] Ibid., p. 554.

[77] U.S. House, Hearings, *Human Rights in Uruguay and Paraguay*, p. 38: Testimony of Edy Kaufman, Ph.D., Latin American Research Department, AI, July 27, 1976.

[78] Ibid., pp. 10–16: Testimony of Wilson Ferreira–Aldunate, leader of the national Blanco party in Uruguay, June 17, 1976.

[79] U.S. House, Hearings, *Human Rights in Uruguay*, p. 37.

[80] Ibid., p. 112: Testimony of Hewson A. Ryan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, August 4, 1976.

[81] Ibid., p. 34: Testimony of Dr. Martin Weinstein, Department of Political Science, William Paterson College of New Jersey, July 27, 1976.

[82] Ibid., p. 47: Kaufman Testimony.

[83] Edy Kaufman, *Uruguay in Transition: From Civilian to Military Rule* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1979), p. 78.

[84] *AI Report 1975–76*, p. 113.

[85] Kaufman, *Uruguay in Transition*, p. 75.

[86] *AI Report 1979*, p. 77.

[87] *State Dept. Report 1981*, p. 539.

[88] Ibid.

that there were only 2,000 prisoners in Uruguay. The AI estimate for 1977 is similar to the 1976 estimate with 2,500 official prisoners and 2,000 to 2,500 unofficial prisoners held in military barracks or other interrogation centers. After that the numbers began to slowly decrease as those imprisoned finished their prison terms. By 1979, AI still estimated that there were some 2,500 to 2,800 prisoners in Uruguay, and more than 1,200 in 1981.

The 5,000 prisoner estimate for 1976 was 1 in 500 people, giving Uruguay the highest per capita population of political prisoners in Latin America.[89] That figure should be decreased by 1,000 in order to account for the short-term detentions to arrive at an estimate of 4,000 for the number of long-term political prisoners in Uruguay. AI also estimated in 1976 that 1 in 50 people or 50,000 people had suffered interrogation or short-term detention since 1972. This number most certainly grew after 1976. The Latin American Political Report of June 17, 1979, put the cumulative total at 70,000. A conservative estimate for the cumulative population of political prisoners would be 60,000.

Adding to the significance of the large number of political prisoners is the fact that a substantial number of those imprisoned served very long terms. The 2,500 official prisoners of 1977 represent a hard-core prisoner population, most of whom had served many years at that point and still had quite a few years left to serve. The crimes for which these people were imprisoned included: being a member of a subversive organization, punishable by 3 to 18 years; attacking the morale of the army or navy, punishable by 16 months to 6 years,[90] and violating the state of dangerousness law that, according to AI, penalized for "the inclination to commit crimes" and provided for up to 6 years confinement with labor though "no offense had been committed."[91] The Uruguayan practice of long-term detention stood in contrast to Chilean repression where massive short-term detentions were the rule. In the Chilean case, of those few long-term political prisoners who were held, most were freed in the amnesty granted in 1977.

The figures on political exiles illustrate the overall repressive nature of Uruguayan society. According to Arthur Whitaker, the estimates of those who left the country ranged from 250,000 (by the Uruguayan government) to 600,000 (by exile sources), both of which are significant figures. In its 1979 report on political imprisonment in Uruguay, AI gave 500,000 as the most commonly cited figure. Ferreira-Aldunate also used the 500,000 figure for exiles when reporting before the House Subcommittee on International Organizations. Martin Weinstein, who also testified before the Subcommittee, cited 250,000 as the government's figure and 400,000 as the figure quoted by others. In light of the government's interest in understating the exile problem, the range from 400,000 to 600,000 appears realistic with 500,000 being a safe middle range figure.

[89] *AI Report 1975–76*, p. 113.

[90] Kaufman, *Uruguay in Transition*, p. 78.

[91] *AI Report 1977*, pp. 161–162.

Table 3505

ESTIMATES OF REPRESSION OF THE URUGUAYAN REGIME, 1973–84

Category of Repression	Source	Date of Estimate	Estimate
Deaths			
Deaths under Torture			
Government Source	1. U.S. State Department	1976	4
Human Rights Sources	2. Amnesty International	11/75	22
	3. Amnesty International	6/76	31
Disappearances			
Human Rights Source	4. Amnesty International	1978	5
Total Deaths			
Academic Source	5. Peter King	1989	36 (maximum)
Political Prisoners			
Number Detained at a Certain Point in Time			
Government Sources	6. U.S. State Department	8/4/76	2,000
	7. U.S. State Department	12/31/79	1,500
	8. U.S. State Department	12/18/81	1,014
Human Rights Sources	9. Amnesty International	1976	5,000
	10. Amnesty International	1977	4,500–5,000
	11. Amnesty International	1979	2,500–2,800
	12. Amnesty International	1981	1,200+

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Table 3505 (Continued)

ESTIMATES OF REPRESSION OF THE URUGUAYAN REGIME, 1973–84

Category of Repression	Source	Date of Estimate	Estimate
Political Prisoners (Continued)			
Media Sources	13. *Newsweek*	6/2/75	3,000
	14. *Punto* (Caracas)	11/75	6,000
Academic Source	15. Peter King	1989	4,000
Cumulative Total Detained			
Government Source	16. U.S. State Department	1981	6,200+
Human Rights Source	17. Amnesty International	1976	50,000
Media Source	18. Latin America Political Report	6/17/79	70,000
Academic Source	19. Peter King	1989	60,000
Exiles			
Government Source	20. Uruguayan Government	1976	250,000
Human Rights Source	21. Amnesty International	1979	500,000
Exile Sources	22. Wilson Ferreira-Aldunate	6/17/76	500,000
	23. Exile Sources	1976	600,000
Academic Sources	24. Martin Weinstein	7/27/76	250,000–400,000
	25. Peter King	1989	500,000

SOURCES:

1. Hewson A. Ryan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State (testimony), August 4, 1976, U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, *Human Rights in Uruguay and Paraguay*, June 17, July 27–28, and August 4, 1976 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 112.
2. Amnesty International, *Amnesty International Report 1976* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1977), p. 113; Amnesty International annual reports subsequently cited as *AI Report 19–*.
3. Ibid.
4. *AI Report 1978*, p. 143.
5. See Table 3507.
6. Hewson Ryan, *Human Rights in Uruguay*, p. 112.
7. U.S. Department of State, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1981* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 539; State Department annual reports subsequently cited as *State Dept. Report 19–*.
8. Ibid.
9. *AI Report 1976*, p. 113.
10. *AI Report 1977*, p. 162.
11. *AI Report 1979*, p. 77.
12. *AI Report 1981*, p. 185.
13. *AI Report 1976*, p. 113.
14. Ibid.
15. See Table 3507.
16. *State Dept. Report 1981*, p. 539.
17. *AI Report 1976*, p. 113.
18. *Latin American Political Report* (1979), p. 181.
19. See Table 3507.
20. Arthur P. Whitaker, *The U.S. and the Southern Cone* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), p. 350.
21. AI, *Political Imprisonment in Uruguay* (London: AI Publications, 1976), pp. 4–5.
22. Wilson Ferreira-Aldunate, Uruguayan exile (testimony), June 17, 1976, *Human Rights in Uruguay*, p. 7.
23. Whitaker, *The U.S. and the Southern Cone*, p. 350.
24. Martin Weinstein, AI Associate (testimony), July 27, 1976, *Human Rights in Uruguay*, p. 33.
25. See Table 3507.

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Brazil

Data on repression of the Brazilian regime and the 1966 Argentine regime are a bit harder to find than for the three regimes already analyzed. There are two main reasons for this. First, the repression in Argentina (1966) and Brazil preceded that in the other countries. The early Amnesty International reports were not as comprehensive as the later versions, and the congressional subcommittees did not begin to intensely review the human rights records of Latin American nations until 1973. Second, the level of repression in these two cases was lower than in the others, thus attracting less attention.[92]

Most scholars believe that the death toll as a result of Brazilian repression was not very high. According to Robert Wesson and David Fleischer, "the maximum number killed by government forces or disappeared was 35 in 1971, declining to 9 in 1975 and zero thereafter."[93] Human rights groups, however, believe that the death toll was higher. According to a February 1974 report by "a large group of Roman Catholic militants, lawyers, relatives of political prisoners and former political prisoners" in Brazil, there were 79 deaths by torture for political reasons since 1969. The International Commission of Jurists in 1973, however, estimated that only 29 had died under torture. There is little doubt that between August 1975 and January 1976 there were four more incidents of deaths under torture, including the well-known cases of Vladimir Herzog and Manoel Fiel Filho, which led to the dismantling of the internal security organization (CODI/DOI) in early 1976.[94]

The 1973 AI report mentions the submission to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights of a list of 210 who had died under mysterious circumstances while in custody. The 1974 report claims that the disappearance of 22 "over an 18 month period" had become a *"cause célèbre"* in Brazil. The list of 210 who disappeared was also mentioned again in that 1974 report. By 1980, however, AI reduced its estimate of those who had disappeared to 60. As with the Chilean disappearance figures already discussed, no explanation was given for the adjustment. AI also declared that "based upon sworn testimonies" many of the 60 were believed to have died under torture while in police custody.[95]

There are a number of problems with using these figures to come up with a reliable estimate for the number of people who died as a result of the Brazilian repression. First, the estimates are not very clear as to what they include, and they were not adjusted as more information became available. The higher totals probably include both disappearances and deaths under torture. Another problem is that a category like "deaths under mysterious circumstances" could include the activities of the Brazilian death squads. The killings by the death squads cannot be attributed to the military regime since these unofficial police bodies existed before the military came to power and since the military actually made significant efforts to curb the activities of these groups.[96]

Because of these problems, no completely reliable estimate of deaths from the Brazilian repression can be made. The 1979 AI figure of 60 is probably the best total figure; but in light of the higher estimates that were circulating, an estimate of 100 deaths would be a better compromise figure.

Brazilian repression was characterized by relatively mild measures during the first years of the regime, massive short-term detentions in response to the student mobilizations of 1968, torture and longer term imprisonment in response to guerrilla movements from 1969 through 1971, and continued intense repression until General Ernesto Geisel assumed the presidency in 1974. Hard-line factions within the military attempted to reintensify repression in 1975, but these groups were defeated by early 1976, putting an end to significant Brazilian repression.

In AI's 1972 special report on Brazil, *Allegations of Torture in Brazil*, 1,081 people are listed as claiming to have been tortured by the military.[97] Though this gives a general idea of the widespread nature of the repression, AI gives few figures for the total number of arrests. In the 1970–71 annual report, AI states that the estimates varied from 500 prisoners claimed by the government to 12,000 prisoners according to international observers. Georges-Andre Fiechter, in describing the repression against the student demonstrations of 1968, mentions 900 arrests in April,[98] 400 in June, 800 in August, and 700 in October.[99] The fact that only 79 student leaders were still in custody by December 1968[100] indicates, however, that the repression of the students involved mainly short-term detentions. James Kohl and John Litt, in describing the repression against the guerrillas, report 200 arrests in mid-1969, 1,800 more following the kidnapping of U.S. Ambassador Elbrick in September 1969,[101] 500 in October 1970, and 5,000 to 10,000 arrests in November 1970

[92] Ernest Duff and John McCamant mention this problem (Duff and McCamant, *Violence and Repression*, p. 27).

[93] Robert Wesson and David Fleischer, *Brazil in Transition* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 36.

[94] *AI Report 1975–76*, p. 91.

[95] *AI Report 1980*, p. 113.

[96] In July 1970, President Medici threatened the governors of five states where executions had occurred that the federal government would intervene immediately unless steps were taken to prevent the death squads "from committing crimes under the pretext of eliminating outlaws" (Georges-Andre Fiechter, *Brazil since 1964: Modernization under a Military Regime* [London: The MacMillan Press, 1975], p. 27). On July 1, the federal police were instructed to put an end to the activities of the death squads. In October, 16 policemen were accused of murder by the Procurator General of São Paulo; and by August 1972, 31 auxiliary policemen were found guilty (ibid.).

[97] AI, *Allegations of Torture in Brazil* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1973).

[98] Fiechter, *Brazil since 1964*, p. 140.

[99] Ibid., p. 256.

[100] Ibid., p. 161.

[101] James Kohl and John Litt, *Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1974), p. 67.

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Table 3506

ESTIMATES OF REPRESSION OF THE BRAZILIAN REGIME, 1968–79

Category of Repression	Source	Date of Estimate	Estimate
Deaths			
Deaths under Torture			
Human Rights Sources	1. International Commission of Jurists	1973	22
	2. Brazilian Human Rights Sources	2/74	79
	3. Amnesty International	8/75–1/76	4[a]
Disappearances			
Human Rights Sources	4. Amnesty International	1/73–7/74	22
	5. Amnesty International	1980	60
Total Deaths			
Human Rights Source	6. Amnesty International	1973, 1974	210[b]
Academic Sources	7. Robert Wesson and David Fleischer	1983	44+
	8. Peter King	1989	100
Political Prisoners			
Number Detained at a Certain Point in Time			
Government Source	9. Brazilian Government	1971	500
Human Rights Sources	10. International Organizations	1971	12,000
	11. Amnesty International	1976	700–800
	12. Amnesty International	1977	200–300
	13. Amnesty International	1978	180
	14. Amnesty International	1979	70
Academic Source	15. Peter King	1989	2,000
Cumulative Total Detained			
Government and Human Rights Sources	None	~	~
Academic Source	16. Peter King	1989	25,000
Exiles			
Media Source	17. *Movimento* (Brazilian journal)	1978	10,000
Academic Source	18. Peter King	1989	10,000

a. This estimate is only for the period 8/75 to 1/76.
b. "Deaths under mysterious circumstances" is the actual category for this estimate. Thus it might also include death squad killings.

SOURCES:

1. International Commission of Jurists, *Report No. 11*, 1973.
2. Marvine Howe, "Brazil Said to Continue Torture," *New York Times*, November 4, 1974; reprinted in *Torture and Oppression in Brazil*, U.S. Congress, House, Hearings, December 12, 1974 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 33.
3. Amnesty International, *Amnesty International Report 1976* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1977), p. 91: Amnesty International annual reports subsequently cited as *AI Report* 19–.
4. *AI Report 1974*, p. 65.
5. *AI Report 1980*, p. 113.
6. *AI Report 1973*, p. 38; and *AI Report 1974*, p. 66.
7. Robert Wesson and David Fleischer, *Brazil in Transition* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983), p. 36.
8. See Table 3507.
9. *AI Report 1970–71*, p. 61.
10. Ibid.
11. *AI Report 1976*, p. 89.
12. *AI Report 1977*, p. 127.
13. *AI Report 1978*, p. 103.
14. *AI Report 1979*, p. 51.
15. See Table 3507.
16. See Table 3507.
17. *AI Report 1978*, p. 103.
18. See Table 3507.

to preempt guerrilla actions to commemorate the death of the Brazilian guerrilla leader Carlos Marighela.[102]

By 1976, AI reports that 2,000 communist sympathizers had been detained since early 1975, and that 700 to 800 of them were still in custody at the time of the report. These figures referred to the attempted reintensification of the repression by hard-line factions during 1975. In the 1977 report, AI reported markedly fewer arrests over the previous eighteen months and fewer reports of torture and disappearance. The population of political prisoners was estimated to be between 200 and 300. Subsequently, the number of political prisoners was estimated to be 180 in 1978, and 70 in 1979.

It is difficult to estimate the population of political prisoners during the height of the repression based upon the information available. The population of long-term political prisoners was probably no more than 2,000 at any one time. Short-term detentions were much more common. I estimate that the cumulative total of persons detained by the military from 1968 to 1976 was approximately 25,000.[103]

I can find very little data on political exiles from Brazil. One opposition newspaper stated that 10,000 had left the country. Even if this figure is correct, it is insignificant in relation to the large population of Brazil.

Argentina 1966

According to Duff and McCamant, the Argentine military regime of 1966 was quite repressive. For the period from 1966 to 1969, they give only Brazil, Haiti, Paraguay, and Cuba higher overall scores for repression in their index comparing the repression of 20 Latin American nations from 1950 to 1969.[104] Argentine repression, however, involved mainly outlawing political parties, suspending constitutional rights, and censoring the media. For the more extreme categories of repression being compared in this analysis (i.e., arrests, exiles, and executions), the repression of the 1966 Argentine regime was very mild. This assertion is confirmed by the fact that Amnesty International makes no significant mention of Argentine repression until its 1974 report.[105]

The emergence in 1969 of the Argentine guerrilla movements led to a steady increase in the yearly totals for political deaths. While deaths averaged only five per year from 1960 to 1968, there were 39 political deaths in 1969, 41 in 1970, 64 in 1971, and 68 in 1972.[106] An increase in the number of attempts against the lives of military officers also began in 1969 with 5 attempts in that year, 33 in 1970, 54 in 1971, and 44 in 1972.[107] In spite of the increase in the number of political deaths (most of which the guerrillas were responsible for), the military did not respond with a pattern of repression that involved a great number of deaths.

Before the Cordobazo, a few students were killed in demonstrations in the interior and approximately twenty people were killed as a result of the Cordobazo.[108] After that time, the military was not directly responsible for many of the deaths mentioned. When guerrillas were killed, it was generally in shootouts that the government could not avoid. Even the actions of right-wing death squads, which are often indirectly connected to the military leaders in control, did not begin with intensity until the military was out of power in 1973. The only deaths that can be attributed with certainty to the repression of the military were the sixteen guerrillas who were executed on August 22, 1972, after the attempted escape from Rawson prison in which a guard was killed.[109]

Most of the arrests in Argentina from 1969 to 1973 occurred in response to the massive popular demonstrations that took place in various cities throughout the interior of the country. For example, the general strike in Mendoza on April 7, 1972, resulted in 700 arrests.[110] There are no reliable data on these arrests, but they are not of much importance anyway since they usually involved very short-term detentions to restore order. A good number for the political prisoners held by the Argentine regime would be the 600 who were released under the general amnesty that was proclaimed by President Campora in May 1973.[111] Even this number, however, is not of great significance since most of the guerrilla prisoners were legitimately convicted of violent crimes and since some of those released were common criminals.[112]

Though these numbers are not as solidly established nor as meaningful as those for the other regimes, I will give some figures for comparative purposes. For the number of deaths that occurred as a result of Argentine repression, I will use the figure of 36, including the 16 that were executed plus 20 for those killed as the military tried to restore order in the popular demonstrations of 1969 to 1973. It can reasonably be argued, however, that none of these deaths should be counted. For long-term political prisoners, the number of 600 will be used despite the problems with that figure. No total will be given for cumulative political prisoners since it cannot be fairly used in comparison with the other regimes because of the very different nature of the Argentine detentions. Finally, very few exiles can be said to have resulted

[102] Ibid., p. 69.

[103] I have arrived at this figure by merely adding up the numbers that I could find and doubling that number to account for those detentions not mentioned. Thus the figure could be a bit high.

[104] Duff and McCamant, *Violence and Repression*, p. 39.

[105] The 1969 report does, however, mention the release of union leader Eustaquio Tolosa (*AI Report 1968–69*, p. 11).

[106] Guillermo O'Donnell, *Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: Argentina, 1966–1973, in Comparative Perspective* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), p. 297.

[107] Ibid., pp. 297 and 300.

[108] Kohl and Litt, *Urban Guerrilla Warfare*, p. 342.

[109] Ibid., p. 357.

[110] Ibid.

[111] Simpson and Bennett, *The Disappeared*, p. 76.

[112] Eduardo Crawley, *A House Divided: Argentina, 1880–1980* (London: C. Hurst and Company, 1984), p. 383.

from the repression of the 1966 Argentine regime. In fact, the lack of severe repression paved the way for the return of one famous, long-time Argentine political exile, Juan Domingo Perón.

Comparisons of the Levels of Repression

Table 3507 shows the estimates established here of the number of deaths, imprisonments, and exiles produced by the repression of each regime, as well as those data adjusted for the varying populations of the countries analyzed, to enable a fair comparison. It is clear that the repression of the 1966 Argentine and the Brazilian regimes was not as great as that of the other regimes. Though there were not many deaths in the Uruguayan case, its repression was comparable to that of the later Argentine and the Chilean regimes with respect to political prisoners. When the figures are adjusted, these contrasts become even more clearly defined. The comparative intensity and extent of each of the cases of repression are illustrated in Figure 35:1.

With respect to the intensity of repression, the 1976 Argentine and the Chilean regimes were fairly similar. Both were cases of very high intensity repression. Since the adjusted total for long-term political prisoners is higher in the Chilean case while the adjusted totals for deaths are the same, the Chilean repression should be considered of greater intensity.

Two important factors, however, make the 1976 Argentine repression of greater overall intensity. Though the adjusted totals are the same, the Chilean deaths were not as significant since they occurred in a civil war situation.[113] Also, the Chilean totals for long-term political prisoners are higher than the Argentine totals simply because of the massive number of detentions in the chaos of the early days of the regime. If there were as many long-term political prisoners in Chile as I estimate (that estimate is less certain than most of the others), it is clear that many of those who passed into the category of long-term political prisoner did so merely because of the bureaucratic problems associated with sorting through the large number of prisoners and not necessarily because of any malice on the part of the regime. Argentina's three years of high intensity repression compared with Chile's one or perhaps two months of high intensity repression make the Argentine repression of much greater overall intensity.

The other cases do not compare with the 1976 Argentine regime or the Chilean regime in terms of intensity of repression. The adjusted figures, however, do make Uruguay stand out as an intermediate case. Though the adjusted Uruguayan death toll is much larger than the totals for the Brazilian and the earlier Argentine regimes, it is the adjusted figure for long-term political prisoners that really separates the Uruguayan case from the other two. The lower Uruguayan

[113] This is not to say that the Argentine military regime faced no significant threat of internal subversion in 1976. There were, in fact, strong guerrilla movements active in Argentina at that time. The more open, civil war situation in Chile, however, makes the great number of deaths in that case more understandable.

Table 3507

ESTIMATES OF DEATHS, IMPRISONMENTS, AND EXILES UNDER ARGENTINE, CHILEAN, URUGUAYAN, AND BRAZILIAN MILITARY REGIMES

Country	Deaths	Prisoners: Long-Term	Prisoners: Cumulative	Exiles
PART I. ESTIMATES				
1976 ARGENTINA	10,000	7,000	30,000	500,000
CHILE	4,000	6,500	60,000	40,000
URUGUAY	36	4,000	60,000	500,000
BRAZIL	100	2,000	25,000	10,000
1966 ARGENTINA	36	600	~	~
PART II. ESTIMATES ADJUSTED FOR POPULATION[1]				
1976 ARGENTINA	10,000	7,000	30,000	500,000
CHILE	10,000	16,250	150,000	100,000
URUGUAY	360	40,000	600,000	5,000,000
BRAZIL	25	500	6,250	2,500
1966 ARGENTINA	36	600	~	~

1. Adjusted using Argentina population during the 1970s (approximately 25 million) as a base.

Figure 35:1

COMPARATIVE INTENSITY AND EXTENT OF REPRESSION IN ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE, AND URUGUAY

death toll makes its repression less intense, however, even though the adjusted figures for long-term political prisoners are higher than for the two high intensity cases.

The adjusted estimates clearly put the Brazilian regime into the same category of low intensity repression as the 1966 Argentine regime. A direct comparison of the data for the Brazilian and the earlier Argentine regimes is not fair, however, since Argentine repression differed considerably from that of Brazil. The fact that Brazilian repression involved a greater amount of torture also puts it in a higher category of intensity. The adjusted figures, however, are very helpful in making a true comparison of the Brazilian repression with the other cases of higher intensity repression.

With respect to the extent of repression, the Uruguayan totals are of greater significance. Though deadly repression has a greater effective range than mere imprisonment, the Uruguayan totals for both long-term and cumulative political prisoners are so much greater than the totals for Chile or Argentina that the extent of the Uruguayan repression must be considered greater. Not only is the adjusted total for long-term political prisoners in Uruguay twice the Chilean total, but the actual long-term detentions were much more significant in the Uruguayan case. The adjusted total for cumulative detentions in Uruguay is, incredibly, four times the Chilean figure and twenty times the Argentine total. The equally incredible adjusted totals for political exiles lend further support to the determination that the Uruguayan repression was of greater overall extent. Uruguayan repression can surely be said to have affected more people in per capita terms than that of any of the other regimes.

The numbers put Chile above Argentina with respect to the extent of repression. The qualitative factors mentioned above, however, keep the Argentine (1976) repression within the same general range as the other two cases in terms of the gross numbers that were affected.

Finally, the extent of the repression of the 1966 Argentine and the Brazilian regimes was also much lower than for the other regimes, as a quick comparison of the totals for long-term political prisoners shows. While the totals for these prisoners reach into the thousands for the other regimes, the population of long-term political prisoners in Brazil and Argentina (1966) is in the hundreds.

Conclusion

From the various estimates presented in the regime sections, it has been possible to intelligently estimate the number of deaths, arrests, and exiles for each regime. It is unlikely that anyone will completely agree with all of the estimates that I have made. The advantage of this comparative analysis, however, is that it gives the reader the latitude to disagree. With all the data presented as clearly as possible, along with some description of the more qualitative aspects of repres-

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sion, readers have enough information to reach their own conclusions.

More importantly, this comparison highlights some of the basic, and quite significant, differences in the levels of repression of the regimes. Though different in qualitative terms, the 1976 Argentine and the Chilean regimes stand out as examples of very high intensity repression compared with the other regimes. The earlier Argentine and the Brazilian regimes, in contrast, are clearly cases of milder repression. Finally, the Uruguayan case falls somewhere between these two extremes. The extent of Uruguayan repression was so great that the country can be said to have been converted into a huge prison. Yet, at the same time, Uruguayan military leaders could not justify a great deal of killing as could their counterparts in Chile and Argentina.

The different levels of repression that characterized similarly "bureaucratic authoritarian" regimes suggest some very significant differences among the regimes. In order to discover exactly how the regimes differed from one another, one must determine why they chose to impose such different levels of repression.

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