

Part VIII: Development of Data

CHAPTER 34

**ON MEASURING POLITICAL CONFLICT IN
LATIN AMERICA, 1948–1967**

by

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ON MEASURING POLITICAL CONFLICT IN LATIN AMERICA, 1948-1967

This study examines the validity of Latin American statistics on political conflict presented in the "authoritative" *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators*. Compiled by Charles Taylor and Michael Hudson, the *Handbook* (2d ed; New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972), hereinafter cited as *WHPSI*, contains aggregate data on 136 countries for the period from 1948 to 1967; hence it is the main source of statistics used by social scientists interested in correlating political factors with social, economic, and civic levels of development. As James Wilkie has noted, if scholars doubt the validity of statistics for a particular year, "... time series analysis may provide a test for meaning, particularly as compared with related time series or with qualitative evaluations. . . . Moreover the viewing of data in time series allows us to see illogical patterns that need qualitative evaluation."¹ Data in *WHPSI* are specifically suited to time-series tests. In offering some methodological observations on problems in assessing political data, this essay attempts to facilitate further research on political conflict at both the quantitative and qualitative stages of analysis.

Other extant sources of political statistics have presented only limited aspects of the universe of political behavior and political structures of Latin America.² The relative paucity of data continues to present serious difficulties for the quantification of political conflict in the region. Much of the available data on political violence in Latin America has been produced by U.S. researchers who have focused on the issue of political instability in the area.³ At a conceptual level

the theoretical definition of the term political conflict has remained somewhat ambiguous, being often categorized elliptically in the literature.⁴ Competing theoretical explanations of political conflict have varied in emphasis. In an early view Merle Kling attempted to account for the chronic nature of political instability in terms of the colonial character of the respective Latin American economies. Recent studies have relied heavily on variations of relative deprivation theory, which has become the dominant explanatory model for much of the research in the field.⁵ Surprisingly, more political interpretations (such as the argument that the study of class structure best explains the distribution of political power) have been wanting in a field dominated largely by the discourse of political scientists.⁶

By contrast, Latin American scholars have tended to neglect the study of collective violence in Latin American

Thailand during the first half of 1975. The methodology used is plagued with serious problems of data validity and data reliability. See *Profile of Violence: An Analytical Model* (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1976).

⁴ For treatment of the problem of such ambiguity in the literature, see Peter H. Smith, "History," in Robert S. Byars and Joseph L. Love, eds., *Quantitative Social Science Research on Latin America* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973), pp. 14-61.

⁵ See Merle Kling, "Toward a Theory of Power and Political Instability in Latin America," in James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds., *Latin America Reform or Revolution?* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett Publications, Inc., 1968), pp. 76-93. For a selective sample of research guided by relative deprivation models, see the work of D.P. Bwy, "Political Instability in Latin America: The Cross Cultural Test of a Causal Model," *Latin American Research Review* 3:2 (1968), 17-66; Kenneth F. Johnson, "Causal Factors in Latin American Political Instability," in Francisco José Moreno and Barbara Mitroni, eds., *Conflict and Violence in Latin American Politics* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1971), pp. 290-309; for an application of Samuel Huntington's theory of modernization and political instability, see J. M. Ruhl, "Social Mobilization and Political Instability in Latin America: A Test of Huntington's Theory," *Inter-American Economic Affairs* 29 (1975), 3-21. Mexican data from research carried out by Wayne A. Cornelius, Jr., on the relationship between urbanization and political conflict has cast serious doubts on the adequacy of relative deprivation theory. His data do not "support the notion of widespread and deep frustration of expectations which is basic to much writing on urbanization and political instability in Latin America." See his "Urbanization as an Agent in Latin American Political Instability: The Case of Mexico," *American Political Science Review* 13:3 (1969), 842.

⁶ One social scientist who is interested in the phenomenon and who has used time-series data effectively is Charles Tilly. He has studied collective political violence in France by means of a class-oriented explanatory model of political conflict. See, for example, his "Collective Violence in European Perspective," in Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr, eds., *Violence in America* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 83-118; and Charles Tilly, Louise Tilly, and Richard Tilly, *The Rebellious Century, 1830-1930* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975).

The author is indebted to James Wilkie for his helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.

¹ *SNP*, p.7. For a discussion of the application of time-series methods in sociological analysis, see Michael T. Hannan and Nancy Brandon Tuma, "Methods for Temporal Analysis," in Alex Inkeles, James Coleman, and Ralph H. Turner, eds., *Annual Review of Sociology* (Palo Alto: Annual Reviews, Inc.), pp. 303-328.

² For example, the Instituto Interamericano de Estadística has not published political statistics since 1972. And data that it did publish are of limited utility for investigators of political conflict, for they include only statistics on political representation. See *Situación Política y Administrativa*, vol. 6 of AC. Selected measures of the political characteristics of individual Latin American countries can be found in Kenneth Ruddle and Philip Gillette, eds., *Latin American Political Statistics*, Statistical Abstract of Latin America Supplement 2 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center Publications, 1972).

³ For an incisive critique of U.S. empirical research on political violence in Latin America, see Pablo González Casanova, "La Violence Latino-Américaine dans les Enquêtes Empiriques Nord-Américaines," *L'Homme et la Société* 15 (1970), 150-177. The inadequacy of predictive research on political violence is epitomized in a recent CIA research report which summarizes "the first experimental ex post facto application" of a predictive model of political violence "to the pre-coup situation in Chile in mid-1973" and the results of a second experimental application to the cases of Argentina, Ethiopia, and

social formations both in its theoretical and its empirical dimensions.⁷ A random survey of the major social science journals published in Latin America (including the *Revista Mexicana de Sociología*, *Revista Paraguaya de Sociología*, and *Revista Latinoamericana de Sociología*) reveals a systematic lack of preoccupation with the violent aspect of the political process in the region. Not until its thirty-sixth year of existence, for example, did the *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* publish three articles devoted to some methodological issues related to the study of political violence in Latin America,⁸ and those contributions were limited to the elaboration of chronologies. By 1976, however, the empirical dimensions of the process of political violence in Guatemala had become the object of an intensive investigation by a group of researchers from the Centro de Investigación y Documentación Centroamericana.⁹

Recent research on political conflict in Latin American social formations discloses some serious deficiencies in longitudinal measurement and historicity. Rather than being based upon successive observations of discrete values over an extended period of time, many of the data used in the analyses are limited to single observations of the values taken by the dependent variables within the brief span of two or three years. As Stanley Lieberson and Lynn K. Hansen have indicated, causal explanations in social science research are usually based on "... a static set of cross-sectional data. . . . Regret-

fully, this propensity to use cross-sectional data as if they represented longitudinal processes is widespread." The point to be stressed from this caveat is not that the use of cross-sectional data possesses no methodological value, but that such data are used to make inferences about causal relations over time.¹⁰

The *WHPSI* is helpful to social scientists because it tries to overcome the problem of short time span upon which erroneous generalizations have been built. The extent of the validity of its Latin American political conflict data can be tested by comparing the series with comparable research. Statistics presented here in tables 3400 through 3406 have been adapted from the *WHPSI*, and for clarity of analysis a summary of total frequency of events aggregated annually has been added to each table. The twenty-year period covered in the *WHPSI* is significant for Latin America because it coincides with the Bogotazo in 1948 and witnesses the rise and decline of guerrilla activity in the region, Che Guevara dying in Bolivia in 1967.

The primary source for the *WHPSI* series was the *New York Times Index*, although additional secondary sources were also used. As the compilers indicate, 79% of the data for Latin America came from the *New York Times Index* and 29% of the data from the Associated Press. The variance in the net contribution of the second source of the data ranged from 6% to 55% for the different units of analysis.¹¹

Tables 3400 through 3406 present an array of indicators intended to measure political conflict in Latin America. The linear trend followed by the six indicators of political conflict for the period under scrutiny is depicted in figure 1. The spatial distribution of all events of political conflict, as measured by the political conflict variables, is shown in figure 2, whereas figures 3 and 4 show the spatial distribution of all political conflict events but as a comparison between the 1948-57 and 1958-67 decades.

The emphasis of the *WHPSI* is upon providing time-series raw data on political "instability" so as to enable investigators to formulate and test research hypotheses. The attributes measured by the variables have been aggregated in the

⁷ There are, however, texts dealing with the phenomenon, but they tend to be limited to testimonial accounts. For a selected sample, see the report of the Comité de Defensa de los Derechos Humanos, *La Violencia en Guatemala* (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Popular, 1969); Orlando Ortiz, ed., *La Violencia en México* (Mexico: Editorial Diógenes, 1971); and Gabriel Aguilera Peralta, *La Violencia en Guatemala como Fenómeno Político*, Cuaderno No. 61 (Mexico: Centro Inter-cultural de Documentación, 1970).

⁸ See Pablo González Casanova, "De las Cronologías Estadísticas," *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 37 (1976), 1014-1026; Guillermo Boils Morales, Aurora Loyo Brambila, and Ricardo Pozas Horcasitas, "Experiencias Teórico-Methodológicas en la Elaboración de una Cronología de la Violencia Política en América Latina (1945-1970) según el *NYT Index* y la revista *Time*," *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 37 (1976), 1027-1041; and Sara Gordon, "Instructivos y Experiencias en la Elaboración de Cronologías de Golpes de Estado y Sucesión Presidencial," *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 37 (1976), 1043-1048.

⁹ Gabriel Aguilera P. and Equipo Investigadores de CIDCA, "El Estado, la Lucha de Clases y la Violencia en Guatemala," *Estudios Centroamericanos*, no. 356-357 (1978), 378-397. To collect data for this research a series of in-depth open-ended interviews was conducted with persons who had been affected by political violence and with their relatives. In addition, three Guatemalan newspapers, *Prensa Libre*, *El Gráfico*, and *El Impacto*, were combed for data for the period 1966 through 1976. The findings of the research can be summarized as follows: (1) the intensity of collective political violence was found to be greater in regions of the country with a high concentration of industrial and agricultural workers, (2) the incidence of political violence was higher in regions of the country with a history of guerrilla activity, (3) 8% of the victims of political upheaval belonged to the capitalist class, 85% were from agricultural and working-class sectors, and only 7% of the victims of political violence were students.

¹⁰ See Stanley Lieberson and Lynn K. Hansen, "National Development, Mother Tongue Diversity, and the Comparative Study of Nations," *American Sociological Review* 39:4 (1974), 538. For a sample of cross-sectional research using Latin American data for 1955, 1956, and 1957, see Rudolph J. Rummel, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations," in John V. Gillespie and Betty A. Nesvold, eds., *Macro-Quantitative Analysis* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), pp. 49-84; for the replication of this study using cross-sectional data for 1958, 1959, and 1960, see Raymond Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1958-60," in *ibid.*, pp. 85-112; and D.P. Bwy, "Political Instability in Latin America."

¹¹ *WHPSI*, p. 421. Liebes reports that 32% of the newspaper editors surveyed in his 1965 sample preferred UPI coverage on Latin America, whereas only 25% of those interviewed expressed preference for Associated Press. See B. H. Liebes, "Decision-Making by Telegraph Editors—AP or UPI?," *Journalism Quarterly* (1966), 432-442.





Figure 1. Linear trend of political conflict events, 1948-67. D, deaths; AA, armed attacks; R, riots; PD, protest demonstrations; EI, external interventions; GS, governmental sanctions; IET, irregular executive transfers. SOURCE: Drawn from data in tables 3400-3406.







Figure 3. Distribution of political conflict events, 1948-57.
SOURCE: Calculated from tables 3400-3406.



WHPSI over two decades and are intended to represent anomie political participation. As Terry Nardin has cogently demonstrated, students of political conflict have tended to conceptualize political violence as a case of anomie. This trend suggests that political violence ought to be equated solely with "... the actions of those who appear to reject consensus. . . . In this view, violence is a form of 'uninstitutionalized,' 'anomic,' or 'disorderly' action on the part of deviant political actors."¹² Needless to say, such normative theoretical orientation leads to a neglect of institutionalized forms of political violence, and to a disregard, in particular, of the role played by the state in interactive processes of political violence.

Data in tables 3400 through 3404 summarize the magnitude of political conflict and collective violence aimed at the state apparatuses and measure the conflict according to the following variables: (1) protest demonstrations, (2) riots, (3) armed attacks, (4) deaths from domestic violence, (5) external interventions, and (6) irregular executive transfers.

The frequency of protest demonstrations aggregated annually for the two decades is shown in table 3400. Data in the historical series refer solely to nonviolent political conflict, yet it can be argued that some protest demonstrations that do not necessarily become riots involve certain dimensions of the continuum of political violence. It is also to be noted that table 3400 reports major demonstrations by coal miners in Mexico City and protest demonstrations in Oaxaca in 1952, but does not report major demonstrations against the Miguel Alemán administration in Yucatán and Colima in 1951.¹³

Table 3400 also reveals some significant trends, such as an increase in the number of protest demonstrations after the beginning of the Cuban revolution, in Latin American social formations as a whole, with protest demonstrations between the Bogotazo and 1956 clustered more heavily in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, Guatemala, and Panama. We may also wonder whether the coding procedures did not allow for the recording of demonstrations in Colombia in 1948, such as the "demonstration of the silence" in which 200,000 people took to the streets in Bogotá just two months prior to the Bogotazo,¹⁴ or whether the primary and secondary data sources

used by the WHPSI compilers simply did not report them.

Frequency of riots from 1948 to 1967 for the twenty Latin American countries is shown in table 3401. The modal category of riots for the region is exhibited by Venezuela, followed by Mexico, Colombia, and the Dominican Republic. The highest frequency occurred in 1961. Data also indicate that in 1967 there was a sharp decrease in the occurrence of riots compared with 1966, as well as with the entire period under consideration. Table 3401 gives an estimate of the magnitude of the variable "riots" in terms of the number of occurrences, but the indicator could also have been expressed in terms of the number of participants in each riot, which would have enriched the presentation of the data and thus enabled the derivation of meaningful and substantive research hypotheses on the violent dimensions of the political process in Latin America.¹⁵ Unfortunately, it appears that the limitations imposed by the data sources upon which the WHPSI relied did not allow for the variables to be expressed multidimensionally. Another shortcoming of table 3401 is that the variable "riots," unlike "protest demonstrations," is said to refer largely to spontaneous political practices, a rather dubious theoretical differentiation between the two categories which is, nonetheless, common in the literature.¹⁶

The extent of armed attacks in Latin America for the period under scrutiny is presented in table 3402. Unlike "protest demonstrations" and "riots," this indicator purports to measure the level of organized political violence.¹⁷ The historical series indicates that Venezuela, Argentina, and Colombia recorded the greatest frequency of armed attacks for the entire period. Likewise it can be discerned from the annual aggregation for Latin America that the series tends to be inflated by the large number of armed attacks in specific countries, such as in Cuba in 1957, 1958, 1960, and 1961 and the Dominican Republic in 1965. A problem with many of the WHPSI data in general and with the data on armed attacks in particular is the homogenization of the phenomena of political conflict. For instance, we cannot differentiate from the aggregation of the data the distribution of armed attacks in the population across occupational categories, social classes, and related variables of interest to investigators, nor can we discern from the data as presented the directionality of the armed attacks, since organized action by dissenting political groups has been collapsed with state action under the same category.

The distribution of deaths resulting from collective political violence is shown in table 3403. A close examination of the time-series figures reveals the low reliability of the data for this variable. In order to estimate the amount of error in

¹² Terry Nardin, *Violence and the State: A Critique of Empirical Political Theory*. Comparative Political Series, vol. 2 (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1971), p. 10.

¹³ See data in Ernest Duff A. and John F. McCamant, *Violence and Repression in Latin America* (New York: Free Press, 1976), p. 153.

¹⁴ Hypothesizing that some of the Colombian demonstrations were coded to be riots, as table 3401 appears to indicate, there were demonstrations before the Bogotazo which were simply not tabulated as such. For a historical account of demonstrations during the months preceding the Bogota riots, see Germán Guzmán Campos, *La Violencia en Colombia, Parte Descriptiva* (Cali, Colombia: Ediciones Progreso, 1968), chapter 3. Methodological decisions made prior to the coding of the data have implications for the qualitative analysis of the data. Pablo González Casanova has aptly warned researchers that "the weight of each registered event has considerable variations that tend to disappear in statistical aggregation." See his "De las Cronologías Estadísticas."

¹⁵ On the problem of expressing indicators in different ways, see John V. Gillespie, "An Introduction to Macro-Cross-National Research," in Gillespie and Nesvold, eds., *Macro-Quantitative Analysis*, pp. 21-22.

¹⁶ For a critique of this theoretical-methodological distinction, see Nardin, *Violence and the State* p. 16.

¹⁷ WHPSI, p. 67.

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Table 3400
PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS, 20 LR, 1948-67^a

Country	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	Total
A. ARGENTINA	~	1	2	3	2	~	2	22	2	8	4	3	7	3	10	2	8	10	10	~	99
B. BOLIVIA	~	~	1	2	~	5	~	~	1	~	~	1	3	7	~	2	8	1	~	~	31
C. BRAZIL	~	~	1	2	2	1	~	~	~	~	3	2	5	6	1	~	~	1	4	~	28
D. CHILE	~	~	~	~	~	2	5	~	~	6	3	~	1	2	~	~	~	7	5	~	31
E. COLOMBIA	~	1	~	~	~	2	~	1	~	17	~	5	~	5	1	7	1	8	5	~	53
F. COSTA RICA ¹	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
G. CUBA	~	~	1	1	4	10	2	3	12	9	1	2	5	5	7	~	~	~	~	~	62
H. DOMINICAN REP.	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	2	24	1	13	1	13	6	~	61
I. ECUADOR	1	~	~	~	1	5	~	~	~	~	~	2	2	6	~	~	2	6	4	~	29
J. EL SALVADOR	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	1
K. GUATEMALA	~	~	2	3	3	9	1	1	7	~	~	~	5	3	2	~	~	~	1	~	37
L. HAITI	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	13	~	2	~	5	~	~	~	~	~	~	21
M. HONDURAS	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	2	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	4
N. MEXICO	1	~	~	~	2	~	~	2	1	3	2	9	6	1	2	~	1	~	~	2	32
O. NICARAGUA	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	2	~	~	~	~	3
P. PANAMA	~	6	~	3	1	1	~	~	8	~	2	2	~	~	~	~	10	5	2	1	41
Q. PARAGUAY	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	5	6	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	12
R. PERU	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	5	5	2	1	~	1	11	~	~	~	~	1	26
S. URUGUAY	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	6	2	~	~	~	1	2	13
T. VENEZUELA	~	~	1	~	5	~	~	~	~	1	4	~	8	17	3	~	~	1	~	~	40
LATIN AMERICA	2	8	9	14	20	35	11	27	40	60	27	29	49	97	40	27	32	53	38	6	624

1. This event was not reported at any time during the twenty years for Costa Rica.

a. A protest demonstration is a nonviolent gathering of people organized to protest the policies, ideology, or actions of a regime, a government or political leaders.

SOURCE: Adapted from *WHPSI*, table 3.1.

Table 3401
RIOTS, 20 LR, 1948-67^a

Country	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	Total
A. ARGENTINA	~	~	1	3	1	5	3	13	6	7	7	3	~	6	8	~	1	13	22	~	99
B. BOLIVIA	~	5	4	11	1	~	~	~	6	6	1	8	9	22	3	1	17	6	~	~	100
C. BRAZIL	~	~	~	6	7	7	13	~	2	~	13	11	1	2	6	1	4	~	22	~	95
D. CHILE	~	16	~	~	12	~	~	~	~	16	7	~	2	1	1	~	~	7	~	2	64
E. COLOMBIA	26	30	2	5	2	5	11	~	5	15	1	3	~	~	~	6	~	11	3	~	125
F. COSTA RICA	6	~	1	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	8
G. CUBA	~	~	7	1	6	7	1	1	5	1	2	9	6	4	1	~	~	~	~	~	51
H. DOMINICAN REP.	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	44	25	5	6	11	29	~	121
I. ECUADOR	~	~	~	~	3	6	~	1	6	~	1	12	1	17	6	~	~	6	14	~	73
J. EL SALVADOR	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	2
K. GUATEMALA	~	~	2	5	3	4	5	~	~	3	~	~	4	1	11	~	~	~	1	~	39
L. HAITI	~	~	5	~	~	~	~	~	1	34	~	~	1	1	~	2	~	~	~	~	44
M. HONDURAS	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	3	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	5
N. MEXICO	~	~	~	7	16	1	12	1	2	9	19	12	13	24	7	~	2	2	1	3	131
O. NICARAGUA	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	5	12	1	~	1	6	~	~	~	1	27
P. PANAMA	1	11	~	11	1	1	~	~	7	~	17	10	~	2	~	~	24	5	8	~	98
Q. PARAGUAY	10	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	5	~	1	2	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	19
R. PERU	5	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	5	5	~	7	5	~	3	7	~	1	2	~	41
S. URUGUAY	1	~	~	2	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	2	~	10	1	~	~	17
T. VENEZUELA	5	1	1	~	~	5	~	~	15	1	51	6	39	13	11	9	7	5	1	~	170
LATIN AMERICA	55	63	24	51	52	41	46	22	68	93	132	94	79	142	87	31	72	69	101	7	1,329

a. A riot is a violent demonstration or disturbance involving a large number of people and characterized by material damage or bloodshed.

SOURCE: Adapted from *WHPSI*, table 3.2.

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Table 3402
ARMED ATTACKS, 20 LR, 1948-67^a

Country	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	Total
A. ARGENTINA	1	1	1	20	6	13	3	81	24	47	6	41	27	15	48	5	31	8	10	~	388
B. BOLIVIA	1	36	10	3	15	22	~	1	12	1	13	6	19	5	~	3	29	25	~	25	226
C. BRAZIL	3	~	13	8	1	4	5	1	10	1	2	7	3	4	14	5	11	4	19	2	117
D. CHILE	1	2	7	1	2	~	1	4	~	2	1	~	~	2	5	~	1	3	1	8	41
E. COLOMBIA	27	49	11	80	33	19	16	23	18	29	23	22	3	33	15	70	28	29	12	12	552
F. COSTA RICA	47	3	~	9	1	~	3	18	~	~	1	~	2	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	84
G. CUBA	14	9	4	6	5	25	15	18	47	225	412	62	204	146	35	30	20	9	7	1	1,294
H. DOMINICAN REP.	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	15	6	16	17	20	3	126	33	20	257
I. ECUADOR	1	~	1	2	10	1	2	1	7	~	1	14	2	9	9	3	4	4	2	5	78
J. EL SALVADOR	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	1	1	~	~	~	~	~	5
K. GUATEMALA	~	2	2	~	5	10	27	3	2	1	1	13	14	1	30	14	6	15	39	31	216
L. HAITI	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	11	14	13	27	1	11	~	40	18	~	2	4	~	141
M. HONDURAS	~	~	~	~	~	~	2	1	6	1	1	31	1	~	2	5	~	3	~	~	53
N. MEXICO	~	~	1	3	10	3	9	1	~	5	3	5	1	9	8	10	~	3	2	9	82
O. NICARAGUA	2	1	~	~	~	~	2	~	~	~	1	11	8	2	~	~	~	~	~	~	43
P. PANAMA	7	1	~	3	1	~	~	~	~	~	19	5	3	2	1	~	13	1	~	~	56
Q. PARAGUAY	9	~	~	~	~	~	2	8	~	~	11	30	~	~	~	6	~	~	~	~	66
R. PERU	14	1	2	1	~	~	~	~	5	6	9	2	~	2	11	13	25	49	7	~	147
S. URUGUAY	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	1	1	~	~	1	~	~	~	5
T. VENEZUELA	~	~	3	6	9	4	1	~	1	2	35	10	34	24	64	174	68	36	21	17	509
LATIN AMERICA	127	106	55	142	99	101	88	160	143	335	553	301	329	283	260	398	258	315	155	152	4,360

a. An armed attack is an act of violent political conflict carried out by an organized group with the object of weakening or destroying the power exercised by another group.

SOURCE: Adapted from WHPSI, table 3.3.

Table 3403
DEATHS FROM DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 20 LR, 1948-67^a

Country	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	Total
A. ARGENTINA	~	2	1	4	1	18	6	6,600	41	1	~	~	21	1	47	25	14	2	2	~	6,786
B. BOLIVIA	1	163	3	13	3,000	40	~	3	4	4	7	105	271	25	9	14	322	119	~	61	4,164
C. BRAZIL	23	1	13	13	8	10	11	~	3	1	5	~	2	5	17	8	~	1	22	~	143
D. CHILE	~	1	1	~	2	~	~	~	~	40	~	~	3	~	5	~	~	~	5	5	62
E. COLOMBIA	1,500	2,300	54	129	833	39	51	714	1,500	154	212	171	38	242	185	92	740	66	40	32	9,092
F. COSTA RICA	12	6	~	~	~	~	1	56	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	76
G. CUBA	10	1	2	2	5	74	1	9	172	638	2,500	16	92	203	45	311	35	11	6	1	4,134
H. DOMINICAN REP.	~	~	8	~	~	~	~	~	100	~	~	145	92	28	13	73	1	4,000	36	7	4,503
I. ECUADOR	~	~	~	2	4	1	~	~	6	~	~	59	7	36	~	3	~	4	2	4	128
J. EL SALVADOR	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	6	5	~	~	~	~	~	~	12
K. GUATEMALA	~	40	26	4	6	16	144	12	5	6	~	~	3	2	18	27	9	15	22	53	408
L. HAITI	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	60	18	7	~	4	~	62	9	61	~	4	227
M. HONDURAS	2	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	42	5	~	72	15	1	11	2	~	1	~	~	152
N. MEXICO	2	~	14	9	47	1	46	44	3	~	11	13	19	112	20	~	24	20	~	61	446
O. NICARAGUA	~	~	~	~	~	~	13	~	2	35	1	235	12	8	~	~	~	~	~	151	457
P. PANAMA	4	~	~	31	~	~	~	3	~	~	10	4	~	~	~	~	44	1	2	~	99
Q. PARAGUAY	2	~	~	~	~	~	26	~	~	~	~	157	17	~	~	3	~	1	~	~	206
R. PERU	~	2	291	1	~	~	~	~	1	2	5	5	~	8	9	8	345	195	10	~	882
S. URUGUAY	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	1
T. VENEZUELA	~	~	2	10	78	4	2	~	25	5	705	5	27	35	620	62	36	26	10	21	1,673
LATIN AMERICA	1,556	2,517	415	218	3,984	203	301	7,443	1,905	951	3,474	994	626	716	999	690	1,579	4,523	157	400	33,651

a. This series records the number of persons reportedly killed in events of domestic political conflict. The data refer to numbers of bodies and not events in which deaths occur.

SOURCE: Adapted from WHPSI, table 3.4.

the series, the figures presented in table 3403 have been compared with statistics from a follow-up monogram on political violence in Colombia by Germán Guzmán Campos, Orlando Fals Borda, and Eduardo Umaña.¹⁸ The results are startling. Using data collected by the Department of Criminal Statistics of the National Police of Colombia, Guzmán estimates the number of deaths resulting from political violence in Colombia between 1949 and 1962 to be 193,822, not 6,622, as reported in table 3403. Similarly, the number of deaths caused by political violence in Guatemala in 1967 was, according to recent research, more than 2,000, not 53 as reported in the series.¹⁹ Although the compilers of the *WHPSI* excluded political assassinations and executions from the count, the inclusion of these variables in the category "deaths from domestic violence" would not be so significant as to account for a large proportion of the variance between the alternative estimates.

In the case of Chile, the entire time series also understates the number of deaths resulting from political upheaval in the country. For example, other limited statistics indicate that 70 slum dwellers were killed by police in 1957 as a result of violence following public transportation fare increases, not 40 as indicated in the *WHPSI*. Likewise, 10 workers were killed in 1960, not 3, and 15 miners were killed in 1966, not 5 as reported in table 3403.²⁰

¹⁸ Guzmán Campos, *La Violencia en Colombia Parte Descriptiva*.

¹⁹ Duff and McCamant, *Violence and Repression in Latin America* p. 225.

²⁰ Leopoldo González Aguayo et al., *Teoría y Praxis Internacional del Gobierno de Allende*, Cuaderno No. 3 (Mexico: UNAM, Facultad de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, 1974), pp. 161-164.

Figures in table 3404 shed some light on the distribution of external interventions in Latin America, yet they provide no additional information such as the number of participants and the length of events. Furthermore, the low number of external interventions reported appears to be, in part, a function of the restricted definition for this category adopted by the *WHPSI* compilers, since they considered only "pattern breaking" occurrences (events that do not become patterned interactions) suitable for inclusion under this category. Repeated "external interventions" or unofficial "external interventions," such as United States military counterinsurgency operations in the region, were simply omitted.²¹

The series reported in table 3405 quantifies primarily the occurrence of coups d'état in the region. Although the data presented are indicative of acts of political violence perpetrated against institutionalized state apparatuses, with the exception of Cuba in 1959 and to a lesser extent Bolivia in 1952 and Guatemala in 1954 the series is a better measure of intraclass shifts of political power within dominant elites than it is of interclass conflict among different social groups.

A serious deficiency of the data on political conflict presented in the *WHPSI* is the marked bias it shows toward deflating the internal political repression of dissenting social forces by Latin American regimes, as evidenced by the inclusion of only one variable that purports to measure it (table 3406). Thus, the real extent of political violence perpetrated by the state against certain sectors of society is deemphasized.

²¹ See, for example, Duff and McCamant, *Violence and Repression in Latin America*, p. 225.

Table 3404
EXTERNAL INTERVENTIONS, 20 LR, 1948-67^a

Country	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	Total
A. ARGENTINA	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
B. BOLIVIA	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	7
C. BRAZIL	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
D. CHILE	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
E. COLOMBIA	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
F. COSTA RICA	8	1	~	~	~	~	~	14	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	24
G. CUBA	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	3	1	1	7	7	13	4	2	4	2	44
H. DOMINICAN REP.	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	2	42	10	~	55
I. ECUADOR	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
J. EL SALVADOR	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1
K. GUATEMALA	~	~	~	~	~	~	11	~	~	~	~	1	2	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	14
L. HAITI	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	2	1	~	~	~	11	~	~	~	~	14
M. HONDURAS	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	2	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	2
N. MEXICO	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1
O. NICARAGUA	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	2	2	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	7
P. PANAMA	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	4	~	~	~	5
Q. PARAGUAY	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	2	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	2
R. PERU	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
S. URUGUAY	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
T. VENEZUELA	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	2	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	1
LATIN AMERICA	8	2	1	~	~	~	11	16	1	~	5	9	9	7	8	24	10	44	15	10	180

a. An external intervention is an attempt by an actor, whether another nation-state or a rebel group operating from outside the country, to engage in military activity within the target country with the intent of influencing the authority structure of the country. The data are listed by target, not intervening, country.

SOURCE: Adapted from *WHPSI*, table 3.6.

Table 3405
IRREGULAR EXECUTIVE TRANSFERS, 20 LR, 1948-67^{a,b}

Country	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	Total
A. ARGENTINA	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	2	~	~	~	~	~	~	2	~	~	~	1	~	5
B. BOLIVIA	~	~	~	1	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	3
C. BRAZIL	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	3
D. CHILE	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
E. COLOMBIA	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	2
F. COSTA RICA	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
G. CUBA	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
H. DOMINICAN REP.	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	2
I. ECUADOR	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	2	1	~	~	~	~	4
J. EL SALVADOR	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	1	~	~	1	~	3
K. GUATEMALA	~	~	~	~	~	~	2	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	3
L. HAITI	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	1	2	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	4
M. HONDURAS	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	5
N. MEXICO	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	3
O. NICARAGUA	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
P. PANAMA	~	1	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	2
Q. PARAGUAY	2	3	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	6
R. PERU	1	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	1	1	~	~	~	~	4
S. URUGUAY	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~
T. VENEZUELA	1	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	1	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	~	3
LATIN AMERICA	5	5	1	2	4	~	5	3	3	3	1	1	1	2	5	5	3	1	2	~	52

a. An irregular executive transfer is a change in the office of national executive from one leader or ruling group to another that is accomplished outside the conventional legal or customary procedures for transferring formal power in effect at the time of the event and accompanied by actual or directly threatened violence.

b. This event was not reported at any time during the twenty years for Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Uruguay.

SOURCE: Adapted from WHPSI, table 3.10.

Table 3406
GOVERNMENTAL SANCTIONS, 20 LR, 1948-67^a

Country	1948	1949	1950	1951	1952	1953	1954	1955	1956	1957	1958	1959	1960	1961	1962	1963	1964	1965	1966	1967	Total
A. ARGENTINA	16	23	97	83	37	50	47	266	64	47	39	47	30	11	52	19	27	12	40	18	1,025
B. BOLIVIA	5	17	15	15	11	20	4	4	8	6	6	8	1	9	6	4	17	24	2	20	202
C. BRAZIL	11	10	19	14	28	13	12	17	11	5	7	6	1	21	11	13	52	27	35	10	323
D. CHILE	16	15	4	6	5	5	13	19	10	11	2	2	4	5	6	~	3	5	2	17	150
E. COLOMBIA	7	10	15	7	17	14	14	12	24	21	8	21	~	6	3	13	3	6	7	4	212
F. COSTA RICA	21	3	3	6	1	3	1	9	1	2	1	~	4	1	~	~	~	1	1	~	41
G. CUBA	7	10	10	9	39	43	31	17	34	98	78	157	210	104	33	5	16	22	26	8	58
H. DOMINICAN REP.	1	2	6	2	~	1	~	2	1	2	1	17	33	54	22	32	17	30	19	11	957
I. ECUADOR	3	2	3	1	9	16	4	3	7	3	6	6	2	14	4	6	7	11	8	1	253
J. EL SALVADOR	~	4	2	2	4	2	~	1	4	1	2	2	7	6	3	~	~	1	~	~	116
K. GUATEMALA	2	5	13	6	8	14	64	20	22	12	4	3	9	9	10	14	2	6	15	1	41
L. HAITI	~	10	~	1	~	~	4	~	9	43	28	33	26	17	12	62	19	8	4	15	239
M. HONDURAS	3	~	~	1	1	1	7	5	21	1	1	5	3	2	~	8	1	1	~	~	291
N. MEXICO	1	4	1	3	19	6	13	2	3	2	10	17	6	10	6	2	1	4	5	4	61
O. NICARAGUA	7	1	1	1	~	~	4	1	7	8	1	8	6	1	1	1	2	1	~	8	119
P. PANAMA	13	10	9	20	5	4	1	17	6	1	8	13	2	5	2	~	8	9	1	3	59
Q. PARAGUAY	11	2	2	3	1	~	2	4	3	1	6	12	3	14	1	2	2	1	~	1	137
R. PERU	11	23	9	7	~	3	4	2	21	3	6	7	2	8	15	6	7	9	1	3	71
S. URUGUAY	1	2	~	2	1	~	6	~	1	1	1	1	1	7	2	~	1	8	4	3	147
T. VENEZUELA	17	4	30	14	18	13	3	5	5	12	30	11	97	33	38	46	21	13	12	8	42
LATIN AMERICA	153	157	238	203	204	208	234	406	262	280	245	376	447	337	227	233	206	199	182	135	4,933

a. A governmental sanction is an action taken by the authorities to neutralize, suppress, or eliminate a perceived threat to the security of the government, the regime, or the state itself.

SOURCE: Adapted from WHPSI, table 3.5.

The coding procedure utilized further understates the WHPSI data. The compilers note that if their sources reported that "several demonstrations" had taken place, the coders were instructed to tabulate the reported events as exactly five demonstrations, which obviously produces data deflation.²²

No data set is absolutely free from either systematic or random error. A source of error in the WHPSI figures may have originated with the news sources of the *New York Times Index* and Associated Press. But we would expect the error to tend to understate the degree of collective political violence; after all, as Raymond Tanter has put it, "Aside from possible exaggeration from the press, one would not expect nations to overstate the number of riots and revolutions it has."²³ We can hypothesize, nevertheless, that under certain circumstances contingent upon political factors, the degree of political violence occurring in a given country may very well have been inflated by the media. Newspaper overstatement in 1965 of the level of political violence in the Dominican Republic just before Lyndon B. Johnson's decision to land marines there probably contributed decisively to a political climate in the United States that made intervention possible. Even the vaunted *New York Times* is not altogether exempt from the influence of political forces on its news coverage, as we know specifically from the case of the Bay of Pigs invasion.²⁴ Recent research has cast serious doubts on the validity of conflict data extracted from newspaper sources, suggesting, therefore, that investigators ought to be cautious when using such sources. Several other studies have also shown the U.S. media to be highly biased in its coverage of Latin America.²⁵

The critical question to be asked, then, is whether the WHPSI data on political conflict in Latin America are representative of the universe of collective political violence or whether the data are a measure of the mass-media perception of the magnitude of political violence. It is argued here that the data are a better measurement of U.S. media perception of political violence than they are of actual political violence in the region.

Several methodological procedures have been proposed in the literature to estimate the validity of a data set. Among these are the examination of a variety of primary sources, such as archives, political yearbooks, historical chronologies, oral history, and police records.²⁶

As a crude measure of the validity of the data on a given country, we can compare the figures for Costa Rica shown in tables 3400-3403 and 3406 with data extracted from Duff and McCamant's research on political violence in Latin America.²⁷ No political violence occurred in Costa Rica in 1962 according to the data in WHPSI, yet Duff and McCamant report from their sources that 3 people were killed and about 50 people were injured. Had the compilers of the WHPSI consistently relied on several data sources throughout the different stages of the research they would not have omitted this case, which was also reported in the *Hispanic American Report*.²⁸ Perhaps the *New York Times* and the Associated Press wire service ignored the matter because of Costa Rica's reputation among observers as a deviantly peaceful case among the states of Latin America, all the others of which are perceived to be politically disrupted.

Time-series data and the arguments presented here suggest that although the compilers of the WHPSI are to be congratulated for developing time-series data on a variable that is difficult to measure, the data fall short in supplying what is necessary to make social science generalizations about political behavior in relation to economic, social, and cultural factors. If it can be argued that realistically the team of researchers of the World Data Analysis Program of Yale University headed by Taylor and Hudson were necessarily limited to two major sources which would offer relatively consistent coverage over time, we know also from Thomas Laichas's study of the U.S. press and its coverage of Mexico and Latin America that such consistency has not occurred in the news coverage. (See chapter 36, below.)

In effect, then, the WHPSI tells us less about political violence in Latin America than about the U.S. perception of political violence there as registered by U.S. reporters. Data presented here help us to understand changing U.S. percep-

²² WHPSI, p. 65.

²³ Tanter, "Dimensions of Conflict Behavior Within and Between Nations, 1958-60," in Gillespie and Nesvold, eds., *Macro-Quantitative Analysis*, p. 89.

²⁴ Robert Kleiman, a member of the editorial board of the *New York Times*, recently disclosed the role played by the *Times* in the Bay of Pigs invasion: "The *Times* played a rather curious role there. One of our best reporters discovered that Cubans were being trained and armed for some mysterious purpose, presumably an invasion of Cuba. There were Americans involved in this operation in Florida and elsewhere, presumably the CIA, and he reported this. The question then arose, Should [sic] the *New York Times* publish it. The government intervened and urged that it not be published. The decision of the editors was to publish it, but in a very restricted form. The story was cut down; it was vagued up a little bit; it was not played very hard; it was left ambiguous." In Yonah Alexander and Seymour Maxwell Finger, "Terrorism and the Media," *Terrorism* 2:1-2 (1979), 117.

²⁵ On the validity of conflict data from newspaper sources, see David Snyder and William R. Kelly, "Conflict Intensity, Media Sensitivity and the Validity of Newspaper Data," *American Sociological Review* 42:1 (1977), 105-123; Herbert M. Danzger, "Validating Conflict Data," *American Sociological Review* 40 (1975), 570-584; and Harvey Molotch and Marilyn Lester, "Accidental News: The Great Oil Spill as Local Occurrence and National Event," *American Journal of Sociology* 81:2 (1975), 235-260. For ample documentation of bias in the U.S. media coverage of Latin America, see "The News from Latin America," *Columbia Journalism Review* (1962), 49-56; Fernando Reyes Matta, "América Latina, Kissinger y la UPI: Errores y Omisiones desde México," *El Periodista* 55 (1975), 18-24; and Robert Schakne, "Chile: Why We Missed the Story," *Columbia Journalism Review* (1976), 60-62.

²⁶ For some useful suggestions on possible data sources, see Tilly, Tilly, and Tilly, *The Rebellious Century, 1830-1930*, pp. 15-16.

²⁷ Duff and McCamant, *Political Violence and Repression in Latin America*, p. 139.

²⁸ The compilers of WHPSI report that the *Hispanic American Report* was initially used to extract data, but was subsequently discarded since "exact dates of events (needed for merging) were included only about a fourth of the time and the early years were not as well reported as in the Associated Press." WHPSI, p. 420.



tions of Latin American politics, perceptions measured by Kenneth F. Johnson in his revision of the Fitzgibbon-Johnson data for the ranking of countries according to the level of democracy attained at five-year intervals between 1945 and 1975 (see table 3301, above). Whereas the data originally purported to represent the status of democracy in Latin America, they are now defined as involving the scholarly images of democracy as seen by U.S. observers.²⁹ These observers must rely heavily on the U.S. media for their impressions of Latin American events, a press that, as we have found here, does not offer an accurate basis from which to judge the course of history.

Limitations imposed by the availability of data have confined our analysis of political conflict to certain forms of collective violence and to only two decades (1948-1967).

²⁹ See Kenneth F. Johnson, "Research Perspectives and the Revised Fitzgibbon-Johnson Index of the Image of Political Democracy in Latin America, 1945-1975," in James W. Wilkie and Kenneth Ruddle, eds., *Quantitative Latin American Studies*, Statistical Abstract of Latin America Supplement 6 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center Publications, 1977), chapter 5. See also his "Measuring the Scholarly Image of Latin American Democracy, 1945-1970," in UCLA 17, chapter 32.

Since 1967, however, Latin America has entered into a new phase of political violence manifested by a dramatic increase in the number of violent occurrences and the appearance of new forms of political violence on an unprecedented scale, in particular, what Amnesty International has aptly called extrajudicial executions. The number of persons subjected to illegal detention and extrajudicial execution in Guatemala since 1966 has been placed at 20,000 by Amnesty International. Between 1976 and 1977 there were 15,000 cases of disappeared prisoners in Argentina alone.³⁰ The complexity of the phenomenon and the paucity of sound investigations create a marked need for further research utilizing time-series design, compilation of valid empirical data from several sources and actual field research, utilization of reliable research instruments, development of multidimensional indicators, and application of comparative and historical methodology in the analysis. It is by means of these expanded approaches that we may begin to understand the archeology and dialectics of political violence in Latin America.

³⁰ *Amnesty International Report* (London: The Pitman Press, 1978), pp. 17, 144.