

CHAPTER 37
MEXICAN MILITARY LEADERSHIP IN STATISTICAL
PERSPECTIVE SINCE THE 1930s

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This study assembles statistical data and uses them to shed light on a number of prevailing hypotheses about the geographic and social background, education, and career patterns of military men, and to assess the interrelationship between the military and civilian leaders in Mexico since 1935. Biographical data are used to show why Mexico has been unique in keeping the military from running the government and to suggest some patterns for the role of Mexico's military in the future. Lastly, the data contradicts the conclusion of some studies that the military's separation from politics has kept it from intervening in the political sphere. We can hypothesize that reduction of the military's influence in politics increases the risk of confrontation between military and civilian leaders, and that the lasting peace previously achieved between these two sets of leaders occurred in part because of the participation of the military in the political leadership.

Mexico's military is one of the more frequently discussed among students examining the role of the military in the political development of Third World countries. Mexico has received attention because no internal military uprising against the state has taken place there since 1929, a fact that is true of no other Latin American country and of few Asian or African countries. Despite this unusual record, Mexico's army is one of the least studied in Latin America. As one scholar has suggested: "The contemporary Mexican military may be the most difficult such institution to research in Latin America. Certainly it is the most difficult national institution to research in Mexico. The few studies that have been completed, the statistical data that can be compiled, and the press and biographic materials that are available enable the historical analyst to gain only a cursory knowledge of post 1940 processes and seminal events¹.

My study is based on a pool of data for 205 officers with the rank of one-star general (and its equivalent in other services) or higher who have served as zone commanders or who held high-ranking positions within the Secretariat of National Defense since 1934. On the basis of the number of positions available during the years of the study, I estimate that the sample consists of approximately half the officers who held these positions in the Secretariat of National Defense and in the Army. The sample for the Navy is confined to high-level Secretariat personnel with the rank of rear admiral or higher and to some naval zone commanders. The Air Force officers held positions in the Air Force Department within the Secretariat of National Defense. Contrary to some Latin American countries, the Navy and Air Force in Mexico

are of minor importance, particularly in the political sphere, which explains why most of the sample consists of career army officers.

The sample of 205 officers is made up of 154 political-military officers and 51 military officers. Political-military officers, men of the rank of general who have held high political positions during their military careers, are included in a separate category because of their essentially dual careers. Their political interests and activities set them apart from their fellow officers in career experience and orientation, and their military activities distinguish them from the typical civilian leader. Included in the political-military category is my modified version of the first six levels of political positions established by Frank Brandenburg ([1] head of the revolutionary family, [2] president of Mexico, [3] revolutionary family members, [4] cabinet and subcabinet heads, [5] supreme court justices, [6] party, union and legislative leaders), the top three positions in the Secretariat of National Defense, the top two positions in the Secretariat of the Navy, and the directorship of the Air Force.

Nonpolitical military officers are men of rank equal to those in the first category but who have not held any of the political positions listed above. The sample for the political-military group can more accurately be considered a population, since it is approximately 95 percent complete. The data underrepresent the nonpolitical top military commanders only because 25 to 45 percent of political-military officers were those same top career officers during the period of this study. Therefore, it is to be expected that the political-military sample should be larger because those officers represent men who have held both high-level military positions and political offices. Nor could the sample be a random one, given the impossibility of obtaining sensitive biographical data and lists of zone commanders from the Secretariat of National Defense; rather it is based on the data available to me.

Career and biographical data for political and military leaders were obtained from published government organization manuals, biographical directories, memoirs, newspaper articles, magazines, personal correspondence and interviews, most of which are discussed in some detail in the "Bibliographic Essay" of my *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-75*.² These data have been used to establish a permanent SPSS data file under the title of Mexican Political Biography Project, stored at Central College, Pella, Iowa, containing coded information on fifty-nine variables for the 205 military officers and more than 700 civilians for whom aggregate data are treated here. Statistical data for civilian political leaders are from a nearly complete population of officeholders during

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¹ David Ronfeldt, "The Mexican Army and Political Order Since 1940," in James Wilkie et al., eds., *Contemporary Mexico* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1976), pp. 321-322.

² Frank R. Brandenburg, *The Making of Modern Mexico* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall, 1964), p. 159.

³ Roderic A. Camp, *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-75* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976).

the same period, who have held those offices used to describe the political-military officers. Specific data sources, which number in the hundreds, are discussed in the Appendix.

The military data pool examined here has an important limitation with regard to the most important and controversial current question on the subject in Mexico: to what degree does the military continue to play an active role in the national decision-making process? We can measure this role formally, that is, through the holding of formal positions, yet informal forms of political influence might be equally important. Prominent scholars of Mexico are not in agreement about the role of the Mexican military: some think it is a negligible force, while others, believing its role has declined, are not yet ready to write off its influence. Statistical data alone cannot provide the answer to this question, but they can illustrate how that role has changed since the 1950s. Furthermore, to better understand the role of military men in positions of civilian leadership, in the future we need qualitative studies for officers who have combined their military and political careers, and for those who have followed strictly military ones. It can only be surmised here, for example, that there are some characteristics peculiar to each type of officer. Thus, Morris Janowitz has theorized as follows: "these political leaders are not only concerned with internal management but also serve to relate the military to external elites and to the variety of publics with whom it must deal. The select military leaders have more of the symbolic negotiating and bargaining skills appropriate for domestic politics."

To better understand the relationship between military and civilian elites in Mexico, the political-military officer should in the future also be examined qualitatively as a part of the total political elite in Mexico. Do political elites, whether of military or civilian origin, share more similarities than do political officers and regular career officers? If so, it may help to explain why there has been less friction among civilian and military leaders in Mexico than in countries in similar stages of development.

Qualitative assessment of personality aside, since the late 1930s, the Mexican military has functioned in several identifiable roles. To prevent the army from dominating political activities, as it had done in the period prior to the mid 1930s, the civilian leadership of the 1940s kept it involved in politics, but integrated it with other groups, weakening its identity. In 1941 the military bloc within the official party was abolished and its members were absorbed by other sector organizations.⁴ But, as Franklin Margiotta has suggested, individual officers continued to run for political office, to participate in party decisions, and to select candidates.⁵ The army also continued to play a role in the management of conflict in

Mexico by functioning in two capacities: it conveyed political information upward to higher levels for action by civilian political leaders and maintained order on behalf of the civilian leaders who dominated Mexican decision-making.⁷ The army has been and continues to be deeply involved in the control and pacification of numerous rural political disturbances.⁸ Furthermore, after the disturbances in Mexico City in 1971, the President reportedly received the support of senior army commanders in putting down a challenge to his authority from a conservative clique within the official party.⁹ For these reasons it is helpful here to examine statistically the officers who have held political positions, provided political intelligence, or resolved political disputes at the local, state, or national level.

Background Characteristics of the Military

The first variable that several prominent scholars name as important for understanding differences in attitudes among military elites and political elites is place of birth. Morris Janowitz has best described its significance:

Since the officer class has its roots in the countryside, its ideological orientation is critical of sophisticated upper-class urban values, which it comes to consider as corrupt and even decadent. This anti-urban outlook is strong in professional armies in other parts of the world, and it seems to be reinforced by the professional indoctrination and style of life of the military community.¹⁰

In the developing nations which Janowitz examined, he found that most elites were recruited from the rural areas, but that the military elite representation from rural areas was even heavier than that of civilian leaders. In Mexico, however, military, political-military officers, and civilian political leaders came in disproportionately large numbers from urban birthplaces (see table 3700). This urban representation is remarkable, considering that 98 percent of the career officers and 91 percent of the political-military officers in the sample were born before 1910, when more than 90 percent of the general population lived in cities of 5,000 or less.

Although Janowitz's conclusion that rural areas are overrepresented among the birthplaces of political and military elites is not true for Mexico, his contention that the military leader is more likely to come from a rural background than is his civilian counterpart is correct also for Mexico.¹¹ Biographical information in our data set suggests

Claude Welch, ed., *Civilian Control of the Military* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1976).

⁷ Ronfeldt, "The Mexican Army," p. 8.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

⁹ Martin C. Needler, "A Critical Time for Mexico," *Current History* (February, 1972), 83.

¹⁰ Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development*, p. 58.

¹¹ Of course, Janowitz never implied that this would be true for Mexico. His analysis focuses on developing countries that only recently have become independent, a situation unlike that of Mexico.

⁴ Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1964), p. 45.

⁵ Edwin Leiuwen, *Mexican Militarism* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1968), p. 143.

⁶ Franklin D. Margiotta, "Changing Patterns of Political Influence: The Mexican Military and Politics," paper presented to the American Political Science Association, New Orleans, 1973, p. 38, published in

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Table 3700
 URBAN-RURAL BIRTHPLACES¹ OF
 MILITARY, POLITICAL-MILITARY,
 AND CIVILIAN POLITICAL ELITES
 IN MEXICO, 1935-76

	(%)		
	Military officer	Political military officer ²	Civilian political leader ³
Total	100	100	100
Urban ⁴	46	47	65
Rural	54	53	35

1. Place of birth is nearly complete for all three samples; only 5 percent were unknown.
2. Career officers of general rank who have held one or more positions in the top six levels as ranked by Frank Brandenburg and modified by me. For a detailed description of these levels and their modifications, see the author's *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-75* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), pp. xvii-xix.
3. Civilian political leaders are those individuals holding the positions specified in note 2 above.
4. Urban denotes a community of 5,000 or more persons.

SOURCE: See Appendix.

why the latter is so: different urban-rural recruitment patterns are the result of age differentials in the military and civilian samples. Within the civilian political elite, persons born before 1910 dominated presidential administrations only through 1958, and for the entire period of the study they account for only 54 percent of the total civilian political leadership. Military officers, whether they served only within the military or participated in politics, are a much older group since those born before 1910 account for 95 percent of the sample. Therefore, as civilian political leadership has grown slightly younger in the last three administrations (1958-1964, 1964-1970, 1970-1976), military leadership has rapidly grown older. The older the elite, whether military or civilian, the more likely he is to have come from a rural birthplace.

If Janowitz's contention that differences in urban and rural birthplaces produce distinct ideologies is true, then Mexico's political elite, by continuing to place the oldest officers in the top positions of the military hierarchy, may have contributed to a significant source of friction between the

George Kourvetaris and Betty Dobratz have completed a recent comparison of fourteen countries, concluding that officers most overrepresent cities with a population of 2,500-25,000 and 25,000 to 1,000,000. Although we have not broken down place of birth into these exact categories, we believe this conclusion would hold true for our sample of military officers. See their *Social Origins and Political Orientations of Officer Corps in a World Perspective* (Denver: Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 1973), p. 11.

two groups. Since less than 9 percent of the members of Luis Echeverría's administration (1970-1976) were born before 1910, it is apparent that contemporary civilian and military leaders come from two distinct generations.¹²

The urban bias in elite military birthplaces appears to be true for Argentina as well as Mexico. In Argentina, the commonly held belief that most of the country's generals come from the traditional families of the rural interior is erroneous: the figures for 1936-1961 show that 38 to 47 percent were born in Buenos Aires metropolitan areas as opposed to only 29 percent born in the "traditional" provinces.¹³ In Mexico, too, those admitted to the officers' school, Colegio Heróico Militar, come increasingly from urban backgrounds. During the 1950s and early 1960s, nearly 40 percent of the officer candidates were from the Federal District,¹⁴ which then accounted for approximately 14 percent of the Mexican population. As McAlister has suggested, the Federal District probably accounts for a disproportionate number of applicants because they have had a better preparatory education; the academy itself is located in the District (a new college was completed in 1976); and, since the qualifying examinations are given only in the District, other applicants must pay travel and living expenses to take the entrance tests.¹⁵

The second variable important in understanding differences in attitude between the two groups concerns social background. The differences are explained to a large extent by the fact that urban-born Mexicans are overrepresented

¹² There is considerable evidence among civilian political elites that those leaders born before 1910, or who actually grew up during the decade from 1910 to 1920 remembering the violence and instability during that period, have attitudes and beliefs different from those individuals born after 1920 or who were not present in Mexico during this era. This generational difference in attitude has been commented on by the late Daniel Cosío Villegas, who, in his recently published memoirs, argued that those who were born after 1920 "do not have the slightest idea of the difficult realities which the Revolution brought, and because of this they talk about it rhetorically" (*Memorias* [Mexico: Joaquín Mortiz, 1976], p. 57). Narciso Bassols, another member of the pre-1910 group and a prominent political leader in the 1930s considered his peers to be members of a revolutionary generation, distinct from those that followed (see Enrique Krauze, *Caudillos Culturales en la Revolución Mexicana* [Mexico: Siglo XXI, 1976], p. 211). For explicit quotations from contemporary political leaders concerning the influence of social and environmental experiences on their values, see Roderic A. Camp, "The Mexican Revolution as a Socializing Agent: Mexican Political Leaders and Their Parents," paper presented to the Rocky Mountain States Council of Latin American Studies, Tucson, 1977.

¹³ Jose de Imaz, *Las Que Mandan* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1970), p. 58.

¹⁴ Javier Romero, *Aspectos Psicobiométricos y Sociales de una Muestra de la Juventud Mexicana* (Mexico: Dirección de Investigaciones Antropológicas, 1956), p. 47, and his *Doce Años de Investigación Psicobiológica Sobre la Juventud* (Mexico: Sociedad Mexicana de Antropología, 1962), pp. 30-31, quoted in Lyle McAlister et al., *The Military in Latin American Socio-political Evolution; Four Case Studies* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Research in Social Systems, 1970), p. 221.

¹⁵ McAlister, *The Military in Latin American Socio-political Evolution*, p. 221.

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among successful Mexican military officers. Of the 85 officers out of the sample of 205 for which there is socioeconomic-status information, 53 percent come from lower and working class backgrounds, and 47 percent from middle and upper middle class backgrounds. More than two-thirds of the civilian political leaders come from middle and upper middle class backgrounds, yet career officers have come from this background in smaller numbers. The preponderance of lower and working class backgrounds among the military may be attributed to the Revolution which gave Mexicans from humble backgrounds the opportunity to succeed on the battlefield. The data show that most individuals who served in the Revolution in a military capacity and went on to public careers after 1930 did so within the military, rather than renounce their military rank and follow strictly civilian political careers. In the environment of the Revolution and postrevolutionary decade, a military career provided increased opportunities for success for individuals from lower socioeconomic backgrounds than did civilian political careers. Unlike the Argentine military, where 71 percent of the army generals are from upper middle class families, Mexico's army has been recruited from a much wider section of the population.¹⁶

Some scholars believe that social origin contributes strongly to the social and political attitudes of the officers.¹⁷ Janowitz argues that the differences in attitude between civilian and military elites produced by place of birth and social background are responsible for a lack of integration between the two groups.¹⁸ Despite the rhetoric of the Mexican Revolution to the contrary, class origins, although not as sharply defined as in developing nations in Africa and Asia, are still obvious. The difference in class background between the military and civilian leadership is declining, however, since the service academies are now recruiting largely from the middle classes, emulating the National University, which produces most political leaders.¹⁹ The poor suffer from educational

disadvantages when taking the competitive entrance examination to the military academy and are less able to pay the examination fee. The military academies and the universities, then, serve as sieves to exclude those who lack financial and educational resources.

The third important variable in the career patterns of military officers is education. It is related to location of birthplace and socioeconomic status. Educational data in Table 3701 confirms the conclusion made from the socioeconomic data that Mexicans from low socioeconomic backgrounds, and therefore low in educational achievements, have had greater opportunities in military careers than in strictly political ones. At the same time, military men without educational attainments, but with political ambition, have had greater chance of success in politics than civilians with equivalent credentials. This pattern can be explained by the practice begun in the 1930s by the Secretary of Defense to retire Revolutionary officers without formal military training. Some men, for example, General Adrian Castrejón, in an effort to become professional military officers, entered the National Military College after 1920 even though they already had achieved the rank of general. Others, who had civilian or military education equivalent to a professional degree, began attending the newly established military specialty schools.

Moreover, a sizable majority of officers, both career military and political-military, attended the Higher War College, an institution designed to train company and field grade officers.²⁰ A smaller but substantial group attended the intermediate schools (known as the *escuelas de aplicación*), train-

TABLE 3701

LEVELS OF EDUCATION OF MILITARY,
POLITICAL-MILITARY, AND CIVILIAN
POLITICAL ELITES IN MEXICO,
1935-76

Educational level	(%) ¹		
	Military officer	Political-military officer	Civilian political leader
Primary	22	18	3
Secondary	4	17	5
Preparatory	7	7	4
Normal	2	5	6
University or military college	64	53	82

1. These figures may not add up to 100 percent due to rounding.

SOURCE: See Appendix.

¹⁶ De Imaz, *Los Que Mandan*, p. 61, based his conclusions on data for 33 percent of the army generals in Argentina. In the early 1950s, it was estimated that Argentina had 35 percent of its population in the middle classes versus 15 percent for Mexico.

¹⁷ Marion J. Levy, Jr., "Armed Force Organizations," in Henry Bienen, ed., *The Military and Modernization* (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971), p. 63; and Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development*, p. 16.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 58.

¹⁹ Lieuwen, *Mexican Militarism*, p. 147; Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development*, p. 49; Kourvetaris and Dobratz, *Social Origins*, p. 10, found in a 1959 study that in the American military elite, fathers from blue-collar backgrounds were clearly underrepresented and officers mainly came from higher status white collar positions; McAlister, *The Military in Latin American Socio-political Evolution*, pp. 219-220; Arthur Liebman et al., *Latin American University Students: A Six Nation Study* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), concluded that students at the National University who had professional and white collar parents were overrepresented in proportion to those with parents in the working force. See pp. 41-42. Lucio Mendieta y Núñez and José Gómez Robledo found the same distribution of parents to be true in their earlier study (see their *Problemas de la Universidad* [México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1948]).

²⁰ Virginia Prewitt, "The Mexican Army," *Foreign Affairs*, 19 (April, 1941), 614.

ing junior officers.²¹ Our biographical data for an elite group of officers support McAlister's contention that "approximately 90 percent of the officers of the Mexican armed forces are today the products of officer formation schools."²² In Mexico, like the United States, more than 90 percent of the top-ranking army officers are graduates of the Mexican equivalent of West Point.²³ The importance of this figure is that educational formation takes place within one institutional environment, an environment foreign to civilian political leaders in Mexico. During the first two decades of the twentieth century, civilian and military political leaders had more opportunities for interchange, since many of them attended preparatory schools and universities together before and during the outbreak of the Revolution. Today, however, most candidates for the National Military Academy have only a secondary school education and, although some officers attended the National University in Mexico City and others are taught by civilian politicians or career professors with a university education, there is little opportunity for them to associate with and develop close ties with individuals who might later hold important political positions.²⁴ More significantly, they share few common experiences. This fact, combined with the possibility that candidates with similar political ideologies and family backgrounds may graduate from military college in disproportionate numbers, suggests that Mexico's military and political leadership is being evolved in two distinct environments.²⁵

²¹ McAlister, *The Military in Latin American Socio-political Evolution*, p. 206.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 218.

²³ Gary Spencer, "Methodological Issues in the Study of Bureaucratic Elites," *Social Problems*, 21 (Summer, 1973), 90-103.

²⁴ In *Los Que Mandan* (p. 68), De Imaz noted that because the typical Argentine military cadet has entered the Military Academy early, after one or two years of high school, he has had less time to build close bonds of friendship with those who after the passage of time might come to occupy responsible positions in the economic political or intellectual leadership of the country. Although some officers do attend the National University, to take courses in the social sciences or even complete a degree program (usually in law), this is an exception and not the rule. For those few officers who become full-time students, political contacts are greatly enhanced. The best example of such an officer in recent years is the career of Alfonso Corona del Rosal, who graduated from the National School of Law in 1937, fourteen years after completing his training at the National Military College. After organizing an important group of students and professional people in support of Manuel Avila Camacho for president in 1940, his political career was launched. From that date until 1970, he held important public offices, including the presidency of the official party.

²⁵ Unfortunately our data do not allow us to reach such conclusions. Spencer points out, however, that at West Point, twice as many liberals resign as remain, the middle ideological group is evenly split, and the majority of conservatives remain on active duty ("Methodological Issues in the Study of Bureaucratic Elites," p. 92).

²⁶ For example, in 1975, the President appointed a new Sub-Secretary of Defense, General Héctor Camargo Figueroa, who, immediately after his graduation from the National Military College, participated in twenty engagements against the rebelling General Escobar and against the Cristero rebels. He was too young to have participated in

These differences in education between civilian and military background experiences at school may in the future cause a lack of cooperation between civilian and military leaders. Bonds of friendship have been an essential feature of the Mexican political system, a phenomenon that explains, in part, why Mexican leaders with different ideological beliefs have successfully cooperated with one another to achieve like goals and maintain political stability, an achievement unique to Mexico in Latin American and to most of the Third World.

Career Patterns

We have suggested that there might well be career differences explaining why some military men opt for political-military careers and others remain strictly within military circles. Scholars have often thought that officers with combat experience during or immediately after the Revolution, continued to predominate among the top hierarchy in the Mexican army. Nearly all of the officers born before 1900 saw combat during and after the Revolution, as is shown in Table 3702. There does not appear to be a significant difference between political-military and career military officer groups in terms of combat experience since the 9 percent difference may be accounted for by the disproportionate number of career officers born before 1900. There is, however, a substantial and striking difference between the Revolutionary experiences of civilian and military leaders. For political leaders after 1935, the Revolutionary military experience was quite rare. Many civilian political leaders were too young to have participated in these events, but not to the extent that would account for the difference shown in Table 3702. Even though the political leaders in the 1930s made a special effort to weed out of the military leadership Revolutionary officers with no professional training, most of the officers who remained had participated in the Revolution. This tradition has been of symbolic importance within the army, and explains why every Secretary and Undersecretary of National Defense through the Echeverría administration had tasted combat between 1911 and 1929. As the government found it more and more difficult in the 1960s and 1970s to find officers with Revolutionary combat experience, the officers with battlefield exploits against rebel groups during the 1920s began to replace them.²⁶

The most important aspect in the difference in figures for combat experience of civilian and military leaders is that few civilian political leaders have shared a Revolutionary experience characterizing the majority of top military offi-

the Revolution. Furthermore, a select number of officers who saw combat as members of Mexico's 201st Air Squadron, which participated in the allied air strikes in the Pacific in World War II, also have been prominent in top-level positions. General Alfonso Gurza Falfán illustrates such a pattern. He was attached to the 6th Artillery of the 2d Belgium Army before becoming Chief of Staff of the 201st Air Squadron. Later, he rose to Chief of Staff of National Defense and to *Oficial Mayor* of the Secretariat of National Defense in 1965 shortly before he died.

Table 3702

COMBAT AND REBEL EXPERIENCES OF MILITARY,
POLITICAL-MILITARY, AND CIVILIAN
POLITICAL ELITES IN MEXICO,
1911-1929

Category	Career officers		Political military officers		Civilian political leaders	
	%	No	%	No	%	No
With combat experience, 1911-1929	61	31	52	80	5 ^a	36
Who supported a rebel movement against the government 1920-1929 ^b	20	10	6	9	4	29

a. Includes individuals who retained civilian status but were on the staff of any revolutionary officer.

b. By far the most important movement for these three groups, especially career officers, was the Adolfo de la Huerta rebellion in 1923. This unsuccessful rebellion involved the largest number of officers and troops against the government since 1920. One general, Federico Silva Villegas, supported de la Huerta in 1923, participated in an invasion of Baja California in 1927, and fought with General Escobar against the government in 1929. Later, he became zone commander of Puebla.

SOURCE: See Appendix.

cers, again suggesting that their outlook might be somewhat different.

Advancement within the military depends, in part, on certain career prerequisites. Among the most important are graduation from the National Military College, receipt of a diploma from one of the advanced schools, especially the staff school of the War College, and duty on one of the staffs at the military schools.²⁷

Officers who seek to reach the six highest military positions in Mexico—presidential Chief of Staff, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, Undersecretary of Defense, Undersecretary of the Navy, or Chief of Staff of either service—usually have held the following prior major positions presented in Table 3703: Military attaché to the United States, Director of the National Military College, and Director of the Naval College.

For geographic and strategic reasons, the following zones are considered important: the Federal District, México, Nuevo León, and Puebla. The position of zone commander in one of these four key commands is not a requirement to reaching the very top positions in the military, but an officer who becomes an attaché to the United States at mid career is very likely to achieve one of them.

Table 3703

KEY POSITIONS HELD BY MILITARY AND
POLITICAL MILITARY OFFICERS WHO
WENT ON TO ACHIEVE HIGHEST
MILITARY OFFICE AFTER 1935

Key position	N ¹	Subtotal Who Went on To Achieve Highest Military Office ²	
		N	%
Total	40	23	52
Military Attaché to the United States	10	7	70
Director of the National Military College or Naval College	14	11	79
Zone Commander of the Federal District, México, Nuevo León, or Puebla	16	5	31

1. From the 205 officers in our pool.

2. Presidential Chief of Staff, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Navy, Undersecretary of Defense, Undersecretary of the Navy, or Chief of Staff of either service.

SOURCE: See Appendix.

The position of Mexican military attaché to the United States seems to be as important in the Secretariat of Defense as the Mexican ambassador to the United States is in the Secretariat of Foreign Relations, where those ambassadors have usually gone on to the secretaryship. The reasons are somewhat similar. Compared with other Latin American countries of comparable size and level of industrialization, Mexico's purchase of weaponry is not very sophisticated.²⁸ It has relied more heavily on the United States for technical assistance, than have most other Latin American countries. Although some officers have received training in Western Europe, more than 90 percent of the officers educated abroad in the 1960s studied in United States military schools.²⁹ Furthermore, because of geography, external defense problems have largely been tied to foreign relations with the United States and Guatemala. Owing to geopolitical realities and the economic interdependence of Mexico and the United States, the army has generally relied on the United States for equipment and military assistance. Because this has been a typical pattern since World War II, the Mexican Secretariat of National Defense finds it advantageous to have highly placed officers who have contacts with Pentagon personnel and a thorough

²⁸ See, for example, Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, "Arms Sales in Latin America," (July, 1973), p. 3.

²⁹ McAlister, *The Military in the Latin American Socio-political Development*, p. 229.

²⁷ McAlister, *The Military in the Latin American Socio-political Development*, p. 230.

understanding of the political implications of relations between Mexico and the United States."³⁰

Most officers who hold the position of Director of the National Military College do so in their senior years. It became an important career position beginning in the 1930s with the emphasis on professionalizing officers and weeding out revolutionary generals who lacked technical qualifications. Since the Military College serves as both the recruiter and socializer for nearly all of Mexico's army officers, the officer in charge is extremely important, particularly in a country like Mexico with a tradition of military involvement in politics. The academy director, more than any single individual, has been responsible for carrying out the presidents' and defense secretaries' mandates to depoliticize the education and training of Mexican officers.

One career officer who exhibits many of these career prerequisites for success is Luis Alamillo Flores. A native of the small village of Fortín de las Flores in Veracruz, Alamillo Flores was born during the first decade of this century, attended the University of Puebla, and completed his military education in the 1920s at the National Military College. Later he received a diploma from the Higher War College, of which he eventually became the director. He served as a military attaché, first in France and then during World War II in the United States. He left Washington, D.C., in 1945 to become the director of Mexico's National Military College. He served in a number of staff positions during his career, among them assistant chief and chief of staff of the Pacific Military Region.³¹ He ultimately was named Chief of Staff of the Secretariat of National Defense. Most recently, he served as zone commander of Sonora.

An officer's promotion beyond the rank of Lieutenant Colonel may also be strongly influenced by nonservice political considerations.³² In the last month of their administrations outgoing presidents promote officers who have won their favor.³³ Too, incoming presidents must have consider-

able faith in their key zone commanders and the top National Defense personnel, so personal as well as political considerations become important; it explains why in this study top officers in the Secretariat of National Defense and the Navy Secretariat are considered political-military officers.³⁴ Biographical data does reveal that educational contacts at the military and naval colleges, service under a superior officer, and kinship ties have led to the formation of small groups of officers within the military whose career advancement, similar to civilian politicians, depended in many cases on the successful trajectories of a member or members of that group. It is evident that certain revolutionary officers, particularly Jesús Agustín Castro, Matias Ramos Santos, Jacinto B. Treviño; and presidents Lázaro Cárdenas and Manuel Avila Camacho were responsible for the successful political and military careers of many officers. It is therefore essential to understand that career patterns explain only part of the reason for advancement within the military and are both a cause and result of informal influences.

If we now have a better understanding of career trajectories, we still need to examine the degree to which military officers hold political office or influence Mexican politics. Although some scholars have seen the number of officers in political positions as stabilizing during the last thirty years, it has actually continued to decline. As the data indicate in table 3704, regardless of the level of political office, there has been an overall decline from the Lázaro Cardenas administration (1934-1940) through the Echeverría administration. Generally speaking, the more important the political position, the more pronounced the decline in percentage of posts held by military men. Influential decision-making positions in cabinet-level agencies have, since 1946, rarely been filled by career military officers. Many of his supporters prided themselves on their belief that Miguel Alemán reduced the degree of military influence in his administration (1946-1952) by appointing or selecting civilian political leaders.³⁵ This assertion is indicated quite clearly by the data that show Alemán as having a marked decrease in the percentage of military men in all levels of his administration. He, of course, was the first civilian president since Emilio Portes Gil in 1929 and, in part, his emphasis on civilian appointees can be explained by his background.³⁶

³⁰ This does not mean that pro-United States officers are more readily promoted. On the contrary, the Mexican army, given past encounters with United States forces as late as the second decade of this century, are understandably nationalistic. One high ranking officer told me that he believed his promotion from colonel to general was very slow in coming because he was considered by his superiors to be too pro-United States.

³¹ In addition to the 35 military zones in Mexico, each one approximating the boundaries of a state, there are 10 military regions, each one encompassing a number of zones. These are more important in the career hierarchy than zone commands. For a list of these regions, see Mexico, Dirección Técnica de Organización Administrativa, "Directorio del Gobierno Federal, 1956.

³² Margiotta, "Changing Patterns of Political Influence," p. 22; McAlister, *The Military in Latin American Socio-political Evolution*, p. 234.

³³ Most notable were the last-minute promotions of Antonio Nava Castillo and Alfonso Corona del Rosal by President Manuel Avila Camacho in late November, 1946. Both were politically active officers who participated in his presidential campaign and served in party and political offices during his administration (*Diario del Sureste* [Yucatan], December 3, 1946, p. 1).

³⁴ In Mexico, the Oficial Mayor and Undersecretary and Secretary of National Defense and the Navy are all military or naval officers, as are their top assistants. Since these are political appointments by the President or the President and his respective secretaries, they should be considered political-military officers rather than strictly career officers. Civilians, unlike in the United States, hold no policy-making positions in these two Mexican cabinet-level agencies.

³⁵ This anti-military attitude stems from the 1929 presidential campaign, during which many of Alemán's collaborators were supporters of José Vasconcelos, the civilian opposition candidate. Personal letter to the author from Eduardo Bustamante (former Secretary of National Properties), Mexico City, December 16, 1975.

³⁶ President Alemán was brought up in an unstable personal environment, resulting from his father's political activities. His father, a Revolutionary general, was killed leading an uprising against the government in 1929. Alemán himself narrowly escaped death several times

Table 3704

POLITICAL OFFICES HELD BY MILITARY OFFICERS IN MEXICO
(%)¹

Political position ranked in order of importance	Administration						
	1935-1940	1941-1946	1947-1952	1953-1958	1959-1964	1965-1970	1971-1976
Cabinet Officers ²	12	12	0	2	0	4	2
Governors ³	48	40	13	23	23	3	5
Senators	18	20	5	17	20	15	12
Deputies	~	~	3	11	11	3	2

1. Because of absolute changes in number of possible cabinet officers, deputies and senators, it is essential to look at percentages rather than absolute numbers.
2. Based on a complete population, excluding, of course, the Ministries of National Defense and Navy and including all directors and sub-directors of cabinet-level agencies and major federal banks in Mexico. The number of such positions open to individuals has changed considerably over time. In 1935, 34 key positions were available; in 1946, 56 key positions; in 1958, 76 positions; in 1973, 93 positions. Other investigators have attempted to construct similar tables for cabinet officers holding such positions. For example, see Franklin D. Margiotta, "The Mexican Military: A Case Study in Non-intervention," Unpublished M.A. thesis, Georgetown University, 1968.
3. Gubernatorial officeholders are placed in an administration according to when they were elected to office, thus more accurately indicating which president was responsible for that particular governor.

SOURCE: Appendices of Camp, *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-75*, pp. 345-462; México, *Directorio de la Cámara de Diputados*, various years, 1934 to 1976; México, *Directorio de la Cámara de Senadores*, various years, 1934 to 1976; and an unpublished mimeographed list of Senators from the Official Mayor of the Senate, 1934-70.

Alemán's administration initiated a declining trend which remained constant at the cabinet level. It could be argued that the number of military officers holding cabinet-level positions today is statistically insignificant and that recent administrations have made no purposeful effort to include them. Military officers have been able to retain some of their original influence only in the Senate, but data from 52 of the 64 senators for the 1976-1982 period indicate that only 6 percent are military officers, a significant decline from previous administrations.

at the hands of political enemies of his father. For him, the desire for political order and stability grew out of his boyhood experiences. Personal interview with Miguel Alemán, Mexico City, October 27, 1976.

The political-military officer is no longer very common among Mexico's political elite, and his position within the military has changed somewhat over the years. Although we do not have access to information for years prior to 1947 or for each year, data in table 3705 show very interesting patterns among the top career officers. Of the top twenty positions within the Secretariat of National Defense in 1947, 35 percent were held by officers who had held political offices.³⁷ In 1951, 33 percent of the top fifteen posts were held by such political-military officers.³⁸ In 1956, under President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines (1952-1958), himself an officer during the Revolutionary period, only 27 percent of the top fifteen positions were controlled by the political-military officers, and 30 percent of the zone commands.³⁹ By 1961, under President Adolfo López Mateos (1958-1964), the figures had climbed back up to 44 percent of the top sixteen positions, falling back to 25 percent during the years of the Gustavo Díaz Ordaz administration from 1964 to 1970.⁴⁰ That 25 percent figure remained constant midway through the Echeverría administration.⁴¹

Related data are note worthy. In 1951, 56 percent of the regional military commands were headed by political-military officers, a figure down to only 20 percent of the regional commands by 1956. And of the twenty-two officers who have served as Undersecretaries and Secretaries of Na-

Table 3705

MILITARY POSTS HELD BY POLITICAL-MILITARY OFFICERS, 1947-73
(%)

	Year					
	1947	1951	1956	1961	1965	1973
Positions in The Ministry of National Defense	35	33	27	44	25	25

SOURCE: 1947, data from the top twenty positions as listed in México, Dirección Técnica de Organización, *Directorio del Gobierno Federal*, 1947.
1951, data from the top fifteen positions as listed in *ibid.*, 1951.
1956, data from the top fifteen positions as listed in *ibid.*, 1956.
1961, data from the top sixteen positions as listed in México, *Directorio del Poder Ejecutivo*, 1961.
1965, data from the top sixteen positions as listed in *ibid.*, 1965.
1973, data from the top sixteen positions as listed in México, *Manual de Organización de Gobierno Federal*, 1973.

³⁷ México, Dirección Técnica de Organización, *Directorio del Gobierno Federal*, 1947, pp. 109-110.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, 1951, pp. 177 ff.

³⁹ *Ibid.*, 1956, pp. 201-202.

⁴⁰ México, *Directorio del Poder Ejecutivo*, 1961, pp. 32-33; and *ibid.*, 1965, pp. 33-47.

⁴¹ México, Secretaría de la Presidencia, *Manual de Organización del Gobierno Federal*, 1973, vol. 1, pp. 175-176.

tional Defense from 1935 to 1976, 41 percent held high political offices before achieving these positions; 27 percent went on to hold political office afterward; and only 31 percent stayed strictly within a military career.⁴² In short, the number of officers with political experience has declined since the 1940s, but has stabilized at around 25 percent in the Defense Secretariat's higher echelons.

If the last four Secretaries of National Defense were political-military officers, indicating no trend away from political activities by these officers, political-military appointments among recent Naval Secretaries and Sub-Secretaries have been markedly fewer than that of their counterparts in National Defense.

Implications

These data raise several important questions. Although the number of political elites who are career officers has declined to an almost insignificant amount, career officers with political experience still are important *within* the military establishment, particularly at the highest levels. Moreover, while political-military officers have headed the Secretariat for the last four administrations, according to one knowledgeable colonel "these officers in general enjoyed little prestige among the military professionals and any 'understanding' about their appointment was a symbolic recognition of the army's role in the revolution rather than a significant political linkage."⁴³ If the information in this quote is correct, then a situation exists where the professional career officer often finds himself a subordinate to those officers who engage in politics. Furthermore, the highest military commander, the Secretary of National Defense, is a model of the officer who is active in politics. These conditions may well suggest a possible conflict between the two types of officer within the Mexican armed services. In a serious crisis, it is conceivable that the "purely" professional military officers might not have sufficient respect for their politically oriented leaders to obey particular commands. This is not to say that such a conflict will occur, but only to hypothesize that the basis for conflict is apparently present within the armed forces.

The more rapid decline in the number of political-military officers outside of the army is equally significant. In Franklin Margiotta's view, "the key to nonintervention, then, based upon the Mexican experience, is to keep the Army involved in politics,"⁴⁴ yet, today, it is rarely involved in policy-making positions. By downgrading the army's involvement in politics to a minimum, political leaders have increasingly isolated themselves from contact with the ideas and the leaders of Mexico's military.⁴⁵ Since contact between them

was a key to nonintervention in politics by the military, lack of it may forbode a different behavior pattern. During the early twentieth century, the somewhat different recruitment patterns of the military provided access to political positions for a number of officers who did not have access to civilian careers. We can hypothesize that today a military officer has little chance of succeeding in politics, other than at the lower electoral and bureaucratic levels, as borne out by the data in table 3704, which show that only two military men could be found among the top ninety-three officeholders in the Echeverría administration. This fact has further closed off political recruitment to a narrower, more homogeneous group in Mexico.

Despite the decrease in the number of political-military officers among the political elite (and to a lesser degree, within the military itself) the military continues to function in a number of residual political roles. Certain positions within the military require adept political skills. The most notable high-level command position having considerable political functions is that of the zone commander, who is named by the president at the recommendation of the Secretary of National Defense.⁴⁶ The zone commanders supply both the President and the Secretary of Government with important information on the activities of state government.⁴⁷ A zone commander can also be used by the President to check a recalcitrant or overly ambitious governor by subtly shifting authority from the latter to the former; or the military commander may directly use the force at his disposal to chasten or depose his civilian counterpart.⁴⁸ During the period of our study, twelve zone commanders replaced governors who had been removed by the federal government. In other cases, zone commanders have taken control of a state government until a substitute or interim governor was selected.⁴⁹ Also it is believed that, since 1940, army officers have served to channel to the government the views of dissident groups: peasant leaders have sometimes protested to the zone commander and sought his help in getting the attention of the President of Mexico.⁵⁰ In short, the zone commander occupies a prominent place in the political life of the state. But, as Needler suggests, he serves as an agent of the civilian national political leadership, not as a represent-

military as a political interest group," p. 148. Instead, political-military officers, like their civilian counterparts, have developed personal contacts with other officers or political leaders already well-established within the political elite, becoming part of a political clique. One scholar has argued that the military academies, like the Latin American universities, provide the ideal setting for the establishment of coteries of friends which form the basis for military cliques or personalistic parties. See Glen C. Dealy, *The Public Man, An Interpretation of Latin and Other Catholic Countries* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977), p. 24.

⁴² Jorge Alberto Lozoya, *El Ejército Mexicano (1911-1965)* (México: El Colegio de México, 1970), p. 73.

⁴³ Ronfeldt, "The Mexican Army," p. 8.

⁴⁴ McAlister, *The Military in Latin American Socio-political Evolution*, p. 244.

⁴⁵ Lozoya, *El Ejército Mexicano*, p. 74.

⁵⁰ Ronfeldt, "The Mexican Army," p. 8.

⁴² See sources to table 3705.

⁴³ Quoted by McAlister, *The Military in Latin American Socio-political Evolution*, p. 241.

⁴⁴ Franklin D. Margiotta, "The Mexican Military: A Case Study in Non-intervention," M.A. thesis, Georgetown University, 1968, p. 165.

⁴⁵ As Edwin Lieuwen has suggested, the selection of military men for political office "cannot be attributed to pressures exerted by the

ative of the armed forces.⁵¹ The career officer, who does not acquire political skills and remains uninterested in serving as an arbiter of state and local or state and national political conflicts, will have little success in a zone command.⁵² Yet, the number of military officers with political experience early in their careers has decreased substantially, indicating that future zone commanders, while well trained in the military arts, may be lacking in skills more essential to maintaining political stability.

During the past forty years Mexico's political leadership has successfully dominated the military through a combination of rapidly increased benefits, praise, and attention.⁵³ Furthermore, the government's own moderate social philosophy has corresponded with that of the officer class.⁵⁴ Although officers continue to have expectations of future benefits from the political system, situations may arise when the military might act on its own, most likely the situation being a serious political crisis in which the government would have to confront the industrialists or a strong political faction within its own ranks.⁵⁵ That may well have occurred in 1968, when, according to at least one scholar, only the support for President Díaz Ordaz by Defense Minister Marcelino García Barragán, a following of high ranking officers, and the military's belief in institutionalized forms of change, averted an army coup d'état.⁵⁶ If a crisis occurs requiring a choice as to

which group to support to restore political stability, the officer corps might have a difficult decision to make. Data presented here suggest that professional officers could lack respect for their politically experienced colleagues of different background, who are most strongly committed to the political elite. In a crisis, they are also the individuals most likely to serve as a crucial link to political leaders.⁵⁷

Even against incidents of terrorism and the activities of rural guerrilla groups, the army's greatest source of strength lies in its symbolic support of the regime rather than in the application of force. Its internal role, which is to function as an ally of the political leadership, the Mexican military demands political skills. As shown by our data, these skills, especially those necessary for negotiation and mass bargaining, are on the decline among military men. At the same time, Mexico's political leadership is limiting itself more and more to individuals with small-group political skills and technical competence, thereby reducing its own ability to deal with broad groups, such as dissident peasants, strident landowners, and antagonized industrialists, all of whom are voicing their demands outside the regular political channels.⁵⁸

It can be hypothesized, then, that in Mexico political-military officers no longer possess the political skills essential for confronting serious political problems and no longer offer an alternative source of leadership. The Mexican experience suggests that professional specialization by military officers may be dysfunctional for developing countries if extended too far and too quickly. The fact that most military officers now in top command posts have little in common with their

⁵¹ Martin C. Needler, *Politics and Society in Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1971), p. 68.

⁵² For example, the author witnessed the intervention of the Zone Commander of Yucatán, in the fall of 1974, when a conflict occurred between the Governor and the Mayor of Merida, Yucatán. Rioting broke out, and when the Mérida police could no longer control the situation, the zone commander, on orders from the Secretary of Government in Mexico City, moved to restore order. So as not to appear to have imposed his will on the Governor, he explained to the press that he was working in close cooperation with the Governor as well as his civilian superiors in Mexico City. In a recent interview with *Proceso*, Rubén Figueroa, Governor of Guerrero, admitted that there are often many conflicts between a governor and the military zone commander, and that sometimes, the conflict becomes permanent. (*Proceso*, August 21, 1978, p. 9).

⁵³ See, for example, Margiotta, "Changing Patterns," p. 7; and Joseph E. Loftus, "Latin American Defense Expenditures, 1938-65," (Santa Monica, Rand, January, 1968), pp. 58ff.

⁵⁴ Lieuwen, *Mexican Militarism*, p. 149.

⁵⁵ All recent studies of lower social-economic urban groups indicate considerable support for the official party as distinct from the government bureaucracy and little desire to use protest tactics. Peasants, until recently, particularly in Sonora and Sinaloa, have been generally more passive than urban groups. See Charles L. Davis, "The Mobilization of Public Support for an Authoritarian Regime: The Case of the Lower Class in Mexico City," *American Journal of Political Science*, 20 (November, 1976), 665ff; Wayne A. Cornelius, *Politics and the Migrant Poor in Mexico City* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1975), pp. 184ff; and Kenneth M. Coleman, "Diffuse Support in Mexico: The Potential for Crisis," *Sage Professional Papers in Comparative Politics*, 5: 01-057 (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1976), p. 44.

⁵⁶ Kenneth F. Johnson, *Mexican Democracy: A Critical View*, 2d ed. (New York: Praeger, 1978), p. 106. The Defense Minister mentioned by Johnson, Marcelino García Barragán, is a classic example of a politically active officer, having been governor of the State of Jalisco

from 1943 to 1947. In 1950, he became a leader of the party which launched the opposition candidacy of General Miguel Henríquez Guzmán for the presidency. His political activism outside the official party cost him his active duty status from 1950 to 1958, when he was reintegrated into the army. Six years later he became Minister of Defense. One might speculate that the career officers who remained in the army would not be wholly accepting of bringing a retired officer back into the army and promoting him to the top. Equally important, it would be useful to speculate why several presidents have recruited defense ministers from officers who had left active duty and/or had supported the "wrong" politicians. This career pattern was also true of Jesús Agustín Castro, 1939-1940 and Francisco L. Urquiza, 1945-1946. It might well be that their loyalty to the government would be stronger because their careers were restored to them.

⁵⁷ During a recent serious economic crisis in Mexico, complicated by a lack of confidence in the government, President Echeverría had to deny personally rumors of a military coup. This rumor was also denied by Augusto Gómez Villanueva, Majority Leader of the Chamber of Deputies. Most United States newspapers carried Associated Press releases describing these rumors on November 20th and 21st, 1976. Earlier rumors were also reported in *Excelsior*, October 23, 1973 and in Alan Riding, "Mexican Army, Amid Rumors, Insists It Steers Clear of Politics," *The New York Times*, February 5, 1974. See also Judith Hellman's statement that "The threat of a military coup weighed on the president's [Echeverría's] mind," *Mexico in Crisis* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1978), p. 166.

⁵⁸ The assertion that Mexico's political leadership has changed its skill emphasis is based on an analysis by the author of the career experiences and credentials of the more than 700 individuals in our elite population.

civilian counterparts in age, experience, and education and that they have almost no role in decision-making political positions, is one element that portends a difficult road ahead for Mexico's recent tradition of military nonintervention.

APPENDIX

Biographical data, which combines information on career patterns with that of socioeconomic background, education, place of birth, friendships, etc., are derived from my research since 1968 in published and unpublished sources. For a detailed list and description of these sources, see my *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-75* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976), and Peter H. Smith, *Labyrinths of Power: Political Recruitment in Twentieth-Century Mexico* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).

Published sources most useful for tracing the careers of politicians and political-military officers include: *Diccionario Porrúa* (Mexico: Editorial Porrúa, 1970), *Diccionario Biográfico de México, 1968, 1970, 1974* (Monterrey: Editorial Revesa, 1968, 1970, 1974), Lucien F. Lajoie, *Who's Notable in Mexico* (México, 1972), José López Escalera, *Diccionario Biográfico y de Historia de México* (México: Editorial del Magistrado, 1964), Miguel Angel Peral, *Diccionario Biográfico Mexicano* (México: Editorial PAC, 1945), *Who's Who in Mexico* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1946), and E. Cordero y Torres, *Diccionario General de Puebla*, 2 vols., Puebla: N.p., 1972).

Unpublished data comes from interviews or correspondence that I have conducted with several hundred personages in Mexico as well as from my biographical data file maintained in up-to-date form for each individual among Mexico's civilian-political and political-military elite. This file, and the SPSS data bank of the *Mexican Political Biography Project*, provided the information contained in tables 3700 through 3703.

Much information about positions held was obtained from a variety of government organization manuals published since 1947. Unlike those put out by the Government Printing Office in the United States, these sources are neither consistent in format, nor published on a yearly basis. Such manuals have been published only for the following years: 1947, 1948, 1949, 1950, 1951, 1956, 1961, 1963, 1965, 1968, 1969, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1977. (For their exact titles and availability, see my book and the Smith, *Labyrinths of Power*, cited above.) These manuals contain the basic data for table 3705.

A complete list of all high-level political officeholders in Mexico can be compiled from the appendices of my *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-1975*. The distribution of military men among the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate can be ascertained from the official *Directorios* of the individual legislative sessions. The only complete collection of these directories is kept under lock and key in the archives of the two legislative bodies in Mexico City. These sources were essential to the collection of data for table 3704.