

## Chapter 2

# Losers in Mexican Politics: A Comparative Study of Official Party Precandidates for Gubernatorial Elections, 1970-75

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In an attempt to determine how the official political system operates, recent studies of Mexican politics have examined the careers of those who hold top-level political positions.<sup>1</sup> Although elite studies that concentrate on "winners" have provided and will continue to provide valuable insights into the Mexican political system, "losers" should not be neglected. Thus my purpose here is to develop a comparative analysis of those persons who lose with those who win in order to reveal much about the victorious politicians, the selection process, and political trends in Mexico.

This essay examines contestants for the official party nomination in each of the twenty gubernatorial elections that took place in Mexico during the term of office of President Luis Echeverría. (For victories and dates of office, see Appendix A.) Where possible, I attempt to evaluate the political situation in each state that held an election between December 1970 and December 1975, and I use case examples from several states to describe the career qualifications for the official party's "precandidates" for governor in order to suggest why one candidate emerged victorious. (The term "precandidate" is used in the official Mexican party system where contestants for the nomination do not compete in primary elections but are in effect designated by national leaders of the official party; the victorious precandidate never loses a gubernatorial election to opponents of the

official party.) Further, I compare the losing precandidates with successful contenders to determine if these individuals lacked some qualifications apparent in successful precandidates as well as to weigh the importance of certain variables in the selection process. Lastly, I analyze political trends reflected by the nomination process.

Students of the Mexican political system have identified several variables which appear to be significant in the process of candidate selection in Mexico. Three such variables are important for gubernatorial candidates: career experience, political friendships, and qualifications peculiarly suited to the political-economic situation of the state in question. Roger C. Anderson, for example, concludes that Mexican governors are college-educated, come from urban backgrounds, and rise in increasing numbers via careers in the federal government.<sup>2</sup> William Tuohy, Kenneth Johnson, Richard Fagen, and Octavio Paz suggest that political friendships may be the determining factor for successful politicians in Mexico.<sup>3</sup> My own research, results which agree with these authors, indicates that political experience is significant in enabling the candidate to solve the unique set of political and economic problems of the state at the time of the election.

<sup>2</sup>Roger C. Anderson, "The Functional Role of Governors and Their States in the Political Development of Mexico, 1940-64," Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1971.

<sup>3</sup>William S. Tuohy, "Centralism and Political Elite Behavior in Mexico," in Clarence E. Thurber and Lawrence S. Graham, eds., *Development Administration in Latin America* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1973); Kenneth F. Johnson, *Mexican Democracy: A Critical View* (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, 1971); Richard Fagen and William Tuohy, *Politics and Privilege in a Mexican City* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1972) and Octavio Paz, *The Other Mexico: Critique of the Pyramid* (New York: Grove Press, 1972).

<sup>1</sup>See Peter H. Smith, "Making It in Mexico: Aspects of Political Mobility since 1946," paper delivered at the 1974 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Chicago, Illinois; Donald Mabry, "Mexico's Party Deputy System: The First Decade," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (1974), pp. 221-233; and Roderic Ai Camp, "Mexican Governors since Cárdenas: Education and Career Contacts," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 16 (1974), pp. 454-481.

In order to understand the Mexican political process, at least in the selection of gubernatorial candidates, we need to examine the interplay among these variables in relation to the political situation of a state. It is argued here that neither special qualifications of the candidate, national political experience, nor political contacts as separate variables can explain which candidates win or lose, but when looked at together with the situation in the state itself, they explain most selections which have taken place for governors in Mexico from 1971 to 1975.

An examination of the seventy-two losing precandidates for governor reveals some interesting comparisons with the twenty winning candidates and past governors in Mexico. In general, Table 2-1 reveals that losers and winners tend to have very similar career patterns. For some career positions, no conclusions can be reached because we have incomplete information for losing candidates. But winning candidates tend to have career experiences in the following four positions: federal deputy, mayor, state party leader, and cabinet or subcabinet secretary. Also, an extremely high proportion

of recent governors have been student leaders, indicating early political recruitment and activity. Losing precandidates have been federal deputies, and to a lesser extent mayors, but they have seldom been state party leaders or members of the federal cabinet. In general, governors in the period before 1973 also had career experiences as federal deputies or senators and state or national party leaders. The key experience which appears to be missing from losers' careers is a high-level position in the federal government or the party.

The significance of this missing career experience becomes more apparent if we examine each of the contests to determine if the winning candidate held a high-level political office before his selection by the official party.<sup>4</sup> In only six states, San Luis Potosí, Hidalgo, Guerrero, Sinaloa, Querétaro, and Puebla, did a candidate win the nomination without having held important national positions (Table 2-2).

<sup>4</sup> A position qualifies as high-level if it is among the following: Official Mayor or above in cabinet agencies, Subdirector General or above in major federal banks or decentralized agencies, or a member of the National Executive Committee (CEN) of the official party (PRI).

Table 2-1  
CAREER PATH PERCENTAGES OF MEXICAN OFFICIAL PARTY LOSERS  
AND WINNERS AND PREVIOUS GOVERNORS, 1973-75

Position	Losers <sup>a</sup>			Winners <sup>a</sup>		Previous Governors <sup>a</sup>	
	Held Position	Did Not Hold Position	(Absolute Number Not Included)	Held Position	Did Not Hold Position	Held Position	Did Not Hold Position
Student Leader	12.5	20.8	(48)	55.0	45.0	6.4	93.2
Federal Deputy	45.8	54.2	(*)	70.0	30.0	44.4	55.6
Federal Senator	18.0	82.0	(*)	30.0	70.0	32.0	68.0
Local Deputy	5.5	58.3	(26)	15.0	85.0	16.0	84.0
City Councilman	≡	59.7	(29)	10.0	90.0	1.0	~
Mayor	13.9	69.4	(12)	30.0	70.0	11.2	88.8
Secretary General of Government	5.6	94.4	(*)	10.0	90.0	15.2	84.8
Oficial Mayor (National Level)	9.7	92.3	(*)	15.0	85.0	11.2	88.8
National Party Position	5.6	94.4	(*)	15.0	85.0	37.5 <sup>b</sup>	64.3 <sup>b</sup>
State Party Position	8.3	50.0	(30)	35.0	65.0	~	~
National Union and Professional Leader Affiliated with PRI	2.7	97.3	(*)	20.0	80.0	11.7	88.3
Private Secretary to National Leader	8.3	34.7	(41)	20.0	80.0	9.8	90.2
State Judge	4.2	83.3	(9)	10.0	90.0	13.0	87.0
State Bureaucracy	9.7	52.8	(27)	10.0	90.0	17.0	83.0
Cabinet Subsecretary or Secretary	18.0	82.0	(*)	35.0	65.0	12.6 <sup>c</sup>	87.4 <sup>c</sup>
Decentralized Agency Director or Subdirector	8.3	91.7	(*)	5.0	95.0	~	~
Military	6.9	93.1	(*)	5.0	95.0	30.0	70.0

a. Figures for losers are based on a sample of 72; for winners, 20; for previous governors, the figures are adapted from Camp, "Mexican Governors since Cárdenas" and from Anderson, "The Functional Role of Governors." The Camp data are for all three groups, and the Anderson data are for the winners only. The Camp data include a nearly complete population of 286 governors from 1935 to 1973.

b. These figures combine data for both national and state party positions.

c. These figures combine data for both cabinet and decentralized agency positions.

Table 2-2  
SIX STATES REPRESENTED BY A WINNING  
CANDIDATE WITHOUT HIGH-LEVEL  
POLITICAL EXPERIENCE  
IN MEXICO

State	Number of losing candidates without high-level experience	Number of losing candidates with high-level experience
San Luis Potosí <sup>a</sup>	~	~
Hidalgo	5	1
Guerrero	6	#
Sinaloa	6	1
Querétaro	1	~
Puebla	2	2

a. Insufficient information available on San Luis Potosí.

Of twenty winners, 70 percent held such positions, while of 72 losers, this was true of only 25 percent. A closer examination indicates that of the six winning candidates without national office only three defeated candidates with national experience. Therefore, in 85 percent of the contests, the precandidate with national political experience emerged victorious.

The recent trend toward national political experience is important because it differs remarkably from that among governors who held office prior to 1973. If we look at the comparable figures in Table 2-1 for governors before 1973 holding cabinet, subcabinet, and decentralized agency positions, we can see that eight, or 40 percent, of our recent winners had such experience as contrasted with only thirty-six or 12.6 percent of all governors from 1935 to 1973. We can only speculate on the reasons for this recent change. Most students of political history in Mexico seem to agree that the number of powerful regional or state bosses in Mexico has been on the decline as the political and economic power of the federal government has increased. As a result, except in the states of Hidalgo, Tamaulipas, and Oaxaca, the national political leadership has had to make fewer concessions to powerful regional leaders. The lack of national political experience has been characteristic of men receiving regional boss support; thus, a decline in this type of governor is probably a reflection of the decline of regional bossism itself.<sup>5</sup>

It is suggested here that national experience has been extremely significant in recent gubernatorial choices. National officeholding at high levels is indicative of several qualities in the Mexican political system. First, by virtue of

<sup>5</sup> For support, both analytically and statistically, see Anderson, p. 8ff. Cf. John F. H. Purcell and Susan Kaufman Purcell, "Machine politics and Socioeconomic Change in Mexico," in James W. Wilkie, Michael C. Meyer, Edna Monzón de Wilkie, eds., *Contemporary Mexico; Papers of the IV International Congress of Mexican History* (Berkeley and Mexico City: University of California Press and El Colegio de México, 1976), pp. 348-366. See also the Purcells "Community Power and Benefits from the Nation: The Case of Mexico," *Latin American Urban Research*, III:49-76.

having held such a position, a politician is personally acquainted with or his abilities are known to the president of Mexico or to a political leader of national prominence. Second, such a precandidate tends to have more access to national political leaders who appear to make these decisions. Lastly, his ability to gain access to decision makers in the federal government who control federal monies is considered a favorable asset by many state supporters.

The only other career factor which might be of some importance to gubernatorial candidates is type and level of education. In Table 2-3, we see that losers and winners are remarkably similar in this respect. Both precandidates and governors are professionally educated, the largest single field being law. The governorship is not readily accessible to representatives of the two largest groups which support the official party in Mexico — the labor and agrarian sectors. True representatives from these groups would not have a professional education. Statistics for the winning candidates indicate (there are insufficient data on losers) that only one successful contender, Alfonso Calderón Velarde of Sinaloa, had a labor background, and he had no preparatory or college education. The high level of education among precandidates is supported by figures on the sectoral membership of winning candidates in the official party. Of nineteen winning candidates for whom data are available, one was from the labor sector and two from the agrarian sector, while the popular or professional sector had sixteen winners, hardly an equitable distribution. The two representatives of the agrarian sector were not from farming backgrounds, and both had professional degrees. The educational and sectoral backgrounds of winning candidates are indicative of the dominance of professional, middle-class persons in the most important state positions in Mexico, similar to office holders at the federal level.<sup>6</sup>

In addition to career background, primarily high-level national experience, political friendships, or membership in a national political camarilla were important in candidate selection. This is so because the camarilla system is an integral part of the Mexican political process.<sup>7</sup> Briefly, the camarilla system is a network of personal political alliances or cliques which operate within the governing elite in Mexico. I have described it as follows:

This personal clique, like the official system itself, tends to form a pyramidal structure within the larger pyramid of the official system. It should not be assumed, however, that all men in a particular camarilla

<sup>6</sup> See Roderic Ai Camp, "The Cabinet and the Técnico in Mexico and the United States," *Journal of Comparative Administration* (1971), pp. 188-214; James Cochrane, "Mexico's New Científicos: the Díaz Ordaz Cabinet," *Inter-American Economic Affairs* 21 (1967), pp. 61-72; Donald Mabry, *Mexico's Acción Nacional: A Catholic Alternative to Revolution* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1973); and Julio A. Fernández, *Political Administration in Mexico* (Boulder: University of Colorado, 1969).

<sup>7</sup> Roderic Ai Camp, "El Sistema Mexicano y las Decisiones Sobre el Personal Político," *Foro Internacional* 17:1 (1976), pp. 51-83. pp. 51-83.

Table 2-3  
EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUNDS OF LOSING AND WINNING CANDIDATES  
FOR MEXICAN GUBERNATORIAL NOMINATIONS, 1973-75

Type of Degree	Winners		Previous Governors 1935-73		Losers	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
Law	9	45.0	87	30.5	33	45.8
Architecture	1	5.0	=	=	=	=
Medicine	2	10.0	24	8.4	8	11.1
Economics	2	10.0	37 <sup>a</sup>	13.0	7	9.7
Engineering	2	10.0	d	d	10	13.9
Teaching <sup>b</sup>	2	10.0	28	9.8 <sup>b</sup>	2	2.8
Military <sup>c</sup>	1	5.0	~	~	2	2.8
None	1	5.0	109	38.2	4	5.6
No data	*	*	1	=	6	8.3
	<u>20</u>	<u>100.0</u>	<u>286</u>	<u>99.9</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>100.0</u>

- a. This is a combined figure for economics and engineering degrees.
- b. Teaching certificate from a normal school, including urban, rural, primary, and secondary certification. This is not equivalent to a professional degree.

- c. Graduate of the National Military College or the National War College. Military equivalent to a professional degree.
- d. Included in category for economics.

are loyal to the man at the top, but that there are many camarillas within the original camarilla headed by men who command their loyalties. To give a realistic explanation of this process, one needs to look at the political system at a given time to determine who is the leader of the Revolutionary Family, or for our purposes, the primary camarilla. Normally, except when a weak president succeeds a strong president, the head of the primary camarilla will be the president of Mexico. The secondary camarillas will often be headed by his closest associates, normally in the cabinet or major decentralized agencies, the National Executive Committee (CEN) of the official party, and occasionally the unions or sectoral organizations. The tertiary camarillas are headed by men who are in turn loyal to the men closest to the leader of the Revolutionary Family. . . . Symbolically, then, the camarilla becomes a small pyramidal group of men which in turn is engulfed by a larger and then a still larger pyramidal structure, until the official system or pyramid itself emerges.<sup>8</sup>

If we examine each of our contenders for the governorship in Mexico, we can see the significance of membership in various camarillas.

Of the winning candidates examined in Table 2-4, eleven of nineteen could be identified with a presidential or influential national camarilla leader. In four additional contests, the winner, who was not a member of a significant national camarilla, had no competition from other precandidates who were known members of such a group. Therefore, in only four cases do we have winning candidates who defeated members of such camarillas. Two of the losing

precandidates have something in common: both were sons of former governors of their states. In Oaxaca, Pedro Vázquez Colmenares, a member of the camarilla of Hugo Cervantes del Río, a precandidate for president in 1976, lost because his father had made numerous, influential enemies in his state.<sup>9</sup> The winner, while not having membership in such an important camarilla, did have the support of a cabinet member and former governor of Oaxaca. In Colima, we cannot make a complete analysis because we do not know the political ties of the winner. We do know, however, that despite the loser's membership in Echeverría's camarilla, he too was the son of a former governor, which may have worked to his disadvantage. While camarilla memberships can be shifted, blood ties cannot, and they often restrict the maneuverability of Mexican politicians.<sup>10</sup> The case of Durango is somewhat less clear. One of the losers, although not a favorite, was Echeverría's personal physician during the presidential campaign. The winning candidate had considerably more experience, however, and was also a member of the same national group as the winner in Oaxaca. Although the contest in Puebla is analyzed in some detail below as a case

<sup>9</sup> *Excelsior*, March 14, 1974, p. 11A.

<sup>10</sup> *Excelsior*, June 1, 1974, p. 16A, gives a very good example of the interplay of such a relationship in the political history of the state of Tlaxcala. In 1969 the two strongest contestants for the governorship were Ignacio Bonilla and Luciano Huerta Sánchez. Bonilla's father, while governor of the same state, had shot and killed Huerta Sánchez's older brother. The elder Bonilla was forced to leave political life, but his son had the good fortune to join a camarilla including Echeverría in the 1940s. Later when Echeverría was Secretary of Government, Bonilla won the gubernatorial nomination from Huerta Sánchez. Just fourteen months later, he died of a heart attack, and in the new election, Huerta Sánchez, with his rival now dead, became the new candidate.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*

Table 2-4  
 IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL FACTORS, CAMARILLAS, AND PREVIOUS CAREER  
 EXPERIENCE IN MEXICAN GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATE SELECTION,  
 1973-75

State and candidate	Score			Total	State and candidate	Score			Total
	Political factors	National camarilla	National office			Political factors	National camarilla	National office	
AGUASCALIENTES	slight				NUEVO LEON	moderate			
Esparza Reyes	3	3	2	8	Zorrilla Martínez	2	3	3	8
Barrientos	1	0	3	4	Martínez Domínguez	2	1	3	6
Landeros	1	2	0	3	OAXACA	slight			
Díaz de León	2	0	0	2	Zarate Aquino	1	2	1	4
CAMPECHE	slight				Suárez Torres	1	2	3	6
Rodríguez Barrera	3	3	3	9	Vázquez Colmenares	1	3 <sup>a</sup>	3	7
Pérez Camara	2	0	1	3	Pérez y Pérez	1	0	1	2
CHIHUAHUA	slight				PUEBLA	heavy			
Aguirre Samaniego	3	3	3	9	Toxqui Fernández	2	2	1	5
González Herrera	1	0	1	2	Langle Martínez	1	2	3	6
González Soto	3	0	1	4	González Sosa	1	3	3	7
Caballero	1	2	0	3	Sánchez Cruz	1	2 <sup>a</sup>	1	4
COLIMA	slight				Fabre del Rivero	2	3	2	7
Barbosa Heldt	2	0	2	4	QUERETARO	slight			
Rivas Guzmán	1	0	1	2	Calzada	1	3	0	4
Noriega Pisano <sup>b</sup>	2	2	0	4	Bonfil	2	3 <sup>a</sup>	3	8
Santa Ana	2	3 <sup>a</sup>	3	8	SAN LUIS POTOSI	slight			
Ruvalcaba	1	0	1	2	Fonseca Alvarez	3	2	1	6
DURANGO	slight				SINALOA	heavy			
Mayagoitia Domínguez	2	2	3	7	Calderón Velarde	3	2	1	6
González	1	0	3	4	Robles Quintero	1	2	1	4
López Faudoa	1	3	3	7	Vega Amador	1	2	2	5
Soto Ruiz	2	0	1	3	Ortegón	2	2	0	4
Terrones Langone	1	0	2	3	Alvarez Nolasco	2	0	3	5
Gámiz Fernández	2	0	1	3	Carlón	2	2	0	4
GUANAJUATO	moderate				Ruiz Almada	2	3	2	7
Ducong Gamba	3	3	3	9	Vega Alvarado	2	3	2	7
Rodríguez	3	2 <sup>a</sup>	1	6	SONORA	moderate			
GUERRERO	heavy				Biebrich Torres	3	3	3	9
Figuroa Figueroa	3	2	2	7	Bernal Miranda	1	0	1	2
Cervantes Delgado	2	0	1	3	Vizcaino Murray	1	2	3	6
Osorio Marban	2	0	1	3	Carrillo Marcor	1	2	2	5
Soberón	1	2	0	3	TAMAULIPAS	slight			
Fernández	1	0	0	1	Cárdenas González	3	3	3	9
Aguilera	1	0	0	1	Ibarra Herrera	2	3	2	7
HIDALGO	moderate				Bermúdez Limón	2	3	2	7
Miranda Andrade	1	2	0	3	TLAXCALA	heavy			
Corona del Rosal	1	2 <sup>a</sup>	1	4	Sánchez Piedras	3	2	1	6
Bravo Santos	2	0	1	3	Juárez Carro	2	0	1	3
Lugo Gil	2	0	1	3	VERACRUZ	heavy			
Lozano Ramírez	2	2	1	5	Hernández Ochoa	2	3	3	8
Rojo Lugo	2	2 <sup>a</sup>	2	6	Méndez Docurro	1	3	3	7
Bonfil	2	0	3	5	Carbonell de la Hoz	1	2	0	3
MICHOACAN	slight				Llorente González	3	2	3	8
Torres Manzo	3	3	3	9	Vargas Saldana	2	0	0	2
Cárdenas	1	2 <sup>a</sup>	0	3	Cubría Palma	1	0	2	3
Pena	2	2	1	5	Aguirre Beltrán	2	0	3	5
Pliego	1	0	0	1	Cházaro Lara	1	2	3	6
Díaz Rubio	2	0	0	2	Senties	1	3	3	7
Bravo Valencia	2	0	1	3	Patiño	1	0	0	1
Mora Plancarte	1	0	1	2					

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Table 2-4 (Continued)

IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL FACTORS, CAMARILLAS, AND PREVIOUS CAREER EXPERIENCE IN MEXICAN GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATE SELECTION, 1973-75

State and candidate	Score			Total
	Political factors	National camarilla	National office	
ZACATECAS	slight			
Pámanes Escobedo	2	2	3	7
Cervantes Corona	2	1	1	4
Rodríguez Santoyo	2	2	1	5
Contreras Serrano	1	0	1	2
Salinas Iniguez	1	0	0	1
García Cervantes	1	0	0	1

- a. Indicates father was governor of the same state or a national political leader.
- b. Noriega Pisano became the new official candidate of the PRI when special elections were held to replace the deceased governor-elect.

Key  
POLITICAL FACTORS

- Score for the state:
- Slight: No major conflicts with opposition groups, with interest groups with the national party organization, or within the state party organization.
  - Moderate: Some recent difficulties with an identifiable group, such as students, businessmen, etc.; traditionally organized opposition which has produced some instability; or considerable infighting among factional groups within the state organization.
  - Heavy: Recent difficulties with groups has resulted in violence involving police action; opposition from organized parties has

study, suffice it to say here that, like Durango, it reflects the political influence of persons outside the presidential camarilla.

Our figures and examples indicate a complex conclusion about national camarilla membership. On the one hand, such membership is an asset to the winning candidate, but it is not necessarily a prerequisite. On the other hand, while the camarilla system is the critical organization within the Mexican political process, it does not seem to be the only factor necessary for success. Presidents of Mexico have to deal with competing interests represented by other national camarillas and by regional political bosses, thus they cannot always select the men closest to them for important political offices.

The Selection Process in the States:  
Some Case Histories

While both national office and camarilla membership are obviously important to the winning candidates in gubernatorial selections, the political situation of the state itself also explains, in part, the success and failure of precandidates. If we examine several case histories of preelection contests, and consider all three variables (national office,

resulted in immediate victories for that party on the municipal or national levels or consistent charges of fraud in individual municipalities and electoral districts

- Score for the candidate:
- 0 Not related to the following scale
  - 1 Career experience slightly helpful to state problems
  - 2 Career experience helpful to state problems
  - 3 Career experience ideal for state problems

NATIONAL CAMARILLA

- Score for the candidate:
- 0 Not related to the following scale
  - 1 "Burned" camarilla or not nationally important
  - 2 Influential camarilla, but not one of the major groups since 1971; or preceding governor's group
  - 3 Presidential or major camarilla

Camarilla identification has been determined by the following criteria: published information about political mentors; identification with an immediate superior if a person has served as his private secretary, secretary general of government, campaign aide, personal physician, or in two or more positions as a direct subordinate to the same individual. While such criteria cannot account for complete accuracy in identifying camarillas, past research, when compared with published sources, indicates it is a generally accurate measure. See my study "El Sistema Mexicano y las Decisiones sobre el Personal Político," *Foro Internacional*, 17:1 (1976), pp. 51-83.

NATIONAL OFFICE

- Score for the candidate:
- 0 Not related to the following scale
  - 1 Federal deputy or senator
  - 2 Official Mayor, subdirector of a decentralized agency, or director general of smaller federal agencies
  - 3 Secretary, subsecretary of cabinet level agency, member of the CEN or the PRI, or a congressional leader or national labor secretary

national camarilla membership, and state political difficulties), we can see the significance of these variables in varied situations.

Sonora (1972)

Before the election in 1973, the political situation in Sonora, where there had been considerable opposition to the most recent governor, was rather fragile for the official party.<sup>11</sup> Furthermore, there was a strongly organized opposition movement from the National Action Party (PAN), which competed successfully in Sonora on the municipal level in 1967.<sup>12</sup> The official party was split in the 1967 campaign for governor, and many members of the PRI supported the PAN candidate for governor that year.<sup>13</sup> Given this immediate political background of the state, in 1973 the PRI needed a candidate who could unify the political factions within the state party organization, improve relations between the national and state representatives of the official

<sup>11</sup> Robert R. Bezdek, "Electoral Oppositions in Mexico: Emergence, Suppression, and Impact on Political Processes," Ph.D. dissertation, Department of Political Science, Ohio State University, 1973, p. 57.  
<sup>12</sup> Mabry, *Mexico's Acción Nacional*, p. 77.  
<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 78; Johnson *Mexican Democracy*, pp. 133-134.

party, and present himself to the Sonoran populace as a young, aggressive, innovative candidate.<sup>14</sup>

Four precandidates were particularly strong in the competition for the nomination: Benito Bernal Miranda, Alejandro Carrillo Marcor, Carlos A. Biebrich Torres, and Francisco Vizcaíno Murray. The weakest candidate, the late Senator Bernal Miranda, former Chief of Staff to General Obregón and a career military man, was too old and in the wrong profession.<sup>15</sup> Furthermore, he did not meet any of the needs in Sonora, even as the PRI seemed to perceive them. Of the remaining three candidates, Senator Carrillo Marcor was atypical of precandidates and their career patterns. First, he was a *cardenista* who was closely tied to the national labor leader Vicente Lombardo Toledano and was prominent in national politics during the 1940s. Second, he was in his sixties, and his political experience from 1930 to 1970 had been confined to the Federal District. Therefore, his lack of recent national experience and unfamiliarity with Sonoran politics made him a losing candidate.

The other two precandidates were more competitive. Francisco Vizcaíno Murray was only thirty-seven years old, held a Ph.D. degree in administration, and had considerable financial and administrative experience culminating in his selection as Subsecretary of the Environment. It is probable that he would have aroused little opposition, but he lacked several essential ingredients: he had never held a party, electoral, or administrative position in Sonora, and his positions, mostly at the national level, were appointive.<sup>16</sup> On the other hand, his opponent, Carlos A. Biebrich Torres, who was Subsecretary of Government, the most politically oriented secretariat of the federal government, had nearly perfect credentials for the Sonoran situation. First, he had held positions at both the city and state levels in Sonora. Second, he was the state director of the PRI for Sonora. Third, as governor he would have to deal with the Secretariat of Government in federal-state political relations, making his former position invaluable. Unlike all of the other precandidates with an education, Biebrich was educated entirely in the state university and was director of the Federation of University Students of Sonora in 1958. Furthermore, in contrast to Vizcaíno Murray, his electoral skills were considerable, and he had won the national PRI oratory contest, a very competitive event. Biebrich was the ultimate choice of the national leadership. His base within the state organization

was strong because he had worked closely with the current governor when that individual was a mayor, and he had served as private secretary to the previous governor. Since both were dominant forces in the local PRI organization, he would have strong contacts needed for conciliation, and Biebrich himself was responsible for the political training of many of the local PRI leaders and members. His experience as a student leader and professor enabled him to deal with the most troublesome and vocal group in Sonora, the university students. Lastly, he had the confidence of the president himself, having served as his campaign aide in 1970. With his varied state and national experience, with his ties to national and state leaders, and his specific qualifications for dealing with the Sonoran situation at that time, he was a winning candidate.

#### Puebla (1974)

Puebla, the state with the most political disruptions under the Echeverría administration, did not provide enviable conditions for any politician seeking to win the gubernatorial election in 1974. Five persons had served as governor during the last two gubernatorial periods. In 1963, General Antonio Nava Castillo resigned under duress after violence erupted in response to student strikes.<sup>17</sup> His successor took over the state government "with tanks in the streets and with a private sector which believed that communist groups were on the increase."<sup>18</sup> Dr. Rafael Moreno Valle, with considerable national political experience as Majority Leader of the Senate, Political Action Secretary of the National Executive Committee of the PRI, and as Secretary of Health, became the third governor in February 1969. He too resigned, in April 1972, after being unable to solve the political problems. He was replaced by Mayor of Puebla, Gonzalo Bautista O'Farrill, the son of a former governor. Bautista O'Farrill failed to cope with a situation which saw increased violence, conflicts between students and police, and dissatisfaction on the part of the private sector.<sup>19</sup> He too resigned after a year in office and was replaced by one of the federal senators from Puebla. Economically, the state was comparatively underdeveloped, and politically, bossism was still widespread.<sup>20</sup> As a result of this political-economic situation, PAN stood to benefit considerably. What the official party needed in the state was a knowledgeable Puebla politician with considerable skills at conciliation, but someone who could also stimulate economic progress. Although the political situation in Puebla was disrupted, there were numerous precandidates for the nomination: Eduardo Langle Martínez, Rodolfo Sánchez Cruz, Rubén González Sosa, Carlos Fabre del Rivero, and Alfredo Toxqui Fernández.

Langle Martínez had served as the Secretary General of

<sup>14</sup> Students, because of their education and middle-class background, tend to be perennial troublemakers for governors. Sonora had been the site of much recent student political violence. Any candidate would find good relations with students an asset in stabilizing political affairs in Sonora.

<sup>15</sup> *Hispano Americano*, October 28, 1974, p. 14 and *Excelsior*, October 22, 1974.

<sup>16</sup> The author maintains that it is essential to separate the Mexican political leadership into two broad groups: those with appointive-administrative experience and those with party-electoral experience. While some persons have experience in both categories, the vast majority are easily identified with one career or the other. Each career emphasizes different skills necessary to succeed within the official system. See Camp, "The Cabinet," pp. 189-190.

<sup>17</sup> Marvin Alisky, "The Governors of Mexico," *Southwestern Studies* 3 (1965), p. 31.

<sup>18</sup> *Excelsior*, July 6, 1974, p. 11.

<sup>19</sup> *Excelsior*, November 26, 1974, p. 4.

<sup>20</sup> For a background on state politics, see David Ronfeldt, *Atencingo, The Politics of Agrarian Struggle in a Mexican Ejido* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1973).

Government under the interim governor, which might associate him with the failures of that administration. His most noticeable lack of career experience, however, was in the field of party political positions and electoral positions on either the state or national level. With the exception of his most recent position, his career centered on national appointive posts.

In contrast to Langle Martínez, Rodolfo Sánchez Cruz had considerable state political experience, but in Chihuahua, not Puebla, where he served a close friend of his father, General Sánchez Taboada, the former President of the National Executive Committee of the PRI. Most helpful to his chances for the governorship was the fact that President Echeverría, like a number of other successful Mexican politicians, was a young protégé of his father. His lack of experience with Puebla and its problems, however, probably prevented his successful candidacy.

The third candidate, Rubén González Sosa, had been a career foreign service officer since 1946, and became Subsecretary of Foreign Relations in 1970. He had known Echeverría since his student days and was a prominent leader at the National Law School in 1942. He had never served in an elective or party post at the state or national level, nor had he held any administrative post in Puebla; he was therefore not likely to appeal to the Puebla state organization.

As nomination time approached, the two strongest precandidates appeared to be Fabre del Rivero and Toxqui Fernández. Both men had similarities: they were educated in Puebla, they served in student leadership positions at the University of Puebla, they were state oratory champions, they held state administrative positions, and they were both known as men with conciliatory abilities. Here the similarities ended. They were men of different generations since Fabre del Rivero was thirty-six years old and Toxqui Fernández was sixty-one. Furthermore, Fabre del Rivero's experience was primarily appointive. Although he had served as a substitute mayor of Puebla in 1969, his two most recent positions were Director of Industrial Development in Puebla and Official Mayor of the Secretariat of Industry and Commerce. His advantages were two: he had access to persons who controlled federal funds, which gave him support among entrepreneurs in Puebla,<sup>21</sup> one of the key disgruntled groups; and he was known personally to the president, having served as a campaign aide in 1970.

On the other hand, Toxqui Fernández had much greater depth of experience in state politics and in electoral positions, and while he did not have contact with Echeverría, he was known to a number of recent governors in Puebla. His distinct disadvantage was that as the state director of the PRI in 1971, he was held responsible for the loss of fifteen municipal presidents (mayors) to opposition party or independent candidates; in 1973, the PRI, under his leadership, lost two federal deputy elections and a third was annulled because of electoral irregularities.<sup>22</sup> Toxqui Fernández became the PRI choice despite his reputed failures as state

director of the PRI. Although he had neither national political experience nor specific economic contacts in the federal government, he may have had the edge in the final analysis because of his numerous contacts within the state organization, and because "above all, he is a man who does not arouse passions."<sup>23</sup>

### Michoacán (1973)

Unlike the other two states discussed above, on the eve of a recent election in late 1973, Michoacán had not been characterized by political upsets in recent years. But like Sonora and Puebla, Michoacán was the home state of a recent Mexican president (Cárdenas), and any candidate would have to deal with his factions going back into the 1930s.<sup>24</sup> The state was also a stronghold for the PAN, primarily because of its widespread regionalism, catholicism, and participation against the federal government in the Cristero rebellion of the 1920s as well as the Sinarquista movement of the 1930s. As of 1974, however, political skills were not at a premium and the more long-range problems of economic development were of greater significance. In fact, what would have been most useful against the organized opposition in Michoacán was an administrator who could achieve economic and industrial growth for the state.

There was no shortage of candidates for the office of governor. Among the four strongest precandidates were Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, Enrique Bravo Valencia, Melchor Díaz Rubio, and Carlos Torres Manzo.

For Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, both a strength and a weakness was the fact that he was the son of former President Lázaro Cárdenas, a man with more than his share of political enemies as well as friends. Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas had not been a strong supporter of the official party in the past, and he had associated with outgroups led by such imprisoned leaders as Heriberto Castillo and Demetrio Vallejo.<sup>25</sup> Further, although he had considerable support from old-line *cardenistas* in Michoacán, he did not have good relations with the business community nor ready access to the purse-strings of the federal government.

The second precandidate, Enrique Bravo Valencia, was similar to the successful precandidate in Puebla, Senator Toxqui Fernández. His career was almost entirely in the political-electoral sphere of Michoacán politics. He was a career politician of the older generation, having served as federal deputy and senator in the 1940s and 1950s. Although he was a moderate within Michoacán political circles, he suffered from overexposure, having tried for the governorship on three previous occasions. In short, his skills were not economic, and his political skills were meager.

<sup>23</sup> *Excelsior*, July 6, 1974, p. 11A.

<sup>24</sup> For background on state politics see: Alberto Bremauntz, *Setenta años de mi vida* (México: Ediciones Jurídico Sociales, 1968); Lázaro Cárdenas, *Obras, apuntes 1913-1940* (México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1972); Eduardo Villaseñor, *Memorias-Testimonio* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1974); and Armando María y Campos, *Música crónica biográfica* (México: Ediciones Populares, 1939).

<sup>25</sup> *Excelsior*, December 20, 1973, p. 9A.

<sup>21</sup> *Excelsior*, June 1, 1975, p. 16A.

<sup>22</sup> *Excelsior*, July 4, 1974, p. 15A.



A stronger precandidate was Melchor Díaz Rubio, a doctor and rector of the University of Michoacán. He had served as a federal deputy and as mayor of the capital city. While he was seen as a competent, experienced candidate, he had one fatal weakness: his Protestant religion. As the reporter Angel Trinidad Ferreira pointed out, a protestant candidate would be at a decisive disadvantage in a state which has produced eight bishops, the cardinal of Guadalajara, and the archbishops of Mérida and Hermosillo.<sup>26</sup>

This left Carlos Torres Manzo as the only really strong precandidate. His career strengths corresponded with the needs of Michoacán: through his position as Secretary of Industry and Commerce he had access to and contacts with leaders in the federal government and private enterprise. He had no experience in state politics or in electoral positions, but he did have widespread support among a group of Michoacán economists and public men who had recently been influential in state politics.<sup>27</sup> Of the precandidates, Torres Manzo had the professional qualifications which, at that particular time in Michoacán, appeared to be more important than political affiliations of the other precandidates on either the state or national levels.

These three cases add some information to our knowledge about the variables discussed above. No single variable is consistently important. In combination with recent state political histories, we see that national political experience need not be relevant, as in the case of Puebla; further, membership in a national camarilla, especially one in which the candidate is tied by blood, as in the case of Cárdenas, often works to the disadvantage of the precandidate. In fact, as Table 2-4 illustrates, none of the eight precandidates who were relatives of well-known national or regional political leaders were a winning candidate.

If we summarize the contents of Table 2-4 by groups of states, we can discern several clear patterns. In one group of states including Sonora, Campeche, Guanajuato, Michoacán, Chihuahua, and Tamaulipas the successful candidates all maximized the three variables discussed above: their qualifications, experiences, and political contacts were ample and well suited to their states. They defeated other precandidates who did not have equal strengths in all three areas. Further, none of these states, in comparison with others, had major political problems at the time of the selection process. A second group of states including Nuevo León, Durango, Zacatecas, and Aguascalientes also had no major political problems, and the winning candidates, while not having the best scores in Table 2-4, defeated men with equal or even lower scores. Only the winning candidates in a third group of states including Querétaro, Colima, Sinaloa, Hidalgo, Puebla, and Oaxaca defeated other precandidates with better composite scores.

Can we explain the reasons for these exceptions? In each case, there are additional factors. In Querétaro, the

strongest competitor against Antonio Calzada was Alfredo Bonfil. Newspaper reporters pointed out that Bonfil did not want to be governor, which was understandable since he was Secretary General of the National Farmers Federation, a position more influential than the governorship of one of the smaller and politically less influential states.<sup>28</sup> In the case of Colima, we lack complete information about the winning candidate, but one of the strong contenders, Cuauhtémoc Santa Ana, had only national experience and was the son of a former governor, which may have caused him some difficulty. In the case of Puebla the winner appears to have succeeded because of his local camarilla ties and political experience, although the latter was considerably tainted. Local political interests, whose influences are unknown, may have predominated in that decision.

Sinaloa, one of the major "problem states" in the Mexico of recent years, was faced with a political history of internal dissension and a drug issue of immense proportions.<sup>29</sup> The governor at the time was unpopular and his efforts favored the privileged class in Sinaloa. While the winning candidate, Alfonso Calderón Velarde, was a surprise, prompting *Excelsior* to refer to his selection as *tapadismo de nuevo* (secretism again), the editor conceded that despite his lack of national experience his selection was plausible as a representative of those groups ignored by past governors. Unlike his two strongest rivals, he was very experienced in state political and administrative activities, had earned a favorable image as an efficient mayor of one of the larger Sinaloan communities, and was not associated with the past two governors, both unpopular. Seen in this light, Calderón's selection was not an example of true *tapadismo* in Mexican politics.

True *tapadismo* may be seen in Hidalgo, a case that fits readily into the old mode of secret imposition influenced by a local political boss.<sup>30</sup> The "winner" in the Hidalgo selection, Dr. Otoniel Miranda Andrade, had all the qualities of locally imposed candidates: personal friendship with and political dependence on the person responsible for impositions,<sup>31</sup> a lack of national political experience or membership in a national camarilla, and state political experience only in fringe positions. The local strong man in Hidalgo was Manuel Sánchez Vite, who left the governorship in 1970 to become president of the Central Executive Committee of the PRI; he became governor once again in 1972 after one of the most lengthy and unusual leaves of absence granted a governor in recent political history. Instead of supporting other well-qualified friends, Sánchez Vite supported a man dependent upon his political power. This attempt at *continuidismo* was pointed out publicly by none other than the Secretary

<sup>28</sup> For evidence of the levels of political power in Mexico, see my *Mexican Political Biographies, 1935-1975* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1976).

<sup>29</sup> *Excelsior*, October 17, 1974, p. 1A.

<sup>30</sup> *Excelsior*, October 12, 1974, p. 4A and October 15, p. 7A.

<sup>31</sup> The Secretary General of the National Action Party accused Dr. Miranda Andrade of helping his patron in sequestering a number of injured *panistas* after violence erupted in Tulancingo in 1972. For details of this affair, see *Excelsior*, October 13, 1974, p. 12A.

<sup>26</sup> *Excelsior*, December 27, 1973, pp. 10A-11A.

<sup>27</sup> Economists and graduates of the National School of Economics have been particularly influential in Michoacán politics. Among his supporters were several former costudents and professors.

General of the National Federation of Popular Organizations (CNOP), who told the press that Sánchez Vite was a man who "had mental gaps and was lacking in political tact" and "wanted to continue running the state through the imposition of his successor."<sup>32</sup> Erroneously, he predicted that such an imposition would not be allowed and that Sánchez Vite's political career would end. But thirteen days later, on October 12, he publicly gave CNOP support to Miranda Andrade's candidacy. Miranda Andrade's precandidacy was further opposed by both federal senators, themselves early precandidates from Hidalgo, one of whom was a friend of Sánchez Vite.<sup>33</sup> Another precandidate, federal deputy Oscar Bravo Santos, opposed him because he had violated Article 48 of the Hidalgo constitution by not relinquishing his public post six months before the election.<sup>34</sup> Miranda Andrade was selected from among a group of close local cohorts because the other possible precandidates were too politically independent.<sup>35</sup>

In a category by themselves are the cases of Veracruz, Guerrero, and Tlaxcala. In Guerrero and Tlaxcala we find that the composite score of a successful was superior to that of his competitors, but that these states had serious political problems. On the other hand, *PRI decision makers* felt that Rubén Figueroa had the qualifications to reconcile some of the political problems in Guerrero.<sup>36</sup> He did not, however, have a popular following in Guerrero. In the Tlaxcalan case the state was split by political feuding and disagreements between state and municipal authorities. This was precisely the reason for selecting a man from the past, and someone with political skills.

Veracruz stands as an unusual case during the years from 1973 to 1975. When the imposition of Manuel Carbonell de la Hoz was announced,<sup>37</sup> the president of the

<sup>32</sup> *Excelsior*, September 30, 1974, p. 1A.

<sup>33</sup> *Excelsior*, October 18, 1974, p. 1A. After Miranda Andrade took office on April 1, 1975, his political enemies, gaining in strength, were able to have him deposed by the Permanent Commission of the Congress on April 29. Both he and his political mentor, Sánchez Vite, fled Hidalgo to avoid prosecution for various charges. To my knowledge, this is the shortest elective term served by a Mexican governor since 1935. In removing his man from office, political enemies of Sánchez Vite seem to have permanently destroyed Sánchez Vite's influence in Hidalgo. For additional details, see *Hispano Americano*, May 5, 1975, p. 42, and *Latin America*, May 9, 1975, p. 141.

<sup>34</sup> *Excelsior*, October 17, 1974, p. 4A.

<sup>35</sup> *Excelsior*, October 10, 1974, p. 1A.

<sup>36</sup> This is reflected by his willingness to deal personally with the guerrilla leader Lucio Cabañas, who later kidnapped him. Despite some uncomplimentary comments about Cabañas after his rescue, Figueroa was still willing to interview him, alone. His consistent willingness to face his opponents was clearly useful to him as a precandidate.

<sup>37</sup> Manuel Carbonell de la Hoz was not only a close confidant of the governor, but he was closely tied to a previous governor and well-known political boss of Veracruz, Fernando López Arias. Carbonell had a reputation as a state official who frequently resorted to violence to achieve his goals.

National Executive Committee of the PRI, Jesús Reyes Heróles, said, "I, as a *veracruzano*, have not voted for him."<sup>38</sup> The result of this statement was nothing short of spectacular because in less than 72 hours, his assured candidacy was withdrawn. The statement by Reyes Heróles had pointed up an important fact: the "local support" claimed for precandidate Carbonell did not exist, such "localism" serving in this case as in so many others as a pretext for control by "the most sinister bossism."<sup>39</sup> The withdrawal of the boss's candidate opened the contest to a number of strong precandidates with national reputations, one of whom eventually won. The difference between the Hidalgo case and that of Veracruz which changed the course of events, was the personal interest of a native veracruzano in a position of sufficient influence to change the decision.<sup>40</sup>

### Conclusions

Initially, we made three assumptions in our study of losing precandidates in Mexico. We suggested that our examination would reveal characteristics of victorious gubernatorial candidates of the official party, of the selection process itself, and possibly of some of the political trends in Mexico.

Victorious gubernatorial candidates nominated by the PRI do not have fixed and therefore predictable career patterns. The majority of them do, however, have certain characteristics which typify all potential precandidates in this process — professional education. While not necessarily suggesting a requirement, a candidate who has held office at the highest levels in the national governmental or party structure is much more likely to succeed in competition than candidates who have not had such experience.<sup>41</sup> In general, the largest number of victorious precandidates, as contrasted with the losers, have had a balance between state or local and national experience.

As for the way in which the PRI selects the winning precandidate, much remains a mystery, a mystery that only national leaders could help solve by revealing the intricacies of that process. We have, however, expanded our perceptions

<sup>38</sup> *Excelsior*, April 19, 1974, p. 1A.

<sup>39</sup> *Excelsior*, April 24, 1974, p. 4A. Carbonell was also strongly opposed by Popular Socialist Party leaders and by the mayor of Veracruz.

<sup>40</sup> For a short comparative analysis of the selection process in Hidalgo and Veracruz, see the editorial by Miguel Ángel Granados Chapa, "Relección en Hidalgo, Imposición Inevitable?," *Excelsior*, October 15, 1974, p. 7A.

<sup>41</sup> This is supported by the makeup of gubernatorial nominations since January, 1975. These include Jorge Jiménez Cantu, who resigned as Secretary of Health to become the candidate for Mexico; Oscar Flores Tapia, who left the directorship of CNOP to become the candidate for Coahuila; Rogelio Flores Curiel, a federal senator and former police chief of the Federal District, who became the party's candidate for Nayarit; and Jorge de la Vega Domínguez, who resigned as head of CONASUPO to become the candidate for Chiapas. In the case of Morelos and Yucatán, candidates with more important national positions lost to other precandidates, but those also had national experience.

of some factors involved in the selection of winners — and losers. Let us look back again and list the states we ranked as heavy in political conflicts — Puebla, Tlaxcala, Guerrero, Veracruz, and Sinaloa. If we had Veracruz without the intervention of PRI President Reyes Heróles, an interesting pattern emerges. In three states, known friends of the President were defeated for the candidacy: under Echeverría, a state having major political problems was more likely to emerge with a candidate outside the President's camarilla, one who was a sop to powerful interests in the state or to a national leader retaining considerable interest in his state. This type of candidate usually had local political experience and was identified with old-style politics, in which precandidacy is handled in a very secretive style.

The more secretive the selection process, the more controversial the candidate. It cannot be proved that the president has to compromise with powerful competing interests, but our analysis definitely suggests that he does this more frequently than might be suspected. Further, sufficient agitation by appropriate individuals and interests can alter the selection of a "strong" precandidate.

While computation of a simple score for precandidates in Table 2-4 offers a tenuous means of determining the importance of certain variables in a selection process so closed to the outside observer, a general overview of all the variables together with qualitative analysis of specific individual cases provides some insight into the reasons for each official party choice. All of our variables are relevant, and a

candidate who has membership in a national camarilla, has held or is holding a high-level party or administrative position, and has the best qualifications to cope with the state's economic-political problems will usually win.

What does our examination of these governors tell us about recent political trends in Mexico? A recent article suggests that the seven state governors selected in 1973 were part of Echeverría's experimental politics and reforms, while the twelve selected in 1974 are tried and trusted party stalwarts, who will put the PRI into "smooth running order for the selections of its presidential candidate next year, and the elections of 1976."<sup>42</sup> This analysis is at once too simple and full of exceptions. Most of the 1974 choices had not held major party positions, and several of them, as we have seen, were candidates of local interest groups in politically less important states. It seems clear that Echeverría, like most recent presidents before him, has refrained from imposing his personal friends on many governorships and has attempted to achieve a balance between various political interests within the official structure in Mexico. It would be a fruitless effort to try to predict future selections because each president and each state confronts the system with different choices. It appears, however, that precandidates with national political experience will become increasingly prevalent, an indication of the growing centralization of political and economic power in Mexico.

<sup>42</sup> *Latin America*, August 30, 1974, p. 271.

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APPENDIX A  
WINNING GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDATES UNDER ECHEVERRÍA

State	Date term began	Candidate
Chiapas	Dec. 1, 1970 <sup>a</sup>	Manuel Velasco Suárez
Tabasco	Jan. 1, 1971 <sup>a</sup>	Mario Trujillo García
Jalisco	Mar. 1, 1971 <sup>a</sup>	Alberto Orozco Romero
Sonora	Sept. 1, 1973	Carlos A. Biebrich Torres <sup>c</sup>
Campeche	Sept. 16, 1973	Rafael Rodríguez Barrera
Guanajuato	Sept. 26, 1973	Louis Ducoing Gamba
San Luis Potosí	Sept. 26, 1973	Guillermo Fonseca Alvarez
Querétaro	Oct. 1, 1973	Antonio Calzada
Nuevo León	Oct. 4, 1973	Pedro Zorrilla Martínez
Colima	Nov. 1, 1973	Antonio Barbosa Heldt <sup>b</sup>
Durango	Sept. 15, 1974	Héctor Mayagoitia Domínguez
Michoacán	Sept. 16, 1974	Carlos Torres Manzo
Zacatecas	Sept. 16, 1974	Fernando Pámanes Escobedo
Chihuahua	Oct. 4, 1974	Manuel Aguirre Samaniego
Aguascalientes	Dec. 1, 1974	J. Rufugio Esparza Reyes
Veracruz	Dec. 1, 1974	Rafael Hernández Ochoa
Oaxaca	Dec. 1, 1974	Manuel Zárate Aquino
Sinaloa	Jan. 1, 1975	Alfonso Calderón Velarde
Tlaxcala	Jan. 15, 1975	Emilio Sánchez Piedras
Puebla	Feb. 1, 1975	Alfredo Toxqui Fernández
Tamaulipas	Feb. 5, 1975	Enrique Cárdenas González
Hidalgo	April 1, 1975	Otoniel Miranda Andrade <sup>c</sup>
Guerrero	April 1, 1975	Rubén Figueroa Figueroa

- a. These governors took office with or after President Echeverría, but their selection and election took place under a previous president, and they will not be considered in the analysis here.
- b. Antonio Barbosa Heldt committed suicide before taking office. He will be considered here since he was the original official party precandidate and governor-elect.

- c. Carlos Biebrich Torres was forced to resign October 25, 1975, and was replaced by Alejandro Carrillo Marcor. His downfall can be attributed in part to his inability to deal skillfully with agrarian problems which became more pronounced after his selection in 1973. Otoniel Miranda Andrade was removed April 1, 1975. See note 33 for details.