

**PART VII**  
**INTERPRETATION OF DATA**  
  
**CHAPTER 32**  
  
**MEASURING THE SCHOLARLY IMAGE OF  
LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 1945-70\***

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**Prefatory Note**

by  
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With the 1975 quinquennial survey of the status of democratic development in Latin America I withdraw from active participation in the periodic process of evaluating and analyzing the political climate of the other America. I have been engaged in the undertaking for twenty-five years, at the indicated intervals, and it has withal, been a fascinating and I believe rewarding and useful experiment.

Professor Kenneth F. Johnson, who collaborated with me most constructively in the 1960 and 1970 surveys, will continue the process with whatever modifications may subsequently appear desirable. He has in mind the possibility of certain imaginative and stimulating changes in the undertaking, beginning with interpretation of the 1970 data, that will, I am sure, render the evaluations still more reflective and informative.

It remains only to express my deep appreciation to all those who have participated in the present and past surveys; some of them are now deceased. Even if an individual took part in only one survey his contribution was nonetheless valuable and valued. I shall always be in their debt.

For the future I bespeak the continued cooperation of Latin Americanists and other countries with Professor Johnson, whom I regard as eminently qualified to carry on and improve a survey technique that is now a quarter of a century old.

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R.H.F.

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## MEASURING THE SCHOLARLY IMAGE OF LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY, 1945-70\*

Surveying the sweep of a quarter-century of Latin American politics one could reasonably assume that observable changes have taken place in the norms, styles, skills, and arenas that help to define that geographic area's political culture. This view is somewhat at variance with Fred Riggs's hypothesis contained in his theory of the prismatic society that politics in some areas of the Third World may not be "developing" in the sense of directional change but may be remaining more or less permanently and continuously unstable.<sup>1</sup> In Riggs's view, acts of political instability, like coups, presidential assassinations, general strikes, subversion, guerrilla warfare, and anomic violence, may be not part of the transition from the underdeveloped to the modern but constants within the context of prismatic politics. Where Latin America is concerned, there is a growing corpus of impressionistic, but empirically based, literature tending to confirm the Riggs hypothesis.

Although it can be argued that the progression of political events over the last twenty-five years speak in support of Riggs's position, my view is that to understand political life we need to be more precise in developing a longitudinal measure, a measure utilizing the judgment of experts concerning trends in the development and/or demise of political democracy in Latin America. My purpose here, then, is to develop a methodological and normative analysis utilizing a unique source available to us progressively and quinquennially since 1945 when Russell H. Fitzgibbon began statistical surveys on Latin American political democracy.

\*This study is referred to as including 1970 even though the final survey took place on or about November 20, 1969. No major events that could affect the analysis took place between then and the beginning of 1970.

[Editors' Note: Professor Johnson's 1975 survey carrying out ideas developed here will appear in the *Latin American Research Review* 11:2 (1976) with the title: "Scholarly Images of Latin American Political Democracy in 1975".]

<sup>1</sup>Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964). Specifically Riggs states: "to call a society prismatic is not equivalent to saying that it is 'transitional.' The idea of 'transition' has a particularly strong connotation of movement and direction which is not implied by the word 'prismatic'... the 'prismatic model'... is used in an effort to identify and analyze a particular kind of social order of wide prevalence and importance" (p. 34).

The Fitzgibbon time series (with which I became associated as Fitzgibbon's collaborator in 1960) has been described by one distinguished Latin American political scientist, Merle Kling, as follows:

Fitzgibbon has made a heroic effort to subject an important concern of traditional political science (the state of democracy in Latin America) to statistical analysis. In a series of studies, he has sought to determine rankings according to the scoring of items included in a scale of democracy among the countries of Latin America and fluctuations at intervals in relative rankings... Utilizing a panel composed of specialists on Latin America in both academic life and journalism, Fitzgibbon requested members of the panel to rank (with the letters A, B, C, D, and E) the individual countries of Latin America with respect to fifteen criteria, for example, educational level, standard of living, freedom of press and speech, freedom of elections, and civilian supremacy over the military. The letter grades were then translated into numerical scores, and the resulting computations were subjected to a variety of statistical analyses. The tables prepared on the basis of accumulated scores indicated the relative rank of each country in accumulated total scores (and hence rank in the "democratic" scale). The surveys were conducted in 1945, 1950, 1955, 1960, 1965, and 1970, and consequently register changes in assessments made by members of the panel during these intervals.

Fitzgibbon reports his findings with considerable caution, but the obvious limitations of the surveys should be appreciated. In the first place, each participant in the polls responds on the basis of individual, subjective judgments; the application of uniform standards by the judges cannot be assumed. Secondly, the criteria of democracy evaluated by each participant contain unavoidably large components of ambiguity. While the ultimate findings are reported with mathematical precision, the figures originate in subjective responses to a relatively ambiguous field of questions. Finally, as Lipset has observed, "The judges were asked not only to rank countries as democratic on the basis of purely political criteria, but also to consider the 'stan-

dard of living' and 'educational level.' These latter factors may be conditions for democracy, but they are not an aspect of democracy as such."

Notwithstanding these substantial reservations, Fitzgibbon's surveys remain one of the most elaborate efforts at quantification of Latin American phenomena by a political scientist. While a few other political scientists have introduced quantified data and have appropriated some of the language of mathematics, the scope of their studies ordinarily has been modest and their statistical methods have been much less complex and sophisticated than Fitzgibbon's.<sup>2</sup>

In short, the Fitzgibbon surveys asked each scholarly respondent to score fifteen items for each country:<sup>3</sup>

1. Educational level
2. Standard of living
3. Internal unity
4. Political maturity
5. Lack of foreign domination
6. Freedom of press, speech, assembly, radio, etc.
7. Free and honest elections
8. Freedom of party organization
9. Independent judiciary
10. Government accountability
11. Social legislation
12. Civilian supremacy
13. Ecclesiastical separation and freedom
14. Professional governmental administration
15. Local government

By reducing the fifteen items to one index with fifteen components, the "Fitzgibbon-Johnson Index" offered a new view of Latin America, suggesting more political change than some observers might like to admit. But the changes, as the data to follow reveal, are more striking when one focuses upon single variables or small clusters of variables rather than upon a broader view of change using the fifteen substantive criteria as an aggregate index. That is to say there have been marked changes in freedom of speech in some countries and it is a key variable. But overall, in terms of the fifteen components in aggregate, the changes will appear less acute. In addition, the criteria for evaluation themselves came to be challenged. Reservations expressed by scholars such as Lipsett brought the Fitzgibbon Index into question (the foregoing quotation from Merle Kling suggests some of the difficulties inherent in the method as originally devised by Fitzgibbon and his early associates). Given the development of a body of criticism of the approach,<sup>4</sup> much of which is justifiably

concerned with overlap in concepts of *social democracy* (including standard of living, social legislation, educational opportunity, as well as political freedoms) and *political democracy* (including only political factors),<sup>5</sup> it seemed to me necessary to give a new focus to the Fitzgibbon survey in order to encourage its continued use.<sup>6</sup> I intend to carry on these surveys in future years and will enlist the expertise of a range of interested scholars in refining the technique.

Methodology for refocusing the structure and meaning of the Fitzgibbon Index has been suggested by several scholars, principally Merle Kling and James W. Wilkie. Wilkie, who is Chairman of the Committee on Historical Statistics of the American Historical Association's Conference on Latin American History, has suggested alternative ways of deriving value from the Fitzgibbon data. In his book *Statistics and National Policy* he points out that the Fitzgibbon data have value because they give rare historical insight into how scholars have viewed Latin American democracy;<sup>7</sup> regardless of the extent to which they reveal the realities of substantive democracy they reveal the opinions and views of those who are in a position to influence United States policy toward Latin America. In correspondence with Wilkie,<sup>8</sup> he suggested distinguishing between the original Fitzgibbon-Johnson Index and revised indexes, the former presenting all the data as originally developed by Fitzgibbon and then adding a breakdown for each of the fifteen components for the quinquennial surveys in order that scholars might adapt the 1,800 item

herein gives a more balanced view). See the article by Welsh "Methodological Problems in the Study of Political Leadership in Latin America," *Latin American Research Review*, 5:3 (1970), 26-27.

<sup>5</sup> In reprinting our 1960 study, Robert Tomasek missed this distinction in his suggestions for improvement of the index, noting that more indicators of social democracy needed to be added; see Robert Tomasek, ed., *Latin American Politics*, (New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1966), p. 3.

<sup>6</sup> A great deal of use has already been made of the Fitzgibbon-Johnson data. See for instance Charles Wolf Jr., *United States Policy and the Third World*, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967), especially chapter 5. Also the same author used our data in "The Political Effects of Economic Programs: Some Indications from Latin America," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 14:1 (1965), 1-20. Dwaine Marvick also wrote "A Memorandum on Fitzgibbon's Survey of Latin American Specialists," a paper presented at the American Sociological Association Convention, Washington D.C., August 1962.

<sup>7</sup> *Supplement to the Statistical Abstract of Latin America*, volume 3 in this series.

<sup>8</sup> In a letter to me, February 5, 1974 (a letter, incidentally, which provided part of the title I have given this study), Wilkie wrote:

In the book I am completing entitled *Statistics and National Policy* I am citing your rankings 1945-1970 as an index of the changing scholarly image of Latin American democracy. My view is that your time series is not so important to help us understand which countries were most or least democratic, but which countries observers have *thought* to be most or least democratic. You might want to develop this view which makes your time series important for a very different reason than that of measuring democracy.

<sup>2</sup> From Kling's "The State of Research on Latin America: Political Science," in Charles Wagley ed., *Social Science Research on Latin America*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), pp. 186-87 (reprinted with permission).

<sup>3</sup> See Appendix H for discussion of items.

<sup>4</sup> The most harsh criticism of the method is that of William A. Welsh who terms the series of experiments a "misadventure" and who quotes Kling's dictum above in *selective* fashion in an attempt to demonstrate that (reproduction of the entire Kling statement as done

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matrix<sup>9</sup> with revisions to meet the standards of their own definitions and needs for quantitative evaluation.

Following Wilkie's suggestion, let us compare the Original Fitzgibbon-Johnson Index (Table 3200) with what we will term the Revised Fitzgibbon-Johnson Index (Table 3201) wherein the fifteen original items have been reduced to five. The five items that Wilkie and I believe are crucial to democracy are:

6. Freedom of speech
7. Free elections
8. Free party organization
9. Independent judiciary
12. Civilian supremacy

Table 3202 facilitates comparing the two indexes on an aggregate basis over the quarter-century under study and it is noteworthy that a very high order of correlation exists between the two columns making computation of a coefficient of correlation superfluous. The most noticeable shifts of position are those of Argentina and Nicaragua. The data reaffirm that, except for individual country variations, little change has occurred in the scholarly image of political democracy (and social democracy) in Latin America over the time period being examined.

Raw data for the complete matrix are presented in Appendixes A-F (high scores bring positive) in order that

scholars may develop their own analyses, including factor analysis or development of alternative revisions.

To facilitate such analyses, I should clarify certain operations that were performed to equalize the representations of time segments. In my 1960 collaboration with Fitzgibbon we equalized the various total scores in the time-series responses to account for the different numbers of expert panelists who previously responded (see Appendix I). In 1945 and 1950 Fitzgibbon employed panels of ten experts. In 1955 he used twenty, so the 1955 raw totals were divided by two. In 1960 we used forty respondents so these raw totals were divided by four, and so on, to divide by 6.1 for 1970. What we have, then, is a data base of equalized raw scores.

Quoting Fitzgibbon on the data, we may note that "use of the raw scores permits a crude determination of how the respondents collectively view the course of Latin American democracy over twenty years. Total raw scores (with appropriate division for the latest three surveys to account for the larger numbers of participants) were: 1945, 9,763.5; 1950, 9,943; 1955, 9,760; 1960, 10,827.5; 1965, 10,656.5. The fluctuations are a rough indication of shifts in the democratic weathervane over the years."<sup>10</sup>

In the 1970 survey, the raw score fell to 8,696. If there was a considerable jump in total raw scores beginning in 1960, attributed to the demise of a number of dictatorships

<sup>9</sup> The 1,800-item matrix equals 15 items times 20 countries times six surveys.

<sup>10</sup> From Fitzgibbon's "Measuring Political Change in Latin America," *Journal of Politics*, 29 (1967), 129-166, quote is from p. 139.

Table 3200  
ORIGINAL FITZGIBBON-JOHNSON INDEX OF  
REPUTATIONAL DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: RANKS, AND RANK ORDER  
CORRELATIONS USING ALL CRITERIA

Country	Rank 1945	Rank 1950	Rank 1955	Rank 1960	Rank 1965	Rank 1970		
						North Americans	Latin Americans	Combined (based on total raw scores)
A. ARGENTINA	5	8	8	4	6	7	9	7
B. BOLIVIA	18	17	15	16	17	18	14	17
C. BRAZIL	11	5	5	7	8	10	10	11
D. CHILE	3	2	3	3	3	2	1	1
E. COLOMBIA	4	6	6	6	7	6	6	6
F. COSTA RICA	2	3	2	2	1.5	1	3	2
G. CUBA	6	4	7	15	18	13	17	14
H. DOMINICAN REP.	19	19	19	18	14	14	11	12
I. ECUADOR	14	9	10	10	12	9	8	8
J. EL SALVADOR	13	14	11	12	11	8	12	10
K. GUATEMALA	12	10	14	13	13	13	13	13
L. HAITI	16	18	17	19	20	20	20	20
M. HONDURAS	17	15	12	14	15	16	15	16
N. MEXICO	7	7	4	5	4	5	5	5
O. NICARAGUA	15	16	18	17	16	17	16	18
P. PANAMA	8	11	9	11	10	11.5	18	15
Q. PARAGUAY	20	20	20	20	19	19	19	19
R. PERU	10	13	16	9	9	11.5	7	9
S. URUGUAY	1	1	1	1	1.5	3	2	3
T. VENEZUELA	9	12	13	8	5	4	4	4

Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient computed for:

1945/60	1950/70	1960/70 (combined)
Rho = .88	Rho = .78	Rho = .90
significant	significant	significant
at < .01	at < .01	at < .01

1965/70 (combined)	North American/Latin American (1970)
Rho = .92	Rho = .93
significant	significant
at < .01	at < .01

SOURCE: Appendixes A-F.

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Table 3201

REVISED FITZGIBBON-JOHNSON INDEX OF REPUTATIONAL DEMOCRACY IN LATIN AMERICA: RANKS, AND RANK ORDER CORRELATIONS USING FIVE KEY CRITERIA: FREE SPEECH, FREE ELECTIONS, FREE PARTY ORGANIZATION, INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, CIVILIAN SUPREMACY

Country	Rank 1945	Rank 1950	Rank 1955	Rank 1960	Rank 1965	Rank 1970 (Combined Respondents)
A. ARGENTINA	9	15.5	15	4	7	14.5
B. BOLIVIA	16	13	12	15	16	13
C. BRAZIL	12.5	5	4	6	10	17
D. CHILE	3.5	2	3	3	2.5	1
E. COLOMBIA	3.5	6	9	5	5	5
F. COSTA RICA	2	4	2	2	1	2
G. CUBA	5	3	10	18	19	19
H. DOMINICAN REP.	20	20	20	20	14.5	8
I. ECUADOR	12.5	7	6	9	12	7
J. EL SALVADOR	14	14	8	13	11	9.5
K. GUATEMALA	11	11	13	12	13	9.5
L. HAITI	19	17	14	18	20	20
M. HONDURAS	17	8	11	14	14.5	12
N. MEXICO	7	9	5	7	6	6
O. NICARAGUA	15	18	19	17	17	16
P. PANAMA	6	10	7	11	9	14.5
Q. PARAGUAY	18	19	18	19	18	18
R. PERU	8	15.5	17	10	8	11
S. URUGUAY	1	1	1	1	2.5	3
T. VENEZUELA	10	12	10	8	4	4

Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient computed for:

1945/50	1950/55	1955/60
Rho = .75 significant at < .01	Rho = .88 significant at < .01	Rho = .77 significant at < .01
1960/65	1965/70	1945/70
Rho = .91 significant at < .01	Rho = .81 significant at < .01	Rho = .80 significant at < .01

SOURCE: Appendix E.

Table 3202

TWO GLOBAL STATEMENTS OF HOW THE SCHOLARLY VIEW WAS AGGREGATED DURING 25 YEARS

(Average Rank Order Positions for all Countries over 6 Quinquennia)

Country	Fitzgibbon's Original Fifteen Criteria	Five Key Criteria (from Appendix G)
A. ARGENTINA	6	10
B. BOLIVIA	17	16
C. BRAZIL	7	8
D. CHILE	3	3
E. COLOMBIA	5	4
F. COSTA RICA	2	2
G. CUBA	10.3	14
H. DOMINICAN REP.	18	18
I. ECUADOR	9	7
J. EL SALVADOR	14	11.5
K. GUATEMALA	15	11.5
L. HAITI	19	19
M. HONDURAS	15	15
N. MEXICO	4	5
Q. NICARAGUA	10.3	17
P. PANAMA	10.3	9
Q. PARAGUAY	20	20
R. PERU	13	13
S. URUGUAY	1	1
T. VENEZUELA	8	6

during the preceding quinquennium, the decline of 1970 may be likewise attributed to the establishment or reestablishment of a considerable number of dictatorships. Thus, the raw-score totals lay a trend that seems to correspond with more subjectively perceived reality.

The raw scores in Appendixes A-G not only form the basis for offering revision in Table 3201 but also permit us to examine alternative views in two specific ways for 1970. In the first analysis for 1970, Table 3203 presents rankings of countries utilizing all fifteen criteria. I then proceed to show how the rankings change when the total number of criteria are experimentally reduced to a selected eight as well as to a selected five. And for purposes of illustrating what happens to my Experimentally Revised Fitzgibbon-Johnson Index the eight selected items are shown when one by one each of the eight are in turn removed from the total to give a seven-item view.

Note that in the first three columns of Table 3203 the rank orderings of the countries change somewhat but probably not significantly in terms of a correlation coefficient.

High variation, however, is seen in the rank orderings according to individual criteria (Table 3203). Why does Argentina rate 6 in political maturity, 7 for its judicial independence, and 19 for civilian supremacy? As a scholar of Argentine politics, I suspect that the rating of civilian supremacy is the only accurate indicator of the three in this particular case. The respondents, perhaps, did not understand the other two indicators in the same way; either that, or we are involved in the pitfall of country relativism. The ratings of Brazil on political maturity and civilian supremacy raise more questions than the same cases in Ecuador and in the Dominican Republic. Probably, political maturity is too vague to be a valid indicator of anything, despite the explanations attached to it. Yet, we do have the expression "political maturity," but is it a fruitful analytic concept? The reader will undoubtedly want to question other items on a similar basis.

Looking at the last eight columns in Table 3203, we see the result of ranking the countries by the eight selected criteria and controlling for each one by its absence. Thus, Argentina falls from ninth rank for eight criteria to twelfth rank on a seven-item basis, standard of living omitted. Yet removing this item does not affect Chile's position at all as is true for most of the other countries. Removing internal unity seems to have no impact at all; this is true for the other items generally. My attention is called, however, to the criterion freedom of speech. Christian Bay and other theorists have argued that this is essential to the overall makeup of a democratic political system. Speaking of the utilitarian value of democratic constitutions Bay writes:

I have argued that freedom from coercion (as a constitutional guarantee) is the supreme good and that therefore freedom from coercion should be the first priority objective. As a second priority consideration, however, freedom of political speech should take precedence over other freedoms, since it is instrumentally more crucial than other freedoms. And freedom of such political speech as in effect and intention is limited to the discussion of general principles should under no circumstances be curtailed.<sup>11</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Christian Bay, *The Structure of Freedom* (New York: Atheneum, 1968), p. 374.



If freedom of speech can be presupposed to be the most crucial of the indicators in the original Fitzgibbon-Johnson index of criteria, then we might expect some substantial difference between the rank ordering of the countries by this criterion, according to others singly, and in aggregate. Inspection of Table 3203 does indeed reveal that for Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, and Cuba there are significant changes when the rank ordering for freedom of speech is compared with the rank ordering under the aggregate fifteen criteria. There are numerous such differences in the rankings when freedom of speech is compared with standard of living.

In the second analysis for 1970, we may compare U.S. and Latin American views on democracy. Inspection of Table 3204 reveals that all of the total raw scores for the various criteria fall within the close range of 3,183 to 3,590, with the important exceptions of internal unity, lack of foreign domination, and ecclesiastical freedom. I have no statistical test to demonstrate what may be a *significant* deviation of total raw scores from a relatively closed response range, but feel that such deviations mean that the respondents did not understand the items in the same normative context. Thus, the three items in question need to be carefully studied to determine their relevance.<sup>12</sup> In the case of ecclesiastical freedom, the comments made by the respondents themselves have convinced me that Latin Americans and North Americans do not understand this concept in similar terms, an important consideration.

Table 3200 contains the rank order correlations for the nations and includes a comparison of U.S. and Latin American respondents in the 1970 survey. The highly significant value of Rho for the comparison of the 1970 respondents suggests strong agreement among them; thus, they have ultimately been combined into a single index. The generally high values of Rho in the quinquennial comparisons suggest that overall there has been little change historically in the experts' perception of political democracy in Latin America.

This study has endeavored to show how longitudinal data gathered at five-year intervals since 1945 by Fitzgibbon (and later with my collaboration) may be of continued interest to Latin American specialists. By examining time-series data for fifteen items (presented here for the first time in a complete and consistently equalized format) it is clear that a great deal of change had taken place in individual Latin American countries if not in the entire cultural area as a whole. Regardless of whether Third World instability may be a permanent way of life (as in Riggs' hypothesis), Latin American countries show a variety of stable and unstable conditions — with countries that have been noted for former stability occasionally becoming quite unstable.<sup>13</sup>

Since assassinations and anomic violence seem to be as prevalent in the modern as in the underdeveloped world, perhaps stability may depend upon the conjuncture of events. It should also be pointed out that the Chilean coup of 1973 (and subsequent revelations about U.S. involvement in events leading to it) is an important reason for continuing the

quinquennial ratings: had the panel of experts ranked Chile's democratic status on September 1, 1973, the result would probably have been something comparable with the 1970 survey. But had the evaluation been administered several weeks later it is certain that the judgment on Chile would have been drastically different. Thus, by repeating the evaluations every five years we can observe trends on a longitudinal basis, thereby avoiding precipitous judgments based upon the erratic behavior that one may observe on a shorter time-span basis. And the data may be used by scholars according to their special needs or redefinition of political democracy.

The Revised Fitzgibbon-Johnson Index (Table 3201) as suggested by Wilkie appears to offer a particularly valuable approach to utilizing the data that Fitzgibbon and I have gathered over the years. It meets with the approval of Merle Kling who continued to participate with me in the 1975 survey. Also, it is in keeping with Christian Bay's dictum regarding the key item — freedom of speech. And it is congruent with several elements for political democracy that I have summarized into the following theoretic construct.<sup>14</sup>

For purposes of the present Fitzgibbon-Johnson Index and the 1975 time-series ranking which remains to be done,

<sup>13</sup> For instance, in the original Fitzgibbon Index (Table 3200) Cuba dropped from 6th place in 1945 to 18th place in 1965 owing to the aftermath of the Batista dictatorship and its replacement with the communist regime of Fidel Castro. But Cuba regained prestige in the eyes of the experts and moved up to 14th place by 1970, perhaps a reflection of the lessening of hostilities in the hemisphere and the domestic impact of "charismatic hardship communism," a concept developed by Edward Gonzalez in his *Cuba Under Castro: The Limits of Charisma* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin 1974). It can also be noted from the original Fitzgibbon Index that over the 25 years Uruguay maintained its control of the first position (tying with Costa Rica in 1965) until 1970. At that time, perhaps because of the abolition of the *colegiado* or plural executive, but more likely because of the increase in insurgent terrorism and other symptomatic expressions of political instability, Uruguay's rating dropped to 3rd place. This result seems very congruent with phenomenal events in Uruguay as of 1970 . . . the subsequent coup of 1973 is, of course, not taken into account in Table 3200, but its impact will presumably be reflected in the 1975 survey (by late 1974 Uruguay seemed to be an outright military dictatorship albeit transparently disguised behind the civilian president who closed his congress and banned all political activity with strong military backing). Finally, glancing at the changes in perception registered for Venezuela, one notes steady reputational status increases over the years. Venezuela moved from 9th to 4th place. Venezuela has, it seems, achieved a smoothly functioning political democracy in which opposition minority parties can unseat a majority government party, and assume power through coalition government. Venezuela, it is important to note, has achieved this democratic appearance since 1958 and from all indications it is being permanently institutionalized. Nevertheless, the same observations concerning stability were made earlier about Chile and Uruguay but these had to be modified in the light of events during 1973. As the time series is repeated over coming decades we will have ample opportunity to test Riggs's hypothesis about permanent instability in the Third World and it would be premature at the moment to assume that nations like Costa Rica and Venezuela are permanently stable democracies.

<sup>14</sup> See Leslie Lipson, *The Democratic Civilization* (New York: Oxford, 1964); see for instance page 589. A similar theoretic construct is found in Stanislaw Andreski, *Parasitism and Subversion: The Case of Latin America* (New York: Pantheon, 1966), pp. 145-46.

<sup>12</sup> I am grateful to Professor Werner Grunbaum of the University of Missouri, St. Louis for calling this issue to my attention.

Table 3204  
**RAW SCORES OF LATIN AMERICAN AND U.S. RESPONDENTS TO THE UNREVISED  
 FITZGIBBON-JOHNSON SURVEY, 1970**  
 (Latin American and U.S. Subtotals and Total Raw Score)

Criteria	A. ARGENTINA		B. BOLIVIA		C. BRAZIL		D. CHILE		E. COLOMBIA		F. COSTA RICA		G. CUBA		H. DOMINICAN REP.		I. ECUADOR		J. EL SALVADOR		K. GUATEMALA	
	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.
1. Educational Level	115	159	57	64	91	97	106	141	82	110	95	150	99	127	61	74	65	78	66	156	63	71
	274		121		188		247		192		245		226		135		143		58	168	134	
2. Standard of Living	105	148	53	61	81	101	86	127	76	102	86	129	73	101	62	76	61	77	58	90	59	74
	253		114		182		213		178		216		174		138		138		168	168	133	
3. Internal Unity	96	109	75	88	91	100	112	145	93	103	109	152	98	129	78	86	78	86	84	109	72	73
	205		163		191		257		196		261		225		164		164		193	193	145	
4. Political Maturity	88	115	68	82	75	102	107	152	83	116	100	153	81	99	64	77	72	90	64	95	66	79
	201		150		177		259		199		253		180		141		162		159	159	145	
5. Lack of Foreign Domination	92	148	77	97	88	125	96	135	80	129	76	137	55	81	64	79	73	108	65	102	67	91
	238		174		211		231		209		212		136		143		181		167	167	158	
6. Freedom of Speech	68	88	77	91	58	75	102	153	97	140	109	166	34	42	79	102	92	113	74	108	74	104
	156		168		133		255		237		285		76		181		205		182	182	178	
7. Free Elections	51	62	51	69	52	64	111	157	80	130	111	160	30	36	74	102	88	107	68	104	67	101
	113		120		116		268		220		271		66		176		195		172	172	168	
8. Free Party Organization	56	74	66	78	48	63	112	156	97	133	109	147	32	38	72	93	85	100	70	97	69	97
	130		144		111		268		230		256		70		165		185		167	167	168	
9. Judicial Independence	83	101	76	78	67	87	102	144	98	127	103	144	39	48	72	87	82	91	74	100	71	94
	184		154		154		246		225		247		87		159		173		174	174	165	
10. Government Funds	87	113	66	73	75	85	93	134	86	124	88	140	88	93	67	84	71	92	66	85	66	85
	200		139		160		227		210		228		181		151		163		161	161	151	
11. Social Legislation	85	113	73	96	65	100	96	143	77	114	96	139	83	131	63	92	70	88	64	96	68	87
	198		169		185		239		191		235		214		155		158		160	160	155	
12. Civilian Supremacy	53	53	61	57	57	54	116	151	99	130	104	158	49	100	72	87	79	97	67	75	75	86
	106		118		111		267		229		262		149		159		176		142	142	161	
13. Lack of Ecclesiastical Control	97	125	89	121	97	128	109	149	89	107	108	151	88	135	98	109	96	98	92	114	89	87
	222		220		225		258		196		259		223		207		192		206	206	176	
14. Government Administration	80	123	67	72	78	103	94	139	83	117	94	136	66	98	69	80	68	82	61	97	66	83
	203		139		181		233		200		230		164		149		150		158	158	149	
15. Local Government	70	93	64	69	70	94	89	124	84	110	89	128	50	72	64	78	67	83	62	89	60	83
	163		133		164		213		184		217		122		142		150		151	151	143	
	1,224	1,822	1,030	1,196	1,091	1,378	1,531	2,150	1,314	1,792	1,476	2,180	963	1,330	1,059	1,306	1,147	1,388	1,035	1,481	1,002	1,295
	2,846		2,226		2,469		3,681		3,106		3,656		2,293		2,365		2,635		2,516	2,516	2,327	



Table 3204 (Continued)  
**RAW SCORES OF LATIN AMERICAN AND U.S. RESPONDENTS TO THE UNREVISED FITZGIBBON-JOHNSON SURVEY, 1970**  
 (Latin American and U.S. Subtotals and Total Raw Score)

Criteria	L. HAITI		M. HONDURAS		N. MEXICO		O. NICARAGUA		P. PANAMA		Q. PARAGUAY		R. PERU		S. URUGUAY		T. VENEZUELA		TOTALS	
	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.	L.A.	U.S.
1. Educational Level	38	39	58	68	95	119	82	75	65	110	61	65	82	62	108	150	96	117	1,565	1,786
	77		128		214		137		175		126		144		258		213		3,531	
2. Standard of Living	40	37	59	66	87	119	60	75	66	73	56	70	74	85	93	140	91	125	1,426	1,896
	77		125		206		135		139		126		159		233		216		3,322	
3. Internal Unity	58	62	80	93	105	138	78	89	73	100	80	102	85	87	106	141	101	125	1,750	2,097
	120		173		243		167		173		182		172		247		226		3,867	
4. Political Maturity	44	44	67	71	88	138	66	73	62	91	63	65	79	97	102	145	97	133	1,534	2,015
	88		138		224		139		153		128		176		247		230		3,549	
5. Lack of Foreign Domination	57	100	67	89	87	146	62	94	58	79	77	103	96	119	89	140	76	121	1,498	2,221
	157		156		233		156		137		180		215		229		186		3,719	
6. Freedom of Speech	35	36	68	91	86	131	64	79	59	103	52	58	84	101	104	151	107	145	1,523	1,967
	71		159		217		143		162		110		185		255		252		3,590	
7. Free Elections	31	35	61	79	78	119	58	66	46	79	41	55	55	72	111	155	109	152	1,383	1,904
	66		140		197		124		125		96		127		266		261		3,287	
8. Free Party Organization	32	36	65	90	83	120	55	73	52	80	47	62	78	90	105	152	107	147	1,440	1,928
	68		155		203		128		132		109		168		257		254		3,366	
9. Judicial Independence	40	42	73	83	94	116	70	78	60	85	63	67	80	94	102	138	95	126	1,544	1,930
	82		156		210		148		145		130		174		240		221		3,474	
10. Government Funds	49	43	66	76	88	119	64	81	63	87	68	72	80	68	89	131	88	127	1,508	1,922
	92		142		207		145		150		140		148		220		215		3,430	
11. Social Legislation	44	46	65	78	94	143	62	79	62	97	58	71	82	106	100	147	99	132	1,508	2,098
	90		143		237		141		159		129		188		247		231		3,604	
12. Civilian Supremacy	54	68	69	70	110	153	65	65	51	70	47	47	61	56	107	151	97	133	1,493	1,860
	122		139		263		130		121		94		116		258		230		3,353	
13. Lack of Ecclesiastical Control	75	103	96	112	101	140	89	116	94	110	92	101	96	109	110	150	105	137	1,920	2,400
	178		208		241		205		204		193		205		260		242		4,320	
14. Government Administration	45	45	63	81	80	130	64	85	61	88	60	78	80	102	88	134	85	130	1,452	2,003
	80		144		210		149		149		138		182		222		215		3,465	
15. Local Government	48	41	62	74	69	112	60	78	60	82	62	70	74	87	89	121	90	112	1,383	1,800
	89		138		181		138		142		132		161		210		202		3,183	
	690	777	1,019	1,221	1,345	1,941	979	1,206	932	1,334	927	1,086	1,186	1,394	1,503	2,146	1,442	1,962	22,925	30,125
	1,467		2,240		3,286		2,185		2,266		2,013		2,520		3,649		3,404		53,050	

political democracy should be understood in terms of the following components: (a) Popular sovereignty is exercised through competing interest groups that vie for power and leadership within a fixed and impartial set of rules that are applied equally and impartially to all participants. (b) The state and its personnel exist to serve the public rather than themselves (the state does not rob the people as "amoral familists" could be expected to do if we embrace Banfield's "predictive hypothesis").<sup>15</sup> (c) Free and honest procedures exist for selecting leaders of the state and these procedures will be competitive and popular. (d) The leadership elements are perpetually and/or periodically subject to public review, challenge, and/or removal. (e) The stakes in the power struggle are not so high as to make it impossible for one politically relevant participant group to accept an adverse popular judgment vis à vis its candidate or favored policy.<sup>16</sup>

Perhaps the only item in the revised five criteria not soundly rooted in political theory concerns civilian supremacy, theorists not being in agreement as to whether democracy can exist only under civilian dominated regimes. Yet, this disagreement itself may suffer from a failure to distinguish between political and social democracy. Military regimes may well foster the latter, but the concepts of military government and political democracy may be mutually exclusive. The crux of the issue is, perhaps, power and the way it is used. Hannah Arendt has argued that "power is indeed the essence of all government, but violence is not . . . power needs no justification, being inherent in the very existence of political communities; what it does need is legitimacy . . . violence can be justifiable, but it never will be legitimate . . . power and violence, though they are distinct phenomena, usually appear together."<sup>17</sup> As this applies to my conceptualization of political democracy in Latin America it suggests the key question of how a regime uses its coercive sanctions that in turn may or may not be seen as legitimate. If the sanctions are used to totally stultify freedom of speech and political organization, then political

democracy clearly is not present. Nor can political democracy flourish where terrorism becomes a way of government.<sup>18</sup> Thus, the inclusion of civilian supremacy in the ranking scheme will be sound in some cases and not so in others, depending upon the way in which the civilians use the power that is implicit in their political association (e.g. the 1976 demise of the "civilian" Peronist regime in Argentina which offered neither social nor political democracy at the end).

Regardless of the alternative views or experimentally developed revisions that are made of the Fitzgibbon-Johnson data presented here, it should be noted that statistical tests show response comparability over time. Comparing the Fitzgibbon-Johnson data (Table 3200) from quinquennium to quinquennium, little difference is observed in the correlation coefficients. And items chosen for the revised index (Table 3201) show equal consistency in correlation coefficients. In short, the variations and changes in country standings are presented with comparable standards from period to period.

In calling for continuation of the original Fitzgibbon-Johnson Index, and in here publishing the full component parts of that Index, I stress the hope that in my future polls the same items will be continued to assure the gathering of data that is needed to enable scholars to use this unique source, longitudinally, despite the problems of conceptual overlap that were created in 1945 and which cannot be changed without destroying the time series. Yet, in maintaining the old series, perhaps new dimensions can be added.<sup>19</sup> And development of the panel of respondents to include larger numbers and/or more points of view than were included between 1945 and 1970 (see Appendix H) also offers opportunity for research into aggregate views of scholarly elites in the United States and Latin America.<sup>20</sup> In sum, if we cannot readily measure the state of democracy with the longitudinal Fitzgibbon-Johnson Index, at least we can better understand the scholarly views that have helped to influence public opinion and policy as well as to shape intellectual outlooks. And continuation of this time series may eventually enable us to clarify a central dilemma that has been raised variously throughout these pages, namely political *change* versus political *development* in democratic theory-building.

period which can be contrasted with the above basic criteria. See his *Latin American Internal Conflict and International Peace* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. 96.

<sup>17</sup> From her *On Violence* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1970), p. 52.

<sup>18</sup> See Kenneth F. Johnson, "On the Guatemalan Political Violence."

<sup>19</sup> A discussion of such new dimensions is contained in Margaret Todaro Williams, "Social Psychology and Latin American Studies," *Latin American Research Review*, 9:1 (1974), 141-53.

<sup>20</sup> For suggestive ideas in this regard see James W. Wilkie, *Elitelore* (Los Angeles: Latin American Center Publications, University of California, 1973).

<sup>15</sup> Edward C. Banfield, *The Moral Basis of a Backward Society* (New York: The Free Press, 1958). He argues that an "amoral familist" will behave consistent with this rule: "Maximize the material, short-run advantage of the nuclear family; assume that all others will do likewise" (p. 83). The expectation that government will be a "business" and that politics is intended for maximizing short-run advantages is a fundamental norm of Latin American political life that must be taken into account in any consideration of democracy. This concept is very much related to Riggs's notion of a "clect" which is at the root of the instability he finds in Third World politics.

<sup>16</sup> The ability of military establishments to intervene in the political life of a Latin American nation, and to do so behind the facade of democracy, has been developed for one nation in Kenneth F. Johnson, "On the Guatemalan Political Violence," *Politics and Society*, 4:1 (1973), 55-82. Additionally, if one views all Latin America for the time span of the present study (roughly 1945-70), it is possible to look for key undemocratic acts as did one historian, Peter Calvert. He listed some 66 major acts of an undemocratic nature within this

## APPENDIX A FITZGIBBON DATA FOR 1945

(Equalized Raw Scores for All Countries and All Criteria)

Country	Criteria														
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
A. ARGENTINA	47	44	40	44	47	36	25	27	40	35	36	27	39	40	36
B. BOLIVIA	13	14	21	16	21	20	16	21	17	15	20	18	29	15	16
C. BRAZIL	27	27	29	33	43	25	20	21	30	25	33	24	43	38	28
D. CHILE	37	30	42	44	40	49	43	43	41	39	44	45	46	38	43
E. COLOMBIA	32	33	40	39	42	47	44	44	42	37	35	44	36	36	37
F. COSTA RICA	44	37	45	43	34	49	47	44	44	40	38	47	44	37	41
G. CUBA	34	35	37	35	28	44	36	39	31	28	35	32	45	32	31
H. DOMINICAN REP.	17	19	29	19	29	15	13	15	15	18	18	16	32	19	17
I. ECUADOR	16	16	20	16	37	30	22	23	21	20	20	24	30	20	20
J. EL SALVADOR	23	27	30	25	31	25	22	20	24	24	23	21	37	24	23
K. GUATEMALA	17	22	25	18	33	29	16	13	25	22	22	25	37	24	23
L. HAITI	14	15	22	15	22	24	18	15	19	18	19	24	33	18	19
M. HONDURAS	17	19	23	17	29	20	18	15	17	16	16	20	34	17	18
N. MEXICO	31	25	36	34	39	41	28	24	30	26	40	31	42	30	26
O. NICARAGUA	20	22	23	20	25	22	16	18	18	22	19	19	36	17	20
P. PANAMA	30	29	30	26	19	41	34	27	36	31	28	34	42	29	29
Q. PARAGUAY	15	19	24	20	21	18	16	18	18	16	16	13	31	16	17
R. PERU	22	23	28	25	38	35	31	32	30	23	26	30	29	27	31
S. URUGUAY	45	42	47	45	43	49	48	44	45	41	49	47	48	44	41
T. VENEZUELA	21	27	32	27	35	33	32	30	31	29	27	28	39	28	27

## APPENDIX B FITZGIBBON DATA FOR 1950

(Equalized Raw Scores for All Countries and All Criteria)

Country	Criteria														
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
A. ARGENTINA	48	47	40	43	48	16	22	23	25	30	41	20	31	36	30
B. BOLIVIA	16	14	16	14	20	24	22	24	23	18	18	22	25	18	18
C. BRAZIL	29	29	35	32	46	39	36	37	38	35	35	34	42	38	32
D. CHILE	38	34	43	45	42	48	46	46	44	39	44	46	47	38	40
E. COLOMBIA	37	35	31	40	42	31	28	35	37	36	36	43	28	36	35
F. COSTA RICA	44	36	42	42	34	43	43	42	45	40	38	46	43	37	40
G. CUBA	37	37	42	36	34	48	41	43	39	31	37	40	43	26	35
H. DOMINICAN REP.	23	24	28	20	32	12	10	11	16	21	25	13	36	23	19
I. ECUADOR	20	19	24	21	37	37	31	32	33	24	25	29	28	25	23
J. EL SALVADOR	28	28	32	23	34	25	19	21	24	27	26	20	31	25	26
K. GUATEMALA	22	23	25	23	33	30	28	27	27	34	30	36	25	27	27
L. HAITI	14	16	20	26	27	23	18	15	18	17	18	24	34	19	18
M. HONDURAS	20	21	29	21	28	23	21	18	21	21	20	23	34	21	22
N. MEXICO	33	28	41	33	38	43	29	29	31	31	44	30	38	34	30
O. NICARAGUA	24	22	32	25	28	20	14	18	18	21	21	13	35	20	21
P. PANAMA	31	29	31	24	18	37	22	25	28	22	27	30	42	28	26
Q. PARAGUAY	16	18	21	17	18	17	16	15	17	18	18	16	29	16	16
R. PERU	28	27	30	27	39	22	21	20	26	26	26	19	29	28	25
S. URUGUAY	48	46	46	46	38	44	48	48	47	43	48	48	46	46	43
T. VENEZUELA	27	31	30	28	36	25	25	20	27	25	31	23	38	24	25

## APPENDIX C FITZGIBBON DATA FOR 1955

(Equalized Raw Scores for All Countries and All Criteria)

Country	Criteria														
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
A. ARGENTINA	46	44	37	40	45	14	21	17	19	29	40	22	36	33	27
B. BOLIVIA	14	15	24	17	34	25	21	20	19	21	29	29	34	24	19
C. BRAZIL	32	31	34	34	42	43	42	41	40	33	37	34	43	38	37
D. CHILE	41	33	41	43	40	46	47	46	44	40	43	42	45	37	37
E. COLOMBIA	35	31	31	36	41	24	24	31	32	33	31	25	25	31	31
F. COSTA RICA	43	38	44	46	41	48	46	45	44	44	44	49	44	39	42
G. CUBA	37	37	35	32	29	34	24	27	29	25	35	21	44	28	30
H. DOMINICAN REP.	23	28	24	16	32	11	11	10	14	18	22	13	33	22	16
I. ECUADOR	21	20	24	25	34	32	35	32	28	26	26	32	32	27	29
J. EL SALVADOR	25	26	31	26	34	31	28	26	26	28	26	28	33	27	27
K. GUATEMALA	20	20	24	23	24	28	22	21	23	23	30	19	33	22	22
L. HAITI	14	15	29	19	32	28	21	20	23	19	18	19	36	21	21
M. HONDURAS	19	19	27	24	27	31	26	27	25	23	22	24	35	23	22
N. MEXICO	40	32	40	39	44	45	37	32	36	32	43	40	42	36	34
O. NICARAGUA	22	23	28	23	36	22	13	15	15	16	18	13	34	21	19
P. PANAMA	32	29	29	29	24	38	29	25	29	25	31	29	39	26	27
Q. PARAGUAY	12	16	23	17	22	20	15	16	16	18	17	16	30	16	17
R. PERU	23	24	25	23	37	21	17	15	21	23	26	14	27	27	22
S. URUGUAY	47	45	49	50	48	50	50	48	48	48	49	50	50	45	45
T. VENEZUELA	25	36	31	25	32	19	18	18	20	26	30	14	33	29	21

## APPENDIX D FITZGIBBON-JOHNSON DATA FOR 1960

(Equalized Raw Scores for All Countries and All Criteria)

Country	Criteria														
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
A. ARGENTINA	46	43	38	42	47	47	46	42	42	39	40	32	41	38	37
B. BOLIVIA	19	18	25	22	31	27	28	25	23	22	31	36	38	23	22
C. BRAZIL	31	32	38	39	46	45	42	41	40	33	35	32	43	36	37
D. CHILE	42	34	44	44	44	48	48	46	44	39	41	46	45	40	39
E. COLOMBIA	35	32	36	37	44	42	42	41	40	38	34	40	32	37	34
F. COSTA RICA	46	40	46	47	43	49	49	46	44	43	42	49	45	42	41
G. CUBA	35	33	36	31	34	23	19	19	18	29	33	23	41	24	24
H. DOMINICAN REP.	24	29	29	16	36	11	11	11	12	16	24	12	30	27	23
I. ECUADOR	24	25	31	30	37	38	39	36	34	31	29	37	31	29	30
J. EL SALVADOR	27	27	34	30	35	34	30	29	29	29	29	26	34	31	28
K. GUATEMALA	22	23	26	25	30	33	32	31	29	17	28	29	35	28	26
L. HAITI	13	13	23	17	27	19	17	17	18	17	17	19	31	16	18
M. HONDURAS	20	20	27	25	29	31	30	28	26	26	26	27	34	25	24
N. MEXICO	37	34	43	41	45	44	37	33	38	35	44	43	45	39	35
O. NICARAGUA	23	23	29	22	30	21	17	18	20	21	24	17	32	25	22
P. PANAMA	30	29	32	27	24	37	33	33	30	27	29	32	38	30	28
Q. PARAGUAY	16	17	22	17	27	13	12	14	16	17	17	12	29	20	18
R. PERU	26	27	31	29	38	39	38	37	34	33	29	34	31	32	30
S. URUGUAY	46	41	47	47	44	49	49	49	45	43	45	49	47	43	42
T. VENEZUELA	29	34	33	34	37	40	43	39	35	36	37	36	41	34	33

# APPENDIX E FITZGIBBON-JOHNSON DATA FOR 1965

(Equalized Raw Scores for All Countries and All Criteria)

Country	Criteria														
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
A. ARGENTINA	46	43	27	30	46	45	39	37	40	36	37	29	42	36	35
B. BOLIVIA	20	17	23	22	30	26	24	24	23	17	28	21	39	20	20
C. BRAZIL	32	30	35	37	43	38	31	34	36	30	32	26	45	32	31
D. CHILE	42	35	43	48	42	49	49	48	45	41	41	48	46	41	38
E. COLOMBIA	35	31	32	37	43	44	41	40	40	36	34	40	31	36	33
F. COSTA RICA	46	40	47	49	45	49	49	47	46	43	43	49	46	42	42
G. CUBA	38	28	36	30	17	12	11	14	13	26	36	23	37	26	17
H. DOMINICAN REP.	24	24	27	23	31	29	23	24	25	25	25	22	34	23	22
I. ECUADOR	23	22	24	23	37	33	27	27	29	27	25	23	30	25	24
J. EL SALVADOR	27	28	30	27	35	34	31	30	29	30	30	25	35	28	28
K. GUATEMALA	22	24	24	23	32	29	26	26	26	26	26	21	35	25	26
L. HAITI	12	12	17	12	35	12	11	12	12	12	13	16	31	13	12
M. HONDURAS	22	23	26	24	33	27	24	25	25	25	24	22	34	23	23
N. MEXICO	37	35	43	43	43	41	38	36	38	36	42	46	44	38	34
O. NICARAGUA	22	24	28	24	33	27	21	23	23	25	24	22	35	26	23
P. PANAMA	31	30	30	28	26	37	36	35	31	27	29	34	40	29	28
Q. PARAGUAY	19	21	26	19	29	17	14	16	18	22	20	14	32	22	18
R. PERU	26	26	28	29	39	40	36	38	34	31	31	30	34	31	30
S. URUGUAY	47	43	46	46	46	49	49	47	45	41	45	49	49	41	40
T. VENEZUELA	35	35	37	37	38	42	46	44	37	37	39	38	43	36	35

# APPENDIX F FITZGIBBON-JOHNSON DATA FOR 1970 (1969)

(Equalized Raw Scores for All Countries and All Criteria)

Country	Criteria														
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
A. ARGENTINA	45	41	34	33	39	26	19	21	30	33	32	17	36	33	27
B. BOLIVIA	20	19	27	25	29	28	20	24	25	23	28	19	36	23	22
C. BRAZIL	31	30	31	29	35	22	19	18	25	26	27	18	37	30	27
D. CHILE	40	35	42	42	38	42	44	44	40	37	39	44	42	38	35
E. COLOMBIA	31	29	32	33	34	39	36	38	37	34	31	38	32	33	32
F. COSTA RICA	40	35	43	41	35	43	44	42	40	37	39	43	42	38	36
G. CUBA	37	29	37	30	22	12	11	11	14	30	35	24	37	27	20
H. DOMINICAN REP.	22	23	27	23	23	30	29	27	26	25	25	26	34	24	23
I. ECUADOR	23	23	27	27	30	34	32	30	28	27	26	29	31	25	25
J. EL SALVADOR	26	28	32	26	27	30	28	27	29	26	26	23	34	26	25
K. GUATEMALA	22	22	24	24	26	29	28	27	27	25	25	26	29	24	23
L. HAITI	13	13	20	14	26	12	11	11	13	15	15	20	29	15	15
M. HONDURAS	21	20	28	23	26	26	23	25	26	23	23	23	34	24	22
N. MEXICO	35	34	40	37	38	36	32	33	34	34	39	43	40	34	30
O. NICARAGUA	22	22	27	23	26	23	20	21	24	24	23	21	34	24	23
P. PANAMA	29	23	28	25	22	27	20	22	24	25	26	20	33	24	23
Q. PARAGUAY	21	21	30	21	30	18	16	18	21	23	21	15	32	23	22
R. PERU	24	26	28	29	35	30	21	28	29	24	31	19	34	30	26
S. URUGUAY	42	38	40	40	38	42	44	42	39	36	40	42	43	36	34
T. VENEZUELA	35	35	37	38	32	41	43	42	36	35	38	38	40	35	33

**APPENDIX G**  
**FITZGIBBON-JOHNSON DATA BASED ON FIVE**  
**KEY CRITERIA FOR LATIN AMERICAN**  
**DEMOCRACY, 1945-70<sup>a</sup>**

Country	1945	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970
A. ARGENTINA	155	106	93	209	190	113
B. BOLIVIA	92	115	114	139	118	116
C. BRAZIL	120	184	200	200	165	102
D. CHILE	221	228	225	232	239	214
E. COLOMBIA	221	174	136	205	205	188
F. COSTA RICA	231	219	232	237	240	212
G. CUBA	182	211	135	102	73	72
H. DOMINICAN REP.	74	62	59	57	123	138
I. ECUADOR	120	170	159	184	139	153
J. EL SALVADOR	112	109	139	148	149	137
K. GUATEMALA	128	142	113	154	128	137
L. HAITI	81	98	111	90	63	67
M. HONDURAS	84	166	133	142	123	123
N. MEXICO	159	161	190	195	199	178
O. NICARAGUA	93	83	78	93	116	109
P. PANAMA	172	143	150	165	173	113
Q. PARAGUAY	83	81	83	67	79	88
R. PERU	158	106	88	182	179	127
S. URUGUAY	233	240	248	241	239	209
T. VENEZUELA	154	118	89	193	207	200

a. The criteria are: 6, freedom of speech, 7, free and honest elections, 8, freedom of party organization, 9, independent judiciary, 12, civilian supremacy, as adapted from equalized raw scores in Appendixes A through F.

# APPENDIX H THE FITZGIBBON SURVEY METHODOLOGY AND DEFINITIONS

Letter circulated by Russell H. Fitzgibbon to colleagues in Latin American studies enclosing his original statement on criteria of Latin American democracy.\*

University of California  
Santa Barbara, California 93106

October 29, 1969

Dear Colleague:

This is a personal letter despite its impersonal appearance. I am sending it in this form merely because I want to communicate with quite a number of you.

You will perhaps recall that early in 1965 you participated in a survey I made of specialists on Latin America whom I asked to evaluate the twenty states of the area according to fifteen criteria of democratic development. This was in pursuance of a surveying technique I began in 1945 and repeated at five-year intervals thereafter. It is now time to undertake it again in a "1970 edition" and I hope you can participate this time, too.

Inasmuch as I am now officially a "has-been," i.e., emeritus (though still teaching) at UCSB, I have asked Professor Kenneth F. Johnson of the University of Southern California who, you will remember, collaborated on and contributed greatly to the 1960 survey and the subsequent analysis, to join me as colleague in this one and to assume responsibility thereafter for continuing the surveys. He has agreed to do so, and this will assure a mature and significant continuance of what I believe has come to be a useful procedure.

Analyses of successive surveys are still apparently of widespread interest to political scientists. Since the latest one, graduate students in at least two universities have used them as springboards for further research, they continue to be reprinted in collections of readings, etc.

Unfortunately, I was not foresighted enough this time to write you far enough in advance to get your agreement to participate before going ahead. Hence, we shall have to hope (and do so, fervently) that you can join us in it.

We want to incorporate certain innovations this time. Chief of them is the use of equal numbers of qualified *latinos* and *norteamericanos*, which should add greatly to the validity of the results. We would also like for them to record their evaluations at just the same time so that later occurring events will not, consciously or unconsciously, affect their judgments. I think these changes will very considerably increase the survey's usefulness.

*Will you consequently please fill in the evaluation sheet on Thursday, November 20, 1969, and return it to me promptly thereafter in the enclosed envelope? Professor Johnson already has machinery in motion to get simultaneous evaluations from an equal number of well qualified persons in various Latin American countries. It is of great importance that everyone record his judgments at the same time!!!*

The enclosed material includes explanations of the various criteria, which have remained uniform in the several surveys so as to increase comparability. Evaluation sheets are also enclosed, and it is imperative, in order that computer analysis of the composite results can be correctly obtained, that *all* cells on the form be filled in, though you might not feel completely qualified (nor do I) to pass expert judgment on all such matters.

"Grading" should be done as follows: in the body of the form, mark an *A* in the appropriate cell (square) if you regard the achievement or present status of a particular country on a certain criterion as *excellent*; a *B* if you consider it *good*; a *C* if you

\*This statement was edited by K. F. Johnson for the 1975 survey but it remained equivalent in substance.

evaluate the accomplishment as only *average* or *fair*; a *D* if it seems to you *poor*; and an *E* if you feel that a particular state for a given criterion has achieved *no* or only an *insignificant* development. In the row and column indicated for "your familiarity level" (separated by double lines), will you place a *G* if you have *great* familiarity with the particular country or criterion, an *M* if you have *moderate* familiarity with it, and an *L* if you have *little* familiarity with it. You may find it more convenient to fill in the bulk of the sheet by columns, i.e. one country at a time, rather than by rows (one criteria at a time). Remember: please FILL IN ALL CELLS, and ON NOVEMBER 20.

The evaluations should not require more than an hour or so, and having your judgments to add to the composite expertise of all involved will greatly increase the value of the whole. I do hope you can be among the respondents.

With my regards and thanks, I am,

Sincerely,

Russell H. Fitzgibbon

Enclosure: Statement on Criteria of Latin American Democracy

### CRITERIA OF LATIN AMERICAN DEMOCRACY<sup>21</sup>.

In formulating these criteria I have endeavored to get at what seemed to me to be the basic elements contributing to the presence or absence of political democracy, and the degree of it, in each Latin American state. Some phenomena strike me as results rather than causes: thus, if a country substitutes revolutions for elections it is probably not in itself an inherent cause of the lack of democracy but the result of the relatively low standing with regard to points 7 and 12 below. The criteria relate to several factors in addition to the usually cited freedom of elections, free speech, freedom of party organization, etc. This broader approach was used because I felt that a number of underlying considerations existed which fundamentally conditioned the character of democracy in a given state. I believe that the degree and kind of democracy a Latin American state has is the product not exclusively of surface factors and manifestations, important as those sometimes are, but also of certain more fundamental phenomena which may not even be commonly or popularly associated with democracy.

I have weighted these, in a relatively simple fashion (a scale of one-half to two points), since it seemed obvious that certain criteria are more to the point and more important as measures of democracy than are others. The weighting is in parentheses.

These points, it should be emphasized, are consciously designed with Latin America in mind. If a yardstick were being applied, say, to Switzerland, Sweden, Britain, Canada, and the United States, it is entirely likely that some of these criteria would not even suggest themselves, although others would perhaps be included as a matter of course. Hence, with this list tailored for Latin America, those twenty states might come relatively higher up the scale than would otherwise be the case.

It is almost impossible to say whether the yardstick of these criteria should be applied to any given country strictly as of today or with a period of a few months, a few years, or a generation in mind. In my own thinking I have frankly compromised on this point. It is readily apparent, of course, that profound changes in certain points might occur almost overnight; under a dictator a certain country might possess almost no freedom of speech but a week later, with the dictator overthrown, seemingly complete freedom of speech might prevail.

I have attempted the difficult job of arranging the points, not by their weighting, but in some logical order. Thus, the first four would seem to be basic and almost unconscious social, economic, and psychological factors; the sixth to ninth inclusive are by-products of a reasonably advanced stage of political development and in themselves are contributors to or measures of democracy; the tenth to the thirteenth inclusive represent political attitudes on various matters, attitudes that are the result of an advanced stage of development; the last two are perhaps technical or mechanical consequences of political maturity. In this fashion I have tried to arrange these points in a logical progression from a very elementary plane to an advanced and mature level.

1. (Weighting: 1)<sup>22</sup> An *educational level* sufficient to give the political processes some substance and vitality.

This is similar to but not identical with the comparative standing with regard to literacy. Unless a fairly large fraction of a population can read and write it cannot have much political impact. Beyond the mere matter of reading and writing, however, this criterion implies some formal education (perhaps slight and almost incidental) pointing towards recognition of the state, the government, and other political elements.

2. (1) A fairly adequate *standard of living* and reasonably well-balanced economic life.

<sup>21</sup> Because weighting of items did not much affect the computations, it has been dropped in presentation of data in the foregoing Appendixes.

<sup>22</sup> See note 21.



This, also, is a foundational criterion. If it appears to fall primarily in the economic sphere, it at least has a conditioning relationship to politics. It is scarcely conceivable that a country that is extremely backward economically could have achieved much political progress.

3. (1) *A sense of internal unity and national cohesion.*

This, to a degree, is an outgrowth of the preceding two points. Unless the population of a state feels that it does have some political interests in common and is convinced that it constitutes, from the ethnic and psychological viewpoints, a nation, there is not much basis for the development of political democracy. At this point, and in regard to the following criterion, the factor of the proportion of Indian population inevitably enters. It may seem unfair to "penalize" a country in this way simply because it has a large fraction of Indian blood, but it seems beyond argument that our modern political democracy, which is essentially an outgrowth of Western European civilization, bears a direct relationship to the ethnic composition of a population. Scientifically, it is no reflection at all, of course, upon a particular population, whatever may be its racial makeup.

4. (1) *Belief by the people in their political dignity and maturity.*

This, too, brings in the ethnic factor. The average unassimilated Indian probably has a high sense of personal dignity but not much consciousness of political maturity as we understand the term. Unless a people feels, consciously or unconsciously that it is capable of guiding its own political destinies it is probably poor soil for democracy.

5. (1) *Absence of foreign domination.*

If a particular state is overshadowed — politically, economically, or psychologically — by some foreign power (non-Latin American or Latin American) it probably furnishes a poorer culture for the growth of political democracy if only by reason of the sense of frustration it must feel. Obviously the application of this point, as with others, must be relative.

6. (1-1/2) *Freedom of the press, speech, assembly, radio, etc.*

This seems to be a more important point, even if admittedly a surface manifestation. Unless a population has free opportunity to shape and express its political views, their nature and functioning must necessarily be strained and artificial. The point is meant to include all means of free expression of political views without restraint or intimidation of any sort, and also free access to information.

7. (2) *Free elections — honestly counted votes.*

This criterion appears to be the most important of all. If a country's balloting is free and honest and if the results are recognized and respected, it implies a great deal in other directions. It is based on the preceding point, of course; it suggests liberty of campaigning for office; it implies willingness to allow an elected official to serve out his term; it means ballots in place of bullets.

8. (1-1/2) *Freedom of party organization; genuine and effective party opposition in the legislature; legislative scrutiny of the executive branch.*

This is obviously closely related to the preceding two points. Political parties are natural accompaniments of demo-

cratic processes. If they have free play in campaigning and if they are allowed a genuine and free part in the legislative discussion and function between elections, a country is doubtless the more democratic thereby.

9. (1) *An independent judiciary — respect for its decisions.*

The protection of the rights of minorities is a very basic part of the democratic concept and it is not only in the United States that the judiciary can serve that purpose. If a particular Latin American judiciary had the courage of its convictions and "calls the shots as it sees them," free of executive domination and with actions dignified and founded on law, it is doubtless an indication of democracy; the necessary corollary is reliance by the people and the political leaders on judicial processes rather than arbitrary executive or legislative action or military force.

10. (1) *Public awareness of the collection and expenditure of governmental funds.*

To the extent that the bulk of the people are aware and jealous (in a good sense) of the control of the money bags and to some degree believe, consciously or unconsciously, that "public office is a public trust" democracy probably is advanced. Wholesale graft does not need to be completely eliminated by attempted legislative fiat; what is more important is a general public consciousness of the problem of fiscal rectitude.

11. (1) *Intelligent attitude toward social legislation — the vitality of such legislation as applied.*

This might suggest social rather than political democracy, but since the approach is a political function, it probably fits in here. By "intelligent" is meant an attitude that prefers designing social programs to fit the needs of the particular population and is not satisfied with the wholesale lifting of a code of social legislation from New Zealand or Denmark or some other alien environment. It is relatively meaningless, too, as long as the code is merely written in beautiful rhetoric in the constitution or the statutes; how seriously, effectively, and generally is it applied?

12. (1-1/2) *Civilian supremacy over the military.*

This does not mean simply an abandonment of what the first Roosevelt called "the insurrectionary habit"; that is result rather than cause. If a Latin American country's military establishment is kept within due bounds and, more importantly, is recognized, by itself and the general public, as subordinate to the civil establishment of the state it is a long step toward a democratic development. Responsible, democratic government would have very great difficulty in the face of a dominant, irresponsible, and capricious military arm.

13. (1/2) *Reasonable freedom of political life from the impact of ecclesiastical controls.*

By this it is not meant that there should be no Church-state issue; that is probably a legitimate political question in any country, especially in a Latin American country. But if the Church is permitted unduly to control and restrain political discussion, particularly with regard to its own position and freedom, democracy is probably retarded thereby. The problem has lost much of the importance it had seventy-five years ago, however.

14. (1) Attitude toward and development of technical and scientific *governmental administration*.

At first glance this might seem rather remote from political democracy, but it would seem that a state that has a professionalized and well-trained civil service in which it has confidence and to which it gives protection is thereby better pointed toward democracy. An erratic and undemocratic spoils system is less likely.

15. (1) Intelligent and sympathetic administration of whatever *local self-government* prevails.

This point depends more on the character and reception of local self-government than on the amount of it, especially as most of the Latin American states have unitary governments and much of the political consciousness and expression is on a national rather than a local plane.

## APPENDIX I<sup>23</sup> RESPONDENTS TO THE FITZGIBBON SURVEYS, 1945-70

In the first two surveys ten persons participated each time; in the third survey, twenty, in the fourth, forty; and in the last one fifty. The list below identifies by superscript numbers the respective surveys participated in by each person: Robert J. Alexander<sup>4-5</sup> (Rutgers), Marvin Alisky<sup>4-5</sup> (Arizona State), Samuel F. Bemis<sup>1-2</sup> (Yale), George I. Blanksten<sup>2-5</sup> (Northwestern), Spruille Braden<sup>4-5</sup> (former Assistant Secretary of State), Frank R. Brandenburg<sup>4-5</sup> (Committee for Economic Development), Ben Burnett<sup>5</sup> (Whittier), James L. Busey<sup>4-5</sup> (Colorado), Ronald H. Chilcote<sup>5</sup> (California, Riverside), Howard Cline<sup>4-5</sup> (Director, Hispanic Foundation, Library of Congress), George G. Daniels<sup>5</sup> (*Time*) Harold E. Davis<sup>3-5</sup> (American), John C. Dreier<sup>5</sup> (Hopkins), Jules Dubois<sup>3-5</sup> (*Chicago Tribune*), Alex T. Edelmann<sup>5</sup> (Nebraska), Charles G. Fenwick<sup>5</sup> (former Director, Department of International Law and Organization, Pan American Union), Russell H. Fitzgibbon<sup>1-5</sup> (University of California, Santa Barbara), William Forbis<sup>4</sup> (*Time*), Jesús de Galíndez<sup>2</sup> (Columbia), Federico G. Gil<sup>4-5</sup> (North Carolina), Rosendo Gomez<sup>4-5</sup> (Arizona), Stephen S. Goodspeed<sup>3-5</sup> (California, Santa Barbara), Frances R. Grant<sup>5</sup> (Secretary General, Inter-American Association for Democracy and Freedom), Paul E. Hadley<sup>4-5</sup> (Southern California), Robert M. Hallett<sup>3</sup> (*Christian Science Monitor*), Simon G. Hanson<sup>5</sup> (*Inter-American Economic Affairs*), Clarence H. Haring<sup>1</sup> (Harvard), Robert D. Hayton<sup>5</sup> (Hunter), Hubert C. Herring<sup>1-5</sup> (Claremont Graduate School), Henry F. Holland<sup>4</sup> (former Assistant Secretary of State), Preston E. James<sup>4-5</sup> (Syracuse), Bertram B. Johansson<sup>4-5</sup> (*Christian Science Monitor*), Kenneth F. Johnson<sup>5</sup> (Colorado State), Miguel Jorrín<sup>3-5</sup> (New Mexico), Harry Kantor<sup>3-5</sup> (Florida), Merle Kling<sup>4-5</sup> (Washington, St. Louis), Leo B. Lott<sup>4-5</sup> (Ohio State), Austin F. Macdonald<sup>1-4</sup> (California, Berkeley), William Manger<sup>4-5</sup> (former Assistant Secretary General, Organization of American States), John D. Martz<sup>5</sup> (North Carolina), Herbert L. Matthews<sup>4-5</sup> (*New York Times*), J. Lloyd Mecham<sup>1-5</sup> (Texas), Edward G. Miller, Jr.<sup>4-5</sup> (former Assistant Secretary of State), Dana G. Munro<sup>1-5</sup>

(Princeton), Harry B. Murkland<sup>3-4</sup> (*Newsweek*), Martin C. Needler<sup>5</sup> (Michigan), L. Vincent Padgett<sup>4-5</sup> (San Diego State), C. Neale Ronning<sup>5</sup> (Tulane), William L. Schurz<sup>3-4</sup> (American Institute of Foreign Trade), Robert E. Scott<sup>3-5</sup> (Illinois), K. H. Silvert<sup>4-5</sup> (Dartmouth), James H. Stebbins<sup>4</sup> (former Executive Vice President, W. R. Grace and Company), William S. Stokes<sup>1-5</sup> (Claremont Men's), Graham H. Stuart<sup>1-2</sup> (Stanford), Tad Szulc<sup>5</sup> (*New York Times*), Philip B. Taylor, Jr.<sup>3-5</sup> (Hopkins), Edward Tomlinson<sup>5</sup> (*Reader's Digest*), Martin B. Travis, Jr.<sup>3-5</sup> (State University of New York), Henry Wells<sup>5</sup> (Pennsylvania), Arthur P. Whitaker<sup>1-5</sup> (Pennsylvania), A. Curtis Wilgus<sup>4-5</sup> (Florida).

The following is a list of the respondents who participated in the 1970 survey, identified as Latin Americans and North Americans.

*Latin Americans* (teachers, students, politicians, community leaders)

*Mexico:* Lic. José Antonio Bravo G. (Escuela Libre de Derecho), Arturo Manuel Hernández Díaz (Filosofía y Letras, UNAM), Lic. Héctor Mauricio Chavira R. (Partido Acción Nacional), Father Porfirio Miranda (Facultad de Derecho, UNAM), Lic. Raúl González Schmal (Universidad Iberoamericana and Partido Acción Nacional), Lic. Humberto José Romo (Banco de México and Partido Revolucionario Institucional), Dra. María Teresa de M. y Campos (Facultad de Historia, UNAM), Lic. Graciela Corro C. (Escuela de Periodismo "Carlos Septien García"), Jaime González Mora, (journalist for *El Sol de México*), Lic. Manuel de la Isla Paulín, (journalist for *Por Qué* et al).

*Venezuela:* Dr. Enrique Betancourt y Galíndez (deputy in the national congress for the Unión Republicana Democrática), Dr. Said Moanack (deputy in the national congress for the Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo), Dr. Marino Pérez Durán (Escuela de Derecho, Universidad Católica Andrés Bello), Dr. Humberto Hernández Calimán (economista with FUNDACOMUN, Fundación Para el Desarrollo de la Comunidad y Fomento Municipal), Dr. Demetrio Boesner (journalist and professor Facultad de Economía, Universidad Central de Venezuela, Caracas), Dr. Marco A. Crespo (FUNDACOMUN), Dr. Alvaro Mejías (FUNDACOMUN), Dr. José Lorenzo Pérez (professor Facultad de Sociología, Universidad Central de

<sup>23</sup> Responses were treated as additive and were aggregated. No special weight was given to the responses of persons claiming to have, or presumed to have, a greater familiarity with given countries or with individual substantive evaluative criteria.

Venezuela and deputy in the national congress for the Movimiento Electoral del Pueblo).

*Argentina:* Horacio Daniel Rodríguez (journalist, editor of *Mundo Nuevo*), Gregorio Selser (journalist, staff writer *La Prensa*, well known author of books highly critical of United States foreign policy), Dr. Pedro David (Executive Director Instituto Internacional de Sociología, Buenos Aires), Dr. José Angel Martelliti (Director, Sala de Situaciones del Poder Ejecutivo Argentino), Lic. Oscar F. Risso (Comisión de Intercambio Educativo entre Argentina y EE.UU.), Jorge Selser (journalist, former leader of Partido Socialista Argentino), Dr. Horacio Pietranera (CONASE, Consejo Nacional de Seguridad), Lic. Milca M. de Cañadas (Comisión de Intercambio Educativo Entre Argentina y EE.UU.), Lic. Carlos Semino (Facultad de Economía, Universidad de Buenos Aires), Lic. María Mercedes Fuentes (Instituto de Ciencia Política, Universidad del Salvador, Buenos Aires).

*Note:* The above selection of Latin American respondents depended exclusively upon the good will established by the junior author with key individuals in the three countries. Both authors sought repeatedly to secure funding for a more representative hemispheric sample. The above choices were governed by the desire to sample in a fair and well balanced manner the *competent* political ideologues in the three countries involved. Nevertheless, a major factor in the ultimate listing of participants was the individual's willingness to be identified publicly as a respondent, a most sensitive requirement as will be appreciated by scholars who regularly do field work in Latin America. In the light of the paucity of financial resources with which we worked it is felt that the sampling was most adequate. It is also worth pointing out that original lists had to be revised at several points because of persons who "changed their minds" and decided they were "incompetent" to answer. Privately most of these admitted that they were afraid the project might be another Camelot or worse. The behavioral contrasts were often striking, however, for the Argentine writer Gregorio Selser answered freely and wrote

Prof. Johnson a signed letter evaluating the method (Selser is the author of a widely circulated book exposing the Camelot scandal); the rector of the Venezuelan Andrés Bello University (who was decidedly moderate in his attitudes toward the United States and who personally promised Prof. Johnson he would answer the questionnaire) ultimately pleaded "incompetence" despite his training as a contemporary historical scholar. The same plea was given by a history professor at the Argentine Universidad del Salvador. It is clear that the legacy of Camelot continues to impede attitudinal research by North American scholars in Latin America.

*U.S.:* (identified institutionally without disciplinary ties). R. A. Gomez (Arizona), George Blanksten (Northwestern), Federico Gil (North Carolina), Dana Munro (Princeton), K. H. Silvert (Ford Foundation), Harry Kantor (Marquette), Stephen Goodspeed (Uni. California Santa Barbara), Howard Wiarda (Massachusetts), Harold Davis (American University), Alexander Edelman (Nebraska), Philip Taylor (Houston), Preston James (Syracuse), John Dreier (Johns Hopkins), J. L. Mecham (Texas), Peter G. Snow (Iowa), Ben Burnett (Whittier), Richard Craig (Kent State), Robert Tomasek (Kansas), William Manger (Georgetown), Robert Scott (Illinois), Edward Williams (Arizona), Julio Fernandez (Colorado), Merle Kling (Washington, St. Louis), Robert Alexander (Rutgers), Kenneth Johnson (Uni. Missouri St. Louis), Marvin Alisky (Arizona State), John Martz (North Carolina), Martin Needler (New Mexico), A. C. Wilgus (Miami of Florida), Jack Gabbert (Washington State), Leo Lott (Montana), Paul Hadley (USC), Russell Fitzgibbon (UCSB), Charles Anderson (Wisconsin), James Busey (Colorado), Jorge Nef (UCSB), Israel Carmona (USC)

*Note:* The U.S. respondents were selected with an eye to balancing senior scholars with junior scholars, and with the intention of drawing upon a range of specializations covering all of Latin America.

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